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ABSTRACT 
 
In the early part of the 21st century, decisions not to defend parts of the coastline 
of England and Wales, with homes expected to be lost uncompensated, were 
contentious. Academic literature encourages further consideration of how people 
in such locations organise themselves to influence policy, and the function of 
social class in this regard. This study suggests that there are limits to the 
influence that can be exerted on policy in this way, and that larger, better-
resourced and better-socially-connected communities are more inclined and able 
to organise as effective action groups. However, limits to influence are also due 
to deliberative structures and processes that can marginalise local concerns and 
representations. The subject is approached through literature review and three 
case studies of policy setting and collective action – two at local level, for 
purposes of comparison, and one of a national lobby group and its engagement 
with central government. At local level, differences in approaches taken to the 
formation of coalitions with institutions and other groups are particularly evident. 
Sustained collective action can result in influence; however, local concerns are 
not always articulated publicly, and do not always result in collective action. The 
business of grassroots action falls typically to very few people with significant 
costs for them, and such arrangements can feed official concerns around 
representative legitimacy.  Overall, coastal planning exercises do not appear to 
satisfy the main tenet of ‘localism’ – that citizens should be given power over 
decisions that affect them. Many coastal communities may require support in 
order to participate effectively, and policy owners must avoid privileging the 
preferences of the ‘usual suspects’. This may not be sufficient, however, given 
contention over the orthodoxy that losses resulting from decisions not to defend 
are borne significantly by individuals. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This introductory chapter situates the author’s interest, identifies the research 
problem and the policy context, and establishes the broad geographical and 
temporal parameters for the study; articulates research questions and 
hypothesis, and identifies and critically examines key concepts; and, finally, sets 
out the structure of the thesis and the ways in which the hypothesis will be 
pursued. 
 
The research interest 
 
 
Predictions of sea level rise, and sea defence policies bringing the prospect of 
the abandonment of homes, were a cause of shock and anger to people living 
around the coast of England and Wales in the early 21st century. The researcher 
lived in one such location when, in 2007, his family and neighbours learned of a 
draft coastal management policy that potentially threatened the abandonment of 
the area to the sea in as little as 20 years. Residents were told they could expect 
their homes to be lost in the process, with no prospect of compensation as things 
stood.  
Many living in the area agreed that a collective response was required.  
A letter from the local authority had advised that if residents wanted to challenge 
the policy they should do so by showing that the decision making process was 
flawed or that, alternatively, a large consistent objection might initiate a 
discussion with the government.   Although very new to the area, when 
approached by anxious neighbours the researcher agreed to coordinate a 
campaign challenging the proposals. He read policy documents and academic 
studies, and gathered information from his neighbours.  What did they think of 
the recommendations, and the process of consultation?  What did they want to 
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see happen next?  People said they felt helpless in the face of what confronted 
them.  They feared financial ruin, and believed that negative effects would be felt 
as soon as the recommendation, as it stood, became policy.  People reported 
anxiety, sleeplessness and feelings of hopelessness. Some sought medical help. 
A petition was launched, and politicians were lobbied.  Coalitions were 
made with rural and environmental campaign groups, the local press was 
involved, and legal advice sought.  Residents also became increasingly 
conscious of the efforts of officers from their local authority: council engineers 
provided information and suggested others from whom they might seek advice, 
resulting in contact with a campaigner on the issue from north Norfolk which 
revealed that the same problem had descended on people in coastal settlements 
all around the coast of England and Wales.  
The resulting consultation response proposed that managed realignment 
be deferred to the longer term, and improvements made to defences. Residents 
explained that they were unimpressed that they had not been fully involved as 
participants in the policy development process from its early stages. Almost 
without exception, they were disappointed with the way in which consultation had 
taken place, with a representative view being that ‘minds seem to be already 
made up and my view does not count’.  The consultation process, they argued, 
bred mistrust and encouraged the belief that ulterior motives were at play.   
Representation on this issue was concerted, voluminous and came from 
many quarters: residents both individually and collectively, the local MP, the local 
authority, an environmental NGO, and the petition – supported by extensive local 
and regional press coverage.   
The policy was changed to one of continuing to defend into the longer 
term – a minimum of 50 rather than 100 years. Not long afterwards a sea 
defence scheme provided limited additional protection for some properties.  
However, on a neighbouring stretch of coastline, with a similar draft policy 
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proposal also threatening the longevity of residential properties located there, 
there was very little recorded response to the consultation and the policy was 
ratified without amendment. The researcher wondered why this should be, noting 
in his own case that whilst many had been happy to help with tasks such as 
seeking signatures for petitions, the task of developing the case against the 
proposal and dealing with the various parties whose support had been sought 
had fallen in the main to him.  Why should this have been? It had struck him as 
strange, for example, that of his many retired neighbours, keen to see the 
proposal changed, none could be persuaded to commit a couple of hours to 
presenting the petition to the Leader of the local council – in the end, his wife had 
agreed to take time off work and do it herself. What, he wondered, were the 
implications of such reticence in terms of sound decisions being made, and 
might a similar reticence explain the lack of response to proposals in the 
neighbouring settlement?  
 
Background 
 
 
In the early years of the 21st century, the UK government stressed the 
importance of working in ‘partnership’ with communities in England and Wales in 
seeking just outcomes to policies not to defend some coastal areas from the sea 
in the longer term.  
Whilst government acknowledged that some communities would need 
support in contributing to policy decisions, a critical reading of policy statements 
and relevant academic literature suggests dissonance between government 
prescription as stated and the experiences of citizens in terms of their attitudes 
towards coastal change, their propensity and willingness to make representation 
through collective action, and in their experience of engagement with authority in 
this context. 
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The aims of this thesis are to contribute to a critical understanding of the 
experiences of people living in coastal locations at risk of coastal erosion in 
trying to influence sea defence policy, and to discussions around government 
policy and practice.  In so doing, it pursues the premise that socio-economic 
characteristics, population size, and wider political and social context can be key 
determinants in the willingness and ability of coastal communities to organize 
and influence relevant decisions.  
The thesis explores both whether larger, well-resourced and better-
connected communities are more able than less well-resourced communities to 
organize as community action groups, form alliances and influence policy 
decisions; and how socio-economic circumstance informs individuals’ willingness 
and ability to contribute to such efforts.  Three broad research questions are 
posed to this end: 
 
• How successfully do authorities’ community participation practices 
accommodate people’s differing needs and concerns?  
 
• To what extent do social, cultural, and economic factors inform the 
abilities and appetites of people in locations at risk to take action to 
influence decision-making processes? 
 
• How do community action group representatives experience activism in 
this context, and what are the implications of this for their effectiveness? 
 
Concerned both geographically and in policy terms with England and 
Wales, the study covers a period of approximately 13 years (1999-2012), 
encompassing what O’Riordan et al (2006) describe as a paradigm shift in 
coastal policy away from a stated disposition to defend to one favouring a 
changing coast, and preference for ‘adaptation’, and the consolidation of the 
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concept of ‘climate change adaptation’. This period also coincides with a UK 
policy interest in ‘localism’, predicated on concerns around public disillusionment 
with extant political processes, and designed to devolve political power to 
communities and citizens.  
 
From sea defence to Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management 
 
 
Portman et al (2012) describe the UK coast as playing an important role in the 
country‘s history, culture and economy. However, they also identify flooding and 
erosion as major threats to coastal communities and the country‘s economy. 
As a consequence of policy decisions resulting from the second round of Shoreline 
Management Plans (SMP)1 in England and Wales, the issue of coastal flooding and 
sea defence policy has proven contentious. Whilst the UK government argues that 
coastal erosion and flooding are not new phenomena (DEFRA/EA, 2011: 6), it 
acknowledges that flood and coastal erosion risk is expected to increase due to 
climate change and development in areas at risk (DEFRA/EA, 2011: iii). As such, 
coastal erosion and flooding, and its implications for some coastal dwellers, has 
become one of the most visible iterations in the UK of climate change and its effects.   
 
1
 SMPs are ‘non-statutory, high level planning documents that provide a ‘route map’ for managing 
coastal flooding and erosion risks. They provide the latest information on coastal changes, 
including social, economic and environmental data and balance these to set sustainable sea 
flooding and erosion risk management policies for the future’ (EA, 2010; p.79). Plans ‘set out the 
approach to achieve long term balanced sustainability of sea flooding and coastal risk 
management for a specific stretch of coast’ with the aim of providing ‘the basis for sustainable 
shoreline management policies over the next 100 years within a natural process unit…’ (EA, 2010: 
80). 
 
Policy options for each SMP – divided into ‘policy units’ - are broken down into three time epochs – 
the short term (0-20 years), the medium term (20-50 years), and the long term (50 to 100 years). In 
terms of defence options, four possibilities are identified: 
 
• Hold the line – maintain or upgrade the level of protection provided by defences 
 
• Advance the line – build new defences seaward of the existing defence line 
 
• Managed retreat – allow retreat of the shoreline with management to control or limit 
movement, and 
 
• No active intervention – a decision not to invest in providing or maintaining defences. 
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Projections of sea level rise inform the 22 SMPs covering the 6,000 
kilometres of coastline in England and Wales (DEFRA, 2003). UKCP09 (2012a) 
forecasts for both London and Cardiff predict that sea level rise (SLR) between 
the period 1990 and 2095 will fall in the range between 37.3cm and 53.1cm. 
However, uncertainties are attributed to a lack of knowledge with regard to the 
rate at which polar ice caps melt, although UKCP09 makes the judgement that 
the associated ‘high impact’ range of  projections (SLR H++) are unlikely to be 
realised in the 21st century (UKCP09b). 
DEFRA makes explicit government’s position that it will defend the coast 
only where it is sustainable to do so, and that it does not plan to compensate 
individuals for any loss of property – sea defence being a permissive power 
under the 1949 Coast Protection Act (HMSO, 1949).  Whilst for the vast majority 
of people the SMP process has resulted in confirmation that they will be 
defended from the sea indefinitely, others have learned that as a consequence of 
unfavourable cost benefit analysis calculations (DEFRA, 2009d) defences are 
likely to be abandoned at some point – and their homes with them (DEFRA, 
2009b: 7). 
This has proven contentious.  A 2009 analysis of national adaptation 
strategies in European countries, referring to the UK, states that: 
 
The debate about the extent to which sea defences should be strengthened or 
‘managed realignment’ planned for has been very controversial in some places 
(Swart et al, 2009: 266).  
 
 
This was subsequently echoed by The Parliamentary Office of Science 
and Technology (POST), which highlighted friction between government policy 
and local communities, observing that: 
 
In places where the perceived threat to property and community vitality is high, 
community action groups have formed to seek policy change or compensation 
for loss (2010: 4). 
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More specifically, many respondents to DEFRA’s Consultation on 
Coastal Change Policy (DEFRA, 2009b) observed that government support for 
communities identified as being at risk would be appropriate on the basis that 
coastal erosion is exacerbated by man-made climate change (DEFRA, 2010b: 
8), with a number arguing for compensation for loss of property. None of the 15 
individuals and community groups responding felt that the proposed assistance 
package (assistance with moving to a new home of up to £1,000 and the costs of 
demolishing property) was set at the right level (DEFRA, 2010b: 9).  O’Riordan et 
al (2006) offer the explanation for conflict that: 
 
 …despite the long-held political and legal position that coastal defence is a 
discretionary responsibility for central and local government and the various 
responsible executive agencies, local residents and businesses have come to 
expect that ‘hold the line’ is a feasible and preferred option (2006: 11).   
 
 
This view, they argue, is challenged by the fact that coastal management 
policy and practice in England and Wales were going through ‘a revolution’. 
Whereas pre-2004 a presumption to defend the coast held sway, O’Riordan et al 
(2006) point to a new orthodoxy favouring coastal change (with the identified 
ramifications) rather than blanket defence, with decision-making in the gift of 
central government rather than local authorities (see Table 1). Government has 
itself described this approach as a shift from a flood defence doctrine to a policy 
framework of flood and coastal erosion risk management (FCERM) [DEFRA/EA, 
2008]. The emphasis, it says, is no longer on defending against floods but rather 
on: 
 
…actions that can be taken to manage these risks and reduce the impacts on 
communities (DEFRA/EA, 2011: 1). 
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Table 1: From flood defence to Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management 
(FCERM) 
  
Pre 2004 Post 2004 
• Hold the line 
 
• Modest managed 
realignment 
 
• Use of cost-benefit 
analysis and points 
scoring system for 
project justification 
 
• Local authority 
autonomy over coastal 
protection and planning 
 
• Modest use of SMPs, 
with a general attempt 
to maintain the status 
quo 
• Change the coast unless ‘hold 
the line’ is unavoidable, or 
change is politically 
unacceptable 
 
• Make space for water and 
sediment 
 
• Adaptation is introduced 
 
• Cost-benefit analysis, risk 
criteria in multi-criteria analysis 
and points scoring much more 
important as guides to project 
management 
 
• Local authorities possibly in a 
weaker role 
 
Source: Adapted from O’Riordan et al (2006: 19)  
 
Adapting to change  
 
 
A key concept in FCERM is that of ‘adaptation’. Smit and Wandel (2006) suggest 
that whilst there are numerous definitions to be found in the literature on climate 
change, they are mostly variations on a theme:  
 
Adaptation in the context of human dimensions of global change usually refers to 
a process, action or outcome (system, household, community, group, sector, 
region, country) in order for the system to better cope with, manage or adjust to 
some changing condition, hazard, risk or opportunity (2006: 282). 
 
 
In rich countries, the United Nations (UN 2007) suggests, coping with 
climate change to date has largely been a matter of adjusting thermometers, 
dealing with longer hotter summers, and observing seasonal shifts.  As sea 
levels rise, it observes:  
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Cities like London and Los Angeles may face flooding risks…but their inhabitants 
are protected by elaborate flood defence systems (2007: 9). 
 
However, the UN also observes that even those in the richest countries 
can be vulnerable, and that this is exacerbated when ‘impacts interact with 
institutionalized inequality’ (2007: 16).   
Swart et al stress (2009) that national climate change adaptation 
strategies in Europe will always involve a mixture of approaches which it 
classifies broadly as: 
 
• Living with risks/bearing losses - an approach that accepts that certain 
systems, behaviours and activities can no longer be sustained,  
 
• Preventing effects/reducing exposures - illustrated by the practice of 
implementing technical solutions, such as sea defences, and 
 
• Sharing responsibility – an approach which implies sharing the 
responsibility for financial and social losses or exposure to risk with 
insurances.  
 
The authors assert that different emphases can be noted between 
countries in relation to how they deal with risk and make decisions about 
different adaptation options2.  A comparison of national adaptation approaches is 
beyond the scope of this study; however, given the post-2004 UK orthodoxy of 
allowing areas of coast to be lost to the sea (and for homeowners largely to bear 
the costs of the loss of their homes) it is reasonable to argue that the UK has, to 
some extent at least, migrated from the second adaptation category of 
‘preventing effects/reducing exposures’ to one of ‘living with risks/bearing 
losses’, with those losses to be borne significantly by individuals. This position 
 
2
 In July 2008 the UK published its first national adaptation strategy, Adapting to Climate Change in 
England: A Framework for Action (DEFRA, 2008). 
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would appear to sit at some odds with Adger’s (2010) analysis that if human 
activities are indeed the cause of climate change, then adaptation must involve 
issues such as compensation and liability. 
By way of mitigation where homes are to be lost to the sea, the UK 
government (DEFRA, 2009b) states an intention to support communities in 
adapting to the physical, social and economic effects of change; with a long-term 
intention that adaptation to coastal change should be part of mainstream 
decision-making and funding.  Local authorities have recently trialled 
approaches: 
  
…which seek to support better informed communities able to shape decisions 
and innovative approaches to build local adaptation solutions (DEFRA, 2009b: 
20).3 
 
 
DEFRA-commissioned guidance for local authorities specific to this 
purpose – ‘Guidance for Community Adaptation Planning and Engagement 
(CAPE) on the Coast’ [DEFRA 2009c] - states that: 
…communities that are most at risk to coastal change (sic) must be informed, 
engaged, and empowered to take an active part in what happens locally (2009c: 
7). 
 
Just solutions, then, appear to be significantly contingent on the abilities 
and appetites of people in local settlements at risk to exert influence on decision-
making processes, consistent with a pluralist confidence that competitive politics 
will produce more satisfactory outcomes.  Government (DEFRA, 2009c) 
acknowledges that this requires the building of ‘adaptive capacity’ and making 
good use of communities’ knowledge and resources in helping find ‘new ways of 
solving complex problems’.   
 
3
 DEFRA/EA concludes that, because both flood and coastal erosion risk management and social 
justice are so multi-faceted, there can be no single model of social justice.  Instead, there should 
be a focus on ensuring that the range of social justice concerns is adequately accounted for in 
policy and practice.  (2008: 15) 
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In targeting those ‘most at risk’ for engagement, CAPE guidance 
methodology appears to have potential as a corrective to the dominant utilitarian 
model of cost benefit analysis adopted for decision-making on where, and for 
how long, to invest in sea defences4.  However, in its analysis of impacts on 
communities affected by coastal change it appears to conflate a community’s 
size with the extent of impact suffered.  By this logic few people affected would 
appear to indicate low impact, raising the possibility that smaller populations may 
be overlooked. Second, CAPE has it that extensive engagement might be 
recommended where consultation is characterised by ‘(potential or actual) high 
conflict, controversy and uncertainty about the problem’ although, again, this is 
‘most likely to affect many’ (2009c: 23). Thus, the guidance appears to assume 
an awareness and capacity on the part of affected communities that might inform 
coherent and powerful protest and subsequent involvement in policy deliberation. 
Both of these points warrant further consideration. 
 
Community empowerment and the shift towards Localism 
 
 
‘Empowerment’ of people and communities has been prominent in the policy 
narratives of early 21st century UK governments.  For New Labour, the 
Department for Communities and Local Government’s (DCLG) Communities in 
Control white paper (2008) acknowledged growing disenchantment with formal 
political mechanisms citing declining electoral turnout and political party 
membership and, locally, a majority who do not feel councillors represent their 
views.  In response, ‘empowerment’ has been described as: 
 
 …passing more and more political power to more and more people…away from 
existing centres of power into the hands of communities and individual citizens 
(DCLG, 2008: 2). 
 
 
4
 DEFRA/EA points to an appetite amongst policy makers for utility principles, resulting in inequality 
in outcomes.  As a consequence, the authors conclude: ‘the vulnerable are not generally seen as 
adequately accounted for…in decisions’ (2008: ii). 
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The Conservative Party too (the dominant partners in the 2010 UK 
Coalition government) [2010: 1] has sought to give people more power, equating 
growing unfairness with an expanding state and in pursuit of what its 2010 draft 
election manifesto called ‘the post-bureaucratic age’.  
Such rhetoric is consistent with a shift from what Held (1987) describes 
as elitist political theories, that see a relatively uncomplicated (if perhaps 
unsatisfying) relationship between individual citizen and elected leadership, to a 
‘pluralist’ analysis. Proponents of the latter are interested in what Held describes 
as the dynamics of group politics arguing that modern democratic politics see 
relationships between citizen and state mediated by groups such as community 
associations, religious bodies, trade unions and others which cut across people’s 
lives and connect them in complex ways to a variety of types of institution. 
 Through such arrangements, he tells us, pluralists argue that modern 
democratic politics are more competitive and consequently more satisfactory.  
In the context of coastal planning and development, DEFRA is 
responsible for developing national environmental policies, while the EA is 
responsible for the strategic coordination of FCERM. Conservation of natural 
habitats and biodiversity is the main role of Natural England, which collaborates 
with the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) in establishing and managing 
marine conservation zones. However, a tension between central and local 
prescription was created in that local authorities were given greater say in local 
planning and the implementation of flood risk management measures under the 
2011 Localism Act, with Statements of Community Involvement prescribing how 
communities should be involved in the making of such decisions (Portman et al, 
2012: 65). 
‘Community’ is a key word in policy considerations relevant to coastal 
change. For example, government’s current FCERM strategy (DEFRA/EA, 2011) 
yields around 70 such references in the main copy. These occur in a variety of 
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contexts - there are references to ‘community-level’ and ‘property level’ action, 
people, individuals, businesses, householders, community groups, 
representatives of communities at risk and community volunteers. However, 
these various ‘units’ of description tend to be subsumed under simple references 
to ‘community’ in discussions of policy deliberation and action. FCERM policy 
proposes that:  
 
The risk management authorities should work in partnership with communities to 
understand the community perspective of flooding and coastal erosion…and 
encourage them to have direct involvement in decision-making and risk 
management actions (DEFRA/EA, 2011: 14).  
 
 
Whilst perhaps understandable for purposes of readability, this 
statement raises questions such as whether government is right to assume 
single community perspectives, under what conditions local perspectives 
translate into an appetite for action, how such populations go about defending 
their interests and the resources available to them in this regard, and whether 
resulting interactions with government might justifiably be characterised as 
‘partnership’. 
‘Community’ is an elusive concept. Smith (2001) observes that the 
relevant literature has focused variously on geographical area, on groups of 
people living in a particular place, and on community as an ‘area of common life’. 
However, he cites Lee and Newby in pointing out that physical proximity does 
not necessarily mean that people share perspectives or even have much to do 
with each other, and Bott, who argues for the importance of social relationships 
in understanding ‘community’.  Associated with this, Blaug et al (2006) highlight a 
crisis of trust in government – that a politically disinterested public is hard to 
mobilise in pursuit of public services and that apathy and mistrust of government 
threaten a ‘legitimation deficit’. 
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 With regard to any realisation of the anticipated benefits of localism, 
Corry and Stoker observe that a ‘genuine transition to devolved and 
decentralised government’ is yet to be achieved and that ‘the centre still has a 
large hand hovering over the tiller’ (cited by Blaug et al [2006: 24]), whilst Amin 
sees the ‘discourse of community’ to be attended by unrealistic assumptions 
(cited by Blaug et al [2006: 29]). A Joseph Rowntree Foundation ‘round up’ of 
findings drawn largely from its Government and Public Services research 
programme (Foot, 2009) suggests conflicting views as to how far communities 
and citizens can exercise substantial influence over decisions about public 
services with the author proposing that involvement in such processes (and any 
benefits accruing) are not equally distributed. 
Whilst government acknowledges that some communities may need 
support in contributing to policy deliberation, the terms on which such support 
might be required or allocated are not made clear. Perhaps more fundamentally, 
it is worth asking whether any such requirement for support may preclude local 
people mounting the kind of action necessary to trigger the consideration of 
authorities in the first place. We might ask, therefore, whether engagement 
between citizens and government on the setting of coastal policy ameliorates 
social inequalities, as intended, or reproduces them.  
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Thesis structure 
 
Exploration of these issues, guided by the stated research questions, is explored 
via the following thesis structure: 
Table 2: Thesis structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Content summary 
1 Introduction Establishes the issue, policy context, key 
concepts, research aims and hypothesis, 
and research questions. 
2 Methodology Describes research approach, design and 
methods; discusses 
epistemology/ontology; and considers 
issues around rigour. 
3 The involvement of 
communities in UK coastal 
governance 
Reviews academic and policy literature, 
and establishes theoretical framework for 
further enquiry. 
4 The setting of local coastal 
policy 
Describes socio-economic and geographic 
features of local cases, explores the 
incorporation of local concerns in 
deliberative processes, and considers how 
findings might be applied to similar 
contexts. 
5 Mobilizing interest at local 
level 
Considers how people in local case 
studies mounted collective action in pursuit 
of influence, with reference to socio-
economic context. 
6 Mobilizing interest at 
national level 
Describes the formation of a national-level 
lobbying group and the nature of its 
engagement with government, and 
appraises the results. 
7 Experiences of activism Considers socio-economic differences in 
exploring the motivations, roles and 
experiences of action group 
representatives, and implications for 
effectiveness of collective action. 
8 Conclusion Explores the utility of different renderings 
of social class in analysis of the effects of 
socio-demographic factors on collective 
action, and implications for policy and 
practice. 
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Chapter 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This study seeks an understanding of the role of socio-economic profile, size and 
wider political and social context in determining the willingness and ability of 
people living in coastal locations identified as being at risk to organize and 
influence coastal planning and related adaptation decisions. It explores whether  
larger, well-resourced and better-connected communities are more able to 
organise as community action groups, form alliances and influence policy 
decisions; and how socio-economic circumstance informs individuals’ willingness 
and ability to contribute to such efforts.  These interests are pursued via three 
broad research questions: 
 
• How successfully do authorities’ community participation practices 
accommodate people’s differing needs and concerns?  
 
• To what extent do social, cultural, and economic factors inform the 
abilities and appetites of people in locations at risk to take action to 
influence decision-making processes? 
 
• How do community action group representatives experience activism in 
this context, and what are the implications of this for their effectiveness? 
 
A multiple case study approach is employed in considering the actions 
and experiences of people in distinctive contexts. Two – those of the setting of 
specific coastal policies and associated collective response on the Isle of 
Sheppey (Kent) [hitherto referred to as Sheppey] and at Selsey (west Sussex) – 
are undertaken for purposes of comparison.  A third, that of the National Voice of 
Coastal Communities (NVCC), explores collective grassroots efforts to influence 
policy at national level and, in so doing, extends consideration of action at local 
level (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: key study locations  
 
 
 
 
The study adopts an approach to inquiry that, in the conduct of applied 
qualitative research, seeks accommodation between the potentially distinctive 
ontologies of positivism and constructivism, and in terms of method favours the 
gathering and analysis of people’s stories in their broader social context.  Such 
an approach brings dilemmas that must be addressed if findings are to be 
defensible. Accordingly, this chapter both details and problematises research 
methods and approach, with a view to satisfying Seale’s imperative that: 
 
good practice... can be achieved through…showing the audience of research 
studies as much as is possible of the procedures that have led to a particular set 
of conclusions… (cited in Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 272).   
 
Particular attention is paid to issues of rigour as they apply to the 
researcher’s own experience of activism in the context studied. 
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Finally, this chapter makes a case for generalisation appropriate to the 
research approach employed, and useful in developing ‘thicker descriptions’5 of 
the involvement of communities in policy deliberation than those available 
hereafter in policy prescription and academic literature.   
 
Research approach 
 
 
The intended outcome of the study is a better understanding of how policy 
aspirations and actions are experienced and acted upon by people collectively, 
and the implications of this for the pursuit of just social outcomes.  Ritchie and 
Lewis (2003) observe that the study of the social world has always been 
attended by philosophical debates, with a key question concerning the existence 
of a ‘captive social reality’ and how it should be constructed.   
Positivism, associated with the ‘standard view’ of science, has 
researchers seeking consistent relationships between variables in pursuit of 
causal explanation of natural world phenomena (Robson, 2002). Central to this 
approach are the ideas that objective knowledge can be had through experience 
or observation, that this is best delivered through quantitative experimental 
research, that the neutrality of the researcher is essential and, importantly for our 
purposes, that these same principles apply to the social sciences (Snape and 
Spencer, 2003). 
However, tenets associated with positivism have been criticised from a 
number of philosophical standpoints. For example, the notion of the neutral 
researcher has been challenged, with the counter-argument offered that what 
observers see is determined by their own qualities as well as the characteristics of 
what is being observed. Critical researchers point to analysis generated via 
 
5
 The term ‘thick description’, commonly associated with  Geertz, can be traced to Ryle’s distinction 
between thinner and thicker descriptions of actions. Olson (1988) explains that ‘…description can 
be thickened by reflecting on purpose…by considering situation…We have to interpret activity to 
know it’ (1988: 3-4). 
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asymmetric power relationships between researchers and the researched.  
Interpretivist approaches, associated with qualitative methods, reject the natural 
science model with its emphasis on causal generalisation in favour of a focus on 
understanding and rich description (Snape and Spencer, 2003), with concerns 
expressed around the idea that replication of research exercises is appropriate in 
qualitative research, given the complexity and dynamism of social phenomena 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).  More fundamentally, interpretivist researchers have 
taken issue with the idea of an objectively knowable reality, suggesting instead 
that in human affairs meaning and knowledge are constructed by people located in 
specific social contexts, and are best revealed through methods such as interview 
and observation (Robson, 2002). 
A significantly, although not exclusively, interpretivist approach is 
compatible with the overriding aim of this study, which is to contribute to the 
understanding and resolution of a contemporary issue. Snape and Spencer (2003) 
argue that such applied research lends itself to qualitative inquiry which, they 
assert, is consistent with understanding context or process. Whilst there is no 
dispute with the idea of an external reality, or with a range of ‘materially’ 
established facts – for example, concerning issues of geography, socio-
demographic composition and decision-making processes – any interest in how 
people respond to the challenges presented by the policy process requires an 
understanding of their values, beliefs and experiences.    
Thus, the research approach taken is predicated on the interpretation of 
Snape and Spencer (2003) that: 
 
 …the social world does exist independently of individual subjective 
understanding, but…is only accessible to us via the respondents’ 
interpretations…we believe that the external reality is diverse and 
multifaceted…and our underlying aim is to apprehend and convey as full a 
picture as is possible of the nature of that multifaceted reality” (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2003: 19-20). 
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 This, in turn, might be bolstered critically by Plummer’s (1983) assertion 
that: 
 
…we must acknowledge that experiencing individuals can never be isolated from 
their functioning bodies and their constraining social worlds… (1983: 54). 
 
 
Research design  
 
The conceptual and theoretical framework for this study – drawing upon Tilly’s 
(1978) framework for the analysis of collective action and Bourdieu’s (1983) 
theory of capitals – posits a world inhabited by a plurality of motivated actors, 
exchanges between whom inform decisions and actions. An appraisal of the 
utility of these frameworks/theories is undertaken in Chapter 3; relevant to 
considerations of methodology, however, is that the research aims of the study 
and its theoretical approach are compatible in that they encourage what Yin 
(1994) – discussing the merits of the case study approach – describes as the 
investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context.  In other 
words, we are principally interested in the attitudes and experiences of actors 
within wider, dynamic institutional contexts, each populated by diverse interests, 
which makes a case study approach eminently suitable. 
Accordingly, a multiple case study approach is employed with a view to 
exploring, describing, comparing and even explaining the actions and 
experiences of people in distinctive contexts – informed by a review of secondary 
sources, and interviews with activists, politicians (operating at national, local and 
parish levels), local authority coastal engineers, relevant central government 
Executive Agency staff, and others with salient perspectives to offer.  
What constitutes a ‘case study’ has been subject to contest.  Whereas 
definitions have variously cited ‘individuals’, ‘organizations’, ‘processes’, 
‘programs’, ‘neighbourhoods’, ‘institutions’ and ‘events’ as major foci, Yin 
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considers the case study to be an approach that is not tied to a particular topic or 
unit of analysis, and does not favour any particular research method or type of 
evidence.  This places the approach in some contrast to others which, he 
suggests, are less suitable for capturing and making sense of the ‘messiness’ of 
human affairs as they unfold.   
However, Yin warns that questions that do not lead to the favouring of 
one unit of analysis over another are probably either too vague or too numerous; 
thus, a challenge lies in identifying discrete and comparable units when a guiding 
theoretical premise is that the actions of groups and the individuals that comprise 
them only make proper sense through interactions in the wider, and even 
societal, context.  Accordingly, at various times the study considers decision-
making systems as a whole, activities and trajectories of various interest groups 
and the relationships between them, and the experiences of sub-groups and 
individuals that comprise them (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Research questions and units of analysis – an approximation 
 
 
 
Research questions 
Units of analysis 
Micro Meso Macro 
 
1 
How successfully do authorities’ 
community participation practices 
accommodate people’s differing 
needs and concerns?  
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
2 
To what extent do social, cultural 
and economic factors inform the 
abilities and appetites of people in 
locations at risk to take action to 
influence decision-making 
processes? 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
3 
How do community action group 
representatives experience activism 
in this context, and what are the 
implications of this for their 
effectiveness? 
 
X 
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The cases 
 
Selection of the two local studies sought to follow Yin’s recommendation that, 
within multiple case studies, cases should be selected either because they 
predict similar results, or contrasting results but for predictable reasons.  
 
Table 4: Local case study sites – key contrasts and commonalities 
 
 Selsey Isle of Sheppey 
Population 
(approx.) 
12,000  40,300 
 
Ethnicity Predominantly white Predominantly white 
Educational 
achievement 
Poor Poor 
Industrial base Service sector 
 
Seasonal employment 
 
Distribution, hotels and 
catering 
 
Tourism 
 
Prisons 
Age profile Older population Age profile in line with 
England 
Indices of 
Deprivation 
Middling  Swale within most 
deprived 35% of local 
authorities. 11 of 
Borough’s 15 most 
deprived Super Output 
Areas on Sheppey. 
Housing tenure High levels of owner-
occupation 
High levels of owner-
occupation 
Extent and nature 
of public response 
to draft coastal 
policies 
Extensive, initially 
hostile, collective 
Sparse, hostile, 
individual. 
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Besides offering convenience (in terms of respondent access in the 
Selsey case, and physical proximity in the Sheppey case), these two cases were 
selected on the basis of the extent of known local response to what appeared to 
be a common issue – the predicted loss of homes under preferred coastal 
policies. With contrasting outcomes established, the task of the study became 
one of establishing the reasons.  Table 4 offers broad points of comparison with 
which to test this study’s broad proposition – that larger, well-resourced and 
better-connected communities are better able to organise as community action 
groups, gather the necessary resources, form alliances and influence policy 
decisions.  At first glance, Selsey appears to be less deprived and older, but not 
dissimilar to Sheppey in terms of its industrial and employment profile. However, 
it also appears to be significantly smaller in terms of population, and an obvious 
question concerns whether or not this fact confounds the part of the proposition 
concerning size. 
Selsey and Sheppey are distinct as units of analysis for at least some 
comparative purposes. First, the risk to homes under draft preferred policies in 
each case does not apply to all in the area under study: not all homes in Selsey 
were at risk, and in only two settlements on Sheppey did the draft SMP identify 
the likelihood of such a loss – at Leysdown and Warden, with a ward population 
of 3,019 (ONS, [no date]d), and Minster Cliffs with 7,513 (ONS, [no date]e). 
Testing of the central thesis as it concerns the size of communities makes 
comparisons between distinctive locales within each study, then, as well as 
comparing the case study areas themselves.  
On Sheppey, a problem arose in terms of determining a useful boundary 
to the study in that there appeared to be very little public response at all to the 
draft SMP – and certainly no grassroots collective action – that might be linked 
specifically to areas where homes were identified as being at risk. However, 
extending the case to include the island as a whole (whilst remaining mindful of 
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distinctive locales within it), and taking in recent action related to sea defences 
but not tied specifically to the setting of the SMP, proved enlightening in terms of 
understanding the public response.  
To conclude on the selection of the case study areas, whilst coastal 
plans relate ultimately to geographies, their settings involve actors operating 
within disparate institutional contexts, corresponding to distinctive geographies 
which can, themselves, be contentious and fluid.  We will see, for example, that 
in the Selsey case the geographical notion of a coastal ‘frontage’ as a unit of 
analysis for the setting of the Pagham to East Head CDS (EA et al, 2008) 
became a point of deliberative contention. Nor do the geographical areas 
covered by coastal planning efforts map neatly onto local authority or other 
administrative boundaries. Thus, whilst Selsey and Sheppey are doubtlessly 
problematic as geographically-bounded cases, they are arguably no more so 
than any alternatives.  Perhaps more important is that geography might usefully 
be seen as a starting point, with the locus of interest lying more usefully in 
interactions between interested actors in the relevant institutional settings. 
Whilst different from Selsey and Sheppey cases, the NVCC case can 
assist with a broader understanding of collective action across the whole. We will 
see, for example, that a key activist in the Selsey case was also heavily involved 
with NVCC as part of local collective action that extended beyond the local to 
addressing a grievance at national level. Similarly, another informant explains 
how national-level lobbying helped to bolster his credibility with others at local 
level.  There is no such involvement from the Sheppey case, and consideration 
of the difficulties NVCC experienced in recruiting local groups assists with an 
understanding of the influence of social, cultural and economic factors on 
collective action. Finally, the NVCC case offers distinctive evidence of the 
experiences of activists, not least in helping to both extend and triangulate those 
reported at local level.  
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Data gathering and analysis 
 
Data gathering was undertaken in two main phases: 
 
1. Literature review 
 
A review of academic and national-level policy literature, conducted using 
Internet and on-line academic library searches, covered: 
 
• Historical analysis of UK coastal defence and flood and coastal erosion 
risk management (FCERM) policies.   
 
• Critical appraisal of modes of governance, and as they relate to 
community engagement in general and to climate change adaptation and 
FCERM in particular.  
 
• Critical appraisal of the utility of Tilly’s (1978) framework for the analysis 
of collective action and Bourdieu’s (1983) theory of capitals for 
conceptualisation and explanation in this context.   
 
2. Case studies 
 
• Across the three cases a total of 17 formal interviews were undertaken, 
along with four annotated meetings on Sheppey (with an activist, a local 
authority officer, a parish councillor and a journalist) and one in Selsey 
(with an activist). These were augmented by two site visits each to 
Sheppey and Selsey.   
 
• Case specific literature review was also undertaken, covering policy 
documents, minutes of meetings and events, submissions made in 
consultation exercises, media reports, and other written commentaries by 
activists. Annotated participant observation took place at project 
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workshops, held on Sheppey, for the European Union-funded Coastal 
Communities 2150 research project6.  All annotations were recorded in 
the researcher’s journal, which also logged details of his own activism 
during the period 2007-13.  
 
The principal means of gathering primary data in each of the three cases, 
Robson (2002) describes the interview as a flexible, adaptable and direct way of 
finding things out and answering research questions. With two exceptions, 
interviews were held with individuals on their own. In the remaining two cases, 
an activist was interviewed with his wife, with her participation encouraged; and 
in the other, at their request, a group interview was held with Environment 
Agency (EA) officials.  
Data analysis was undertaken as two distinctive exercises: 
 
• Literature review saw critical reading aligned to systematic cross-
referencing of themes and actors, paying particular attention to issues of 
social justice and modes of governance – both generically and in relation 
specifically to coastal change at both national and local levels.  
 
• For case studies, data analysis saw the use of qualitative data analysis 
software in both theoretical and generative coding of themes – derived 
from close reading and annotation of verbatim interview transcripts and 
supporting documentation. Theoretical coding drew upon a priori 
concepts implicit in the theoretical framework for the study and derived 
from literature review, whilst ‘free’ codes reflected attention to cases, 
 
6
 Funded by INTERREG 2 Seas Programme and European Development Funds. Partners involved 
Environment Agency, Kent County Council, Alterra (Stichting DLO), Province West-Vlaaderen and 
Agency for Maritime and Coastal Services – Coastal Division (EA, 2013: 1)  
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respondent categories, narrative and discourse features, and emotional 
components (Bazeley, 2007). 
 
Overall, the analytical strategy saw mixed approaches applied to the 
development of pattern codes in service of a broadly phenomenological 
approach (Bazeley, 2007). 
 
Methodological issues 
 
 
To adopt an approach to inquiry that accommodates interpretivist orthodoxies is 
to inherit dilemmas that must be addressed if findings are to be defensible to 
mainstream audiences.  
Yin (1994) observes that the case study approach has traditionally been 
considered weak among social science methods, and is regarded as having 
insufficient precision, objectivity and rigour.  This demands that particular 
attention is paid to issues of reliability and validity, and especially with accounts 
that deviate from the positivist orthodoxies associated with the natural sciences, 
or the realist tradition within the social sciences. 
 
Reliability and validity 
 
According to Ritchie and Lewis (2003), reliability is: 
 
generally understood to concern the replicability of research findings and 
whether or not they would be repeated if another study, using the same or similar 
methods, was undertaken (2003: 270).  
 
Whilst this makes clear sense for research paradigms associated with 
controlled experiments, the authors raise the objections that for constructivists 
there is no single, discoverable reality to capture (let alone reproduce), and that 
the idea of replicability is further rendered naïve given the complexity and 
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context-specific nature of phenomena being studied.  Accordingly, their interest 
shifts to consideration of whether what is found within the original data would 
recur outside of the study population, with an associated consideration around 
whether the constructions placed on the data are rigorously derived.  
Ritchie and Lewis (2003) highlight:  
 
debate amongst qualitative researchers about the extent to which triangulation is 
useful in checking the validity of data or whether it is more a means of widening 
or deepening understanding of a subject through the combination of multiple 
readings (2003: 275). 
 
Snape and Spencer (2003) assert that, unlike the natural sciences, 
where the purpose is to produce law-like propositions, the aim in the social 
sciences is to understand subjectively meaningful experiences. Of the former, 
Robson (2002) proposes that: 
 …if we can explain, we can predict, and vice versa.  But in open systems…while 
the future cannot be predicted, the past can be explained by establishing the 
particular configuration which was in existence (2002: 41).  
 
Whilst predictive generalisation is beyond the scope of this study, 
exploring and explaining patterns within what has happened in the cases with a 
view to better understanding what may be happening in similar cases is a 
realistic aim. To this end, two distinctive forms of triangulation are employed in 
pursuit of a quality of understanding as advocated by Ritchie and Lewis (2003): 
triangulation of sources (comparing data from different qualitative methods such 
as observations, interviews and documented accounts); and theory triangulation 
(looking at data from different theoretical perspectives). 
With regard to validity in essentially constructivist research inquiry, 
Ritchie and Lewis suggest that the primary question concerns whether 
phenomena under study as perceived by the study population are reflected 
accurately. This, they propose, requires scrutiny of sample coverage with an eye 
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on bias and criteria for inclusion, and consideration of the environment in which 
data was gathered – in other words, whether interview questioning was 
sufficiently effective for participants to fully express/explore their views.  
 
Sampling strategy – selecting informants 
 
 
An original schema for the selection of informants for the local cases (Table 5) 
proved hard to achieve, for two main reasons. First, and perhaps most 
significant, is that the plan assumed a common degree of concern amongst local 
people across the two cases that, in the event, did not obviously materialise. On 
Sheppey, locating individuals associated with grass roots collective action was 
difficult: conversations with elected representatives, officials and others offered 
no encouragement that local groups of any kind had formed around the issue of 
houses at risk under SMP draft policies. The second issue was one of access to 
informants: whilst, in the Selsey case at least, it may have been possible to find 
local residents fitting the profiles described in terms of tenure and risk, in practice 
this proved difficult.  People had moved away from the area or even died, and as 
will become clear in the following chapters, many ceased to maintain an interest. 
The principal result of this was to render impractical any detailed examination of 
how housing tenure and perception of risk interacted to form attitudes, although 
this is partly mitigated as the subject arose in other testimonies. 
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Table 5:  Original informant scheme for local cases 
 
 Selsey Sheppey 
Policy officials   
 
  
Local political 
representatives 
  
 
  
Community allies   
 
  
Activists   
(heavily involved)   
(marginally/previously 
involved) 
  
Residents   
(Home owner – home 
at risk) 
  
(Home – home not at 
risk) 
  
(Renter – home at 
risk) 
  
(Renter – home not 
at risk) 
  
 
 
 
Accordingly, the idea of seeking testimony from residents uninvolved as 
activists was abandoned. However, a simplified scheme maintaining aspects of 
the original plan was developed (see Table 6) that sought to differentiate 
between, on the one hand, elected representatives at various levels, government 
officials at various levels, and activists (as interested members of the public). 
This, it was rationalised, broadly represented key groups of actors in terms of 
deliberative processes.  
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Table 6: Revised informant scheme for local cases  
 
 Selsey Sheppey 
Executive Agency officials 2  
   
Local authority coastal 
engineers with policy 
setting responsibilities 
1 1 
   
National political 
representatives 
 1 
   
Local authority councillors  2 
   
Town/parish councillors 
and officials 
2 2 
   
Activists 1 1 
 
 
As with the geographical framing of local cases, the fit between 
categories and actors proved to be less than watertight in practice.  An issue 
arising was the discovery that some of the respondents either occupied more 
than one category at the outset of the study, or moved between categories over 
the duration of their interest in the issue. For example, one informant began his 
‘career’ in coastal change activism as a founder of a grassroots group before 
being elected as a local authority councillor, whilst his colleague went on to 
become chair of his local town council. Elsewhere, a borough councillor also had 
a role as a parish councillor – whilst there is no obvious tension between these 
two roles, evidence taken from interviews suggests significant differences in the 
two functions (for example, with regard to their inclusion as key stakeholders in 
deliberative processes). 
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Such categories are important for purposes of comparison, but are hard 
to establish definitively for the reasons given.  Accordingly, actors were 
categorised by the capacity in which they were first approached, with any 
ambiguities or changes in their situations identified and considered at 
appropriate points.   
The revised informant schema for the two local studies, for which efforts 
were made at achieving optimum symmetry across the two cases, was 
successful up to a point, although the apparent absence of collective grass roots 
action on Sheppey made this difficult to fulfil.   
In the light of this a revised strategy was developed for Sheppey – in 
short, given that there appeared to be no grassroots activists on the issue under 
consideration, interviews were sought with those who had attempted to mobilize 
others on this or related issues, and those well placed to comment on 
mobilization in other contexts, and on the political interests, skills and appetites 
for collective representation of the local population.  
Potential informants were identified from policy and related literature or 
by ‘snowball sampling’, or were already known to the researcher – for example 
through activity with NVCC. However, in neither case was gaining access to 
desired interviewees straightforward. In the Selsey case, unsuccessful attempts 
were made to obtain interviews with various activists and officials.  In the 
Sheppey case, some local politicians – both at borough and parish level – 
proved equally reticent.  More pertinently, although contact was made with 
homeowners at Shell Ness whose properties were at risk, repeated attempts to 
gain interviews proved fruitless.  Nonetheless, an overall spread of respondents 
for the two cases was achieved that, whilst not representative in any statistically 
meaningful sense, can be said to represent actors in each case salient to the 
research questions.  
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Identifying informants and gaining access was a more straightforward 
proposition for the NVCC case, as the main protagonists were known to the 
researcher who had been closely involved in the group’s activities. This being a 
purposive study of activity involving, for the most part, a discrete group of people, 
the sample might be said to have been largely self-selecting. All but one of those 
who might have been considered central NVCC actors agreed to an interview, 
although it is of note that the one who did not was female – not least because 
across the spread of interviews women’s voices proved to be a relative rarity. In 
addition to NVCC members, an interview was also obtained with an officer of the 
non-governmental organisation with which it worked closely. However, efforts to 
obtain interviews with central government and Executive Agency officials who 
might have been able to lend useful perspectives on government’s expectations, 
and experience, of dealing with NVCC, were unsuccessful as officials had either 
left their roles or did not respond to requests for interviews. 
 
Interviewing strategy 
 
 
Digitally-recorded semi-structured interviews were undertaken in each case, 
informed by a schedule of questions7 for different categories of respondents both 
within and across cases. Robson (2002) warns that any departure from the full 
standardisation of questions associated with structured interviews comes with a 
concern over reliability – for example in the shape of interviewer bias.  However, 
in following interview schedules in the way described, a degree of reliability was 
assured, although not at the expense of flexibility; where necessary, the order of 
the schedule and degree of depth allowed for each question was adapted to fit 
the interviewee’s narrative, allowing unanticipated insights to emerge. As a 
further guarantee of reliability, reflection on interview planning and practice was 
recorded as interview notes (made as soon as was practical after the conclusion 
 
7
 Examples in Appendix A. 
39 
 
of interviews), which proved particularly useful in considering issues of 
researcher positionality. 
 
Positionality and bias  
 
 
Geertz’s (1975) observation that anthropological writings are themselves second 
or even third order interpretations draws attention to the researcher’s potential 
influence on findings – problematic, of course, in natural science and related 
settings. Much appears to fall on the ability of the researcher to use data even-
handedly, and to exercise self-awareness and – arising from this – ‘self-
management’.  Gillham (2005) stresses the need to avoid serving ideological or 
populist purposes whilst conceding that is hard to avoid when we are blind to 
aspects of our attitudinal make-up.    
Interest in the questions under consideration here was born from the 
researcher’s experience of community representation in this context, with part of 
the rationale a desire to help effect change to government policy and related 
practice. Given that the study has, in part, drawn upon data gathered from 
activists working in community action groups, a world in which the researcher 
was closely involved for a number of years, considerations of positionality and 
bias require particular attention. Thorne, quoted by Blee and Taylor (2002), 
describes a: 
…problematic balance, a dialectic between being an insider, a participant in the 
world one studies, and an outsider, observing and reporting on that world (2002: 
97). 
 
For some of the time that fieldwork was being undertaken, a challenge 
lay in the maintenance and management of both pre-existing working and 
research relationships with some informants.  For example, as will become 
apparent, a proportion of fieldwork was undertaken at a time of uncertainty over 
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the constitution and priorities of NVCC – a process in which the researcher was 
closely involved as a member, and which formed an area of interest for research.   
Simultaneously, the researcher continued to maintain contact, and even 
working relationships, with officers from the EA and a local authority represented 
in this study. Such relationships pertained to the researcher’s own activism with 
regard to questions of sea defence and associated decision-making; thus, 
research activity was attended by concerns not to disrupt what in some cases 
were already fragile relationships, whilst posing meaningful questions.   
Participant information sheets detailing the purpose of the project and 
arrangements pertaining to ethical considerations were prepared for informants, 
each of whom signed a consent form.  Discussion of the ethical implications of 
participation was encouraged, and some interviewees sought, and were granted, 
assurances concerning the timing of publication and the institutional capacities in 
which they were quoted. Worthy of mention in this regard was the development 
of an approach to interviewing that saw interviews prefaced with an explanation 
to respondents of the genesis of the research interest, including reflections upon 
the researcher’s own experiences as an activist. The rationale was that such an 
approach would a) provide useful context for questions and, no less importantly, 
b) make explicit the question and nature of the researcher’s positionality, with a 
view to both allaying any concerns that interviewees might have harboured, and 
encouraging a reciprocal candour.  
 
Data management 
 
 
Data collected on interviewees was securely stored, in compliance with the Data 
Protection Act 1998 and in accordance with European Directive 95/46/CE. 
Interview and personal material stored electronically was anonymised using a 
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coding system and is accessible only to the researcher. Any data held in paper 
files was also stored securely, with access again limited to the researcher.8   
 
Generalisation 
 
 
Snape and Spencer (2003) assert that in the natural sciences, the purpose is to 
produce law-like propositions whereas in the social sciences, the aim is to 
understand subjectively meaningful experiences. Writing about comparative 
analysis in the context of social movement research, Della Porta (2002) favours 
the pursuit of ‘thick descriptions’ of a few cases leading to ‘causality linked to 
specific contexts’, and cites Mair in observing that recent comparativists have 
contented themselves with a relatively middle-range or even a low-level 
abstraction, with context a crucial determinant. She goes further still in 
suggesting that comparative analysis: 
 
…allows us to shift…towards understanding more clearly the causality and 
meaning of a certain situation for the actors involved (2002: 307).  
 
 
To conclude on the subject of generalisation, broadly interpretive 
accounts of social phenomena might be said to involve an intellectual trade-off, 
with a reduced ambition in terms of knowledge generation allowing for the 
application of a different order of rigour.  This sits comfortably with the broad aim 
of this study in exploring, comparing – and perhaps even explaining – the 
experiences of communities, action groups, individuals and authority actors in 
distinctive contexts as they seek solutions to the problems posed by sea level 
rise, and associated coastal planning.   
A broad focus on understanding the phenomenon under scrutiny 
resonates with this study’s interest in developing ‘thicker descriptions’ than those 
 
8
 Examples of participant ethical and data management compliance information sheets in Appendix 
B. 
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hitherto available in policy prescription and academic literature as it applies to 
England and Wales – not law-like propositions, but instead what Patton, cited in 
Ritchie and Lewis (2003) sees as modest speculations on the likely applicability 
of the findings to other situations under similar, but not identical conditions with a 
focus on the logical, thoughtful and problem-oriented rather than statistical or 
probabilistic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Chapter 3: THE INVOLVEMENT OF   
  COMMUNITIES IN COASTAL  
   GOVERNANCE   
 
By the end of the first decade of the 21st century the UK government had come 
to stress the importance of working in partnership with communities in seeking 
just outcomes to issues presented by policies not to defend some coastal areas 
from the sea in the longer term, and not to compensate people for the resulting 
loss of their homes.  This thesis explores the proposition that such encounters 
are both structured by, and propagate, social inequalities. 
Whilst government acknowledged that some communities would need 
support in contributing to policy decisions, a critical reading of policy statements 
and relevant academic literature suggests dissonance between such government 
prescription and the experiences of citizens in terms of their attitudes towards 
coastal change, their propensity and willingness to mount and participate in 
collective action, and in their experience of engagement with authority.   
Evidence – here organised using Tilly’s (1978) framework for the 
analysis of collective action – is largely pessimistic as to the degree of influence 
people are able, or inclined, to exert on decision makers. Housing tenure and 
associated loss emerges as a key interest around which social action might 
coalesce on this issue.  However, the literature encourages further consideration 
of the ways in which social class informs individuals’ decisions as to whether and 
how to participate in collective action, the ways in which resource deficits 
manifest themselves and are addressed, and the ways in which affected 
populations organize themselves in defence of their interests. Bourdieu’s (1983) 
Theory of Capitals is employed in exploring the experiences of ‘communities’ – 
and the people who comprise them – as they respond to the threats posed by 
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climate change and associated policy, with a view to further critiquing 
government’s essentially pluralist version of its interactions in this context. 
 
Environmental campaigns, networks and the role of the individual 
 
 
Contention around coastal management, with its respective emphases on 
change, environmental protection and shelter and people’s quality of life, 
suggests that collective action might usefully be understood through the prism of 
environmental justice. 
Environmental justice is about social transformation directed toward meeting 
human need and enhancing the quality of life – economic equality, health care, 
shelter, human rights, species preservation and democracy – using resources 
sustainably. (Dodds and Hopwood, 2006: 271)  
 
The environmental justice movement can be traced to the United States 
in the 1970s, and concerns around the inequitable distribution of environmental 
risks – significantly those associated with waste management (Dodds and 
Hopwood, 2006; Watson and Bulkeley, 2005). The 1990s saw a growing 
recognition of environmental justice in the UK, with a focus on issues of justice, 
inequality and decision processes – arguably at the expense of examination of 
the struggles and lessons to be learned (Dodds and Hopwood, 2006). This 
mirrors what appears to be a divergence in focus on distinctive efforts at 
achieving environmental justice – on the one hand as a generic campaign of 
NGOs translating easily into the discourse of governments and, on the other, 
locational issues concerning the siting of high risk facilities. 
Social movement literature links successful protest mobilization to both 
the levels of material resources available to communities and the density of pre-
existing networks (Walsh et al, 1993) – both salient given evidence around the 
inequitable distribution of environmental risks. Where resource in a particular 
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locale is hard to find, Foot (2009) observes that people need to make alliances.  
Dodds and Hopwood (2006) see grassroots action as crucial to gaining justice, 
but they stipulate that successful struggles start with local action in reaction to a 
local issue but go on to build alliances, gain a wider understanding of the causes 
of injustice and seek solutions. However, Rootes (1999) asserts that potential 
allies are only likely to act to enhance the effort if the goals and strategies 
employed by local campaign groups are compatible with their own, and appear 
achievable.  
Resource issues may partly explain why there has been no prominent 
campaign against waste incineration in the UK, or effective linking of local 
campaigns (Rootes, 2009). However, another compelling explanation lies in the 
struggle to transform local discourse based around a grievance, and open to 
charges around NIMBYism and self-interest, into one rooted in consideration of 
the public good. Walsh et al (1993) argue that the framing of protest ideologies in 
this way is more important in determining the outcome of grassroots protest than 
are considerations of socio-economic profile and the degree and nature of 
organization.  
Rootes (1999) reports tense and complicated relationships between 
established environmental movement organizations and emergent groups. A 
distancing from some actions on the part of the former is ascribed to the need to 
be seen by those in power as ‘responsible’ in the interests of maintaining policy 
access; such constraints upon support are not always understood by those 
seeking it.  
Perceptions of NIMBYism, or clashes between discourses, are 
especially problematic given the terms of admission to deliberative exercises 
framed in liberal constitutional terms. Rootes (1997) argues that whilst the 
perceptions and values of the rest of the population are important in response to 
collective action, they are less so than those of elites who can shape official 
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reaction. Instead, universalist arguments about the public good are required, 
thus placing an onus on communities to reframe discourses (Kurtz, 2003). Doing 
so may require external help – Zsamboky et al (2011) have suggested that 
coastal adaptation activities in the context of climate change (of which efforts to 
influence public policy must be considered a part) sit well down the list of 
priorities for disadvantaged communities. Conversely, we might ask whether 
garnering support from beyond an affected locality is per se contingent on the 
ability of local campaigners to themselves reframe the discourse in more 
universalist terms. Either way, developing networks might be considered in part 
an exercise requiring intellectual as well as other resources.  
 
Collective action and the individual 
 
 
Community activism is demanding. Dodds and Hopwood (2006) observe that 
participation can involve extensive reading and preparation and attending 
meetings – unpaid, and on top of family commitments, and with typically limited 
access to resources and any kind of long-term independent support structures. 
Such sacrifices, they propose, usually go unrecognised by those in power.  
Writing in the context of community resilience in response to 
emergencies including climate events, and primarily for policy audiences, 
Collingwood Environmental Planning (2009) reports that individuals can be very 
influential in terms of community action, and that their effectiveness depends on 
them enjoying the respect and trust of local people, of them being well-
established in the community, and having both good social skills and a vision of 
what change should look like. They must also be situated in ‘supportive 
systems’. This is not the place for a discussion of notions of ‘resilience’: suffice to 
say, it is a more conciliatory rendering of collective action than that typically 
associated with environmental justice. Nonetheless, it directs attention to the 
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range of skills, attributes and resources required of individuals: a state of affairs 
thrown into some relief by evidence that the considerable demands associated 
with collective action tend to be borne by few people. 
Writing in the context of the Labour government’s New Deal for 
Communities regeneration programme, Robinson et al (2005) find that only a 
small number of residents have the confidence, interest or time to get involved, 
and that it is unrealistic to assume that many will want to take on such a 
responsibility – irrespective of the degree of affluence in the area. Rootes (1997) 
confirms that participation in collective action is a minority activity and one 
skewed in its over-representation of the highly educated and relatively young. 
An associated concern for Robinson et al (2005) is that community 
representatives don’t tend to represent the diversity of their communities and 
tend to focus on what they know and what concerns them, with representative 
bodies open to being hijacked by cliques.  
Thus, literature on environmental justice encourages attention to the 
importance of resource mobilization from both within affected locales and beyond 
and, as part of this, the wherewithal to transform the discourse from a local 
grievance to one with a universalist resonance, which  in some deliberative 
contexts is a key to participation. To this end we must be especially alert to the 
effects of socio-economic inequalities, whilst evidence that the burden of 
collective action invariably falls to the few encourages close examination of the 
experiences of individuals in shaping and undertaking collective action. 
 
Analysing community involvement  
 
 
Tilly (1978) proposes a framework for the analysis of collective action, which he 
suggests consists of people acting together in pursuit of common interests. The 
framework comprises five essential components: ‘interest’, ‘organization’, 
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‘mobilization’, ‘opportunity’, and ‘collective action’ itself (see Table 6). Tilly 
continues:  
The interests which concern us most are the gains or losses resulting from a 
group’s interaction with other groups…The organization which concerns us most 
is the aspect of a group’s structure which most directly affects its capacity to act 
on its interests…mobilization is the process by which a group acquires collective 
control over the resources needed for action.  Those resources may be labor 
power, goods, weapons, votes, and any number of other things…Opportunity 
concerns the relationship between a group and those around it…Collective 
action…results from changing combinations of interests, organization, 
mobilization and opportunity (1978: 7). 
 
In conceptualising collective action in this way, Tilly seeks to combine 
causal models of constraints with purposive models of choices among available 
courses of action. He explains:  
We may choose to consider the action of an individual or of a group as a 
resultant of forces external to the individual or group …Alternatively, we may 
consider the individual or group to be making choices according to some set of 
rules, implicit or explicit (1978: 6).  
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Table 7: Conceptualising collective action 
 
Component of 
collective action 
Description  
Interest Gains or losses resulting 
from a group’s interaction 
with other groups 
 
Organization Aspect of a group’s 
structure which most 
directly affects its capacity 
to act on its interests 
 
Mobilization The process by which a 
group acquires collective 
control over the resources 
needed for action 
 
Opportunity Concerns the relationship 
between a group and 
those around it 
Opportunity has three elements: 
 
Power: the extent to which the outcomes of 
the population’s interactions with other 
populations favour its interests over those of 
the others. 
 
Repression: the costs of collective action to 
the contender resulting from interaction with 
other groups…an action which lowers the 
contender’s cost is a form of facilitation. 
Political repression and political facilitation 
apply to the relationship between 
contender(s) and government(s). 
 
Opportunity/threat: the extent to which other 
groups, including governments, are either (a) 
vulnerable to new claims which would, if 
successful, enhance the contender’s 
realisation of its interests or (b) threaten to 
make claims which would, if successful, 
reduce the contender’s realisations of its 
interests. 
 
Collective action Results from changing 
combinations of interests, 
organization, mobilization 
and opportunity 
 
 
Source: adapted from Tilly (1978) 
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Two related models serve this conceptualisation – the Polity model and 
the Mobilization model. The former is concerned with what Tilly calls a 
‘population of interest’, and is concerned with interactions between groups within 
that population, comprising one of more of the following: 
• Government: an organization which controls the principal 
concentrated means of coercion within the population. 
 
• Contender: any group which, during some specified period, applies 
pooled resources to influence the government. Contenders include 
challengers and members of the polity. A member is any contender 
which has routine, low-cost access to resources controlled by the 
government; a challenger is any other contender. 
 
• Polity9: consists of the collective action of the members and the 
government. 
 
• Coalition: a tendency of a set of contenders and/or governments to 
coordinate their collective action. (1978: 52) 
Tilly explains:  
…contenders are attempting to realize their interests by applying pooled 
resources to each other and to the government.  They vary in the success with 
which they get back resources in return; the biggest division in that regard 
separates the high-return members of the polity from the low-return 
challengers…all contenders (members and challengers alike) are struggling for 
power (1978: 54). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9
 Polity: ‘A generic term for the set of political institutions within a society’ (Abercrombie et al, 2000: 
267). 
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 His second model – the Mobilization model (see Figure 2):  
…declares that the main determinants of a group’s mobilization are its 
organization, its interests in possible interactions with other contenders, the 
current opportunity/threat of those interactions and the group’s subjection to 
repression (1978: 56).  
 
Figure 2: Tilly’s Mobilization model 
 
 
Source: adapted from Tilly (1978) 
 
A small number of UK studies (see Table 7) has considered coastal 
change and related governance arrangements. Whilst it is important to be wary 
of generalisation, they have potential for shedding light on – and prompting 
further questions about – how coastal groups are constituted, and fare in their 
interactions with power and competing interests. The studies span the decade 
2002-2011, and so cover the period during which the coastal governance 
paradigm changed from one of a presumption to defend from the sea to FCERM. 
Some of the studies are directly concerned with establishing the efficacy or 
otherwise of particular approaches to decision-making (it is these that are 
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broadly categorised10 according to the process employed in Table 8), whilst 
others yield salient points whilst having different research objectives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
 The categories employed – ‘Participative’ and ‘Representational’ – are the subject of conceptual 
and theoretical scrutiny, although here they are employed simply as broad markers of the 
approach taken. 
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Table 8: Coastal change studies 2002-2011 
 
 
 
 
Author(s) Relevant research 
interest(s) 
Research design Decision 
making model 
(where 
relevant) 
Myatt-Bell 
et al 
(2002) 
Locals’ perceptions of 
flooding, their awareness 
of the managed 
realignment scheme and 
issues they consider to be 
important. 
Case study (Brancaster West 
Marsh) underpinned by 
questionnaire survey of visitors 
conducted at managed 
realignment exhibition. 
 
Myatt et al 
(2003a) 
Whether local residents 
are more accepting of a 
managed realignment 
scheme that is fully 
established rather than at 
its inception or under 
construction. 
Case study (Freiston Shore, 
Lincolnshire) underpinned by 
postal questionnaire survey of 
local households. 
 
Myatt et al 
(2003b) 
Whether local residents 
are more accepting of a 
managed realignment 
scheme the longer it is the 
public domain. 
Case study (Orplands, Essex) 
underpinned by postal 
questionnaire survey of local 
households. 
 
O’Riordan 
et al 
(2006) 
Existing arrangements of 
coastal governance in 
England including 
effective stakeholder 
involvement. 
Case study (north Norfolk coast) 
underpinned by literature review, 
observation of facilitated 
meetings, stakeholder 
interviews. 
Participatory 
Few et al 
(2007) 
Local capacity for 
strategic response to 
climate risks with a focus 
on issues surrounding 
coastal defence. 
Case study (Christchurch Bay) 
underpinned by documentary 
analysis, semi-structured 
interviews and workshop 
discussions. 
 
Fletcher 
(2007) 
The relationship between 
stakeholder 
representatives and their 
constituencies of interest 
within the context of 
coastal partnerships. 
Multiple case study (Medway 
Swale Estuary Partnership, 
Moray Firth Partnership, Sefton 
Coast Partnership, Solent 
Forum) underpinned by semi-
structured interviews with 
respondents from distinctive 
stakeholder categories. 
Representational 
Milligan et 
al   
(2009) 
The character and 
reasoning behind 
changing management 
policies and governance 
practices in England. 
Single case study (Winterton-on-
Sea, Norfolk) underpinned by 
literature review and 
involvement in consultative 
forum events 
Participatory 
Zsamboky 
et al 
(2011) 
How disadvantaged 
communities are 
vulnerable to climate 
change. 
Multiple case study underpinned 
by literature review, interviews 
with policy officials, and focus 
groups involving residents.  
 
54 
 
Whilst Tilly’s (1978) conceptual framework can help us to organize this 
literature (see Figure 2), this comes with a caveat. Tilly’s Mobilization model 
suggests fluidity in the ways in which these concepts interact, with collective 
action resulting from ‘changing combinations of interests, organization, 
mobilization and opportunity’ (1978: 7). This makes it difficult to locate evidence 
neatly under discrete headings although what follows offers at least a rough idea 
of trends. 
 
Interest 
 
As already established, interest is a key concept for Tilly in that collective action 
fundamentally consists of people acting together in pursuit of their common 
interests, with those of greatest concern the gains or losses resulting from a 
group’s interaction with other groups. So how, if at all, is interest manifest in 
these studies? 
Zsamboky et al (2011) research ‘disadvantaged’ communities (those at 
risk of the physical impacts of climate change and which already suffer from high 
levels of deprivation or geographic isolation with case studies involving five 
coastal communities, defined as any local authority area that adjoins the sea 
and/or the coastline.  Thus, the study appears to explore the vulnerability of 
communities that are carefully defined in terms of pre-existing socio-economic 
profile, but arguably homogenous in terms of exposure to the physical impacts of 
climate change and the nature of any additional risk faced. 
In their Orplands study, Myatt et al (2003b) also pursue a geographical 
analysis in hypothesising from their preceding Freiston and Brancaster case 
studies (Myatt, 2003; Myatt-Bell et al, 2002) that public awareness of managed 
realignment projects decreases with distance from the respective area (with the 
obverse implication that those closest to the scheme will have highest 
awareness of it). However, the authors observe that the area under scrutiny is 
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relatively rural and modestly populated, and that those closest to the scheme are 
in fact least aware of it. This reinforces the point that there may be merit in 
looking beyond geography as the locus of interest in responding to coastal 
change. 
Beyond Zsamboky et al’s (2011) study with its focus on communities 
facing significant socio-economic challenges, we do not learn a great deal from 
this body of literature about the composition of populations in the relevant 
locations, although what little analysis there is of how this informs attitudes and 
actions, or plays out in the setting of policy, would suggest that this may be 
useful. For example, for many respondents in Zsamboky et al’s study climate 
change is considered less pressing a risk than low incomes or unemployment, 
which raises the question as to whether the link between exposure to climate 
change impacts and contentious social action is as straightforward as has been 
assumed. We might ask whether such a group of people would make it onto 
government’s radar, given CAPE’s requirements for ‘extensive engagement’.  
Elsewhere, respondents in Myatt et al’s (2003a) Freiston Shore study 
are mostly either professional or retired, which the researchers equate with 
widespread club membership and a willingness to take on local issues. By 
contrast, Myatt et al (2003b) report on comments from respondents in the 
Orplands study, where there is a more even occupational split, about a lack of 
leisure time due to work and family commitments. Accordingly, these 
researchers suggest a link between an occupational rendering of social class 
and awareness of and attitude towards change and its implications, and strength 
of orientation towards social action.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, residential property is also a potential locus of 
interest, reflecting concerns about reduction in housing value as reported by 
Zsamboky et al (2011) and reinforcing the more general points made by POST 
(2010) and DEFRA (2010) about the focus of contention as it relates to coastal 
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change. Few et al (2007) report that the most vulnerable stakeholders are 
residents, home owners, and business owners with property located in the at-risk 
zones. Myatt-Bell et al (2002) suggest that 38% of respondents in the Brancaster 
study identified impacts to their property as a consequence of  
change as a very serious issue, although precisely how and to what extend is not 
made clear given that the authors also stress that few properties are potentially 
affected.  
We might ask, then, how important such factors are in determining 
interest, with regard to the formation of attitudes towards coastal change and 
willingness to mobilize in pursuit of such interests. 
 
Mobilization 
 
For Tilly (1978), mobilization is the process by which a group acquires collective 
control over the resources needed for action.  Those resources may be labour 
power, goods, weapons, votes, and any number of other things. Groups attempt 
to realise their interests by applying such resources to each other as contenders, 
and to government.   
Interviews with local residents raise questions about the motivation and 
capacity of local people to consider long-term issues (Few et al, 2007), with 
Zsamboky et al (2011) identifying a lack of adaptive capacity in agencies and, in 
turn, ascribing to institutional failure the finding that coastal communities may 
lack the necessary adaptive capacity to respond to climate change and that a 
lack of clarity on actions needed may be leading to local apathy.11 Milligan et al 
(2009) characterise some stakeholders as ‘hard to reach’. To use simpler 
language, some communities appear to lack vital resource in defending their 
interests, although there are also concerns around appetite for action. 
 
11
 In such contexts it may make sense to consider the capacity of agencies themselves as a 
resource upon which coastal communities might draw. 
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Looking beyond studies concerned specifically with social change may 
be instructive on this point. Foot (2009) observes that when people from 
deprived neighbourhoods get involved in tackling deep-rooted social problems, 
they need to persuade those from the more affluent and socially influential 
neighbourhoods to ally with them.  Given this finding, we might consider what 
happens when communities are unable to mobilize such resource and, as is 
suggested in Zsamboky et al’s (2011) study, authorities lack the adaptive 
capacity themselves to compensate to some degree.  
On a related point, and returning to the coastal literature, Milligan et al 
(2006) stress the need for consideration of potential costs to those active in 
participative decision making; in representative settings, Fletcher (2007) 
suggests that negativity on the part of stakeholder representatives may be 
unsurprising given the reported significant additional workload implied. However, 
aside from findings by O’Riordan et al (2009) that local stakeholders having 
attended meetings and given their points of view feel they have wasted their time 
and effort, the resource burden for ‘community-side’ participants in decision-
making processes are not considered beyond the broad links made by Myatt et 
al (2003, 2003a) concerning occupational status, available time, club 
membership and willingness to take on local issues. This may be an apposite 
concern for those active within coastal residents groups involved with responding 
to SMPs and related policies, and is worthy of further investigation. 
 
Opportunity 
 
Whilst considerations of interest, organization and mobilization are best 
accommodated by Tilly’s (1978) Mobilization model, consideration of opportunity 
– with its emphasis on interactions between diverse interests12 – leads us to his 
 
12
 For example, SMPs: ‘set out how maritime Local Authorities and the EA (the operating 
authorities), work together with other foreshore owners to reduce the risks to people, property and 
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Polity model.  This encourages the consideration of relationships in terms of 
power, the costs of action, and the extent to which groups are either vulnerable 
to competing claims, or are able to enhance the realisation of their own interests. 
The typology proposed by Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation (see Table 
9) might help us to further demarcate (albeit crudely) the different renderings of 
‘polity’ pursued in the literature – in terms of both intention and effect. 
The involvement of people in coastal planning takes place in a variety of 
contexts – from structured and facilitated deliberative events involving local 
people in formal ‘stakeholder’ capacities, to citizens’ interests largely being 
represented in decision-making fora via local elected representatives, to more 
‘hands-off’ involvement such as attending public exhibitions.   
Viewed through the lens of Tilly’s (1978) Polity model, we might observe 
that participatory approaches appear to offer groups membership of the polity 
with the attendant benefit of low-cost access to government resources.  
However, despite the identification of clear gains, the literature suggests that this 
does not necessarily translate to the realisation of interests.  
O’Riordan et al (2006) and Milligan et al (2009) explore the potential of 
participatory approaches13 to involving local people in the setting of coastal 
policy, and report improved relationships and greater understanding between the 
various parties involved.  Milligan et al (2009) suggest potential for finding a 
successful common vision for the Winterton-on-Sea case study area, whilst 
O’Riordan et al (2006) report a willingness by participants in the  
north Norfolk study to engage in debate, with a raised awareness of the issues 
emerging alongside the bringing together of various facets of coastal 
management (2006: 12).   
                                                                                                                                                                                             
land from sea flooding and coastal erosion. In developing SMPs a range of partners and the public 
are extensively consulted and involved in the decision making processes’ (EA, 2010: 80). 
 
13
 What Arnstein might categorise as ‘partnership’ – see Table 9. 
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However, this is contradicted by evidence that locating common ground 
between actors is a problem – Milligan et al (2009) find that local and official 
cultures are neither aligned nor likely to be in the future, with one problem lying 
in the limits to what people are able to understand. This latter point might also be 
considered a mobilization issue in Tilly’s terms.  
Difficulties are also presented by the need to balance the sometimes 
conflicting objectives of a wide mix of stakeholders (Milligan et al, 2009). 
O’Riordan et al (2006) point to the importance, on one hand, that participants’ 
expectations of the degree of influence on decisions should be managed and, on 
the other, their desire to have ownership of the outcomes – a tension possibly 
exacerbated by concerns that agencies and authorities are unwilling to give up 
power to negotiated results. It is perhaps telling that the researchers identify the 
very need for public acceptability as a blockage to the effective delivery of 
managed realignment schemes.14  This, in turn, invites analysis of the nature of 
the participation experienced by local people. The broad categories in Arnstein’s 
Ladder of Citizen Engagement pose the question as to whether the nature of 
deliberation in this case might be better described as ‘citizen power’ or 
‘tokenism’. 
 
 
 
 
 
14
 Myatt et al (2003a) see public relations as a means through which authorities might alleviate 
public scepticism, and as having a role in the promotion of managed realignment. This would 
appear to see engagement as having a persuasive rather than simply democratic purpose 
potentially at the expense of discourse around conflict, legitimacy and social justice.  
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Table 9: Conceptualising citizen participation  
Citizen 
control 
People demanding the degree of power (or control) over 
community resources and services which guarantees that 
participants or residents can govern a programme or an 
institution, be in full charge of policy and managerial 
aspects, and be able to negotiate the conditions under 
which outsiders may change them. 
Citizen power 
Delegated 
power 
Negotiations between citizens and public officials can result 
in citizens achieving dominant decision-making authority 
over a particular plan or programme. 
Partnership Power is redistributed through negotiation between citizens 
and powerholders who agree to share planning and 
decision-making responsibilities. Partnership can work 
most effectively when there is an organised power base in 
the community to which the citizen leaders are 
accountable; when the citizens group has the financial 
resources to pay its leaders for their time-consuming 
efforts; and when the group has the resources to hire and 
fire. 
Placation At this level citizens begin to have some degree of 
influence though tokenism is still apparent. An example of 
placation strategy is the placing of a few hand-picked 
people on boards or panels. If they are not accountable to 
a constituency in the community, however,  and if the 
traditional power elite hold the majority of seats, they can 
easily be marginalised 
Tokenism 
Consultation Inviting citizens' opinions, like informing them, can be a 
legitimate step toward their full participation. But if 
consulting them is not combined with other modes of 
participation, this offers no assurance that citizen concerns 
and ideas will be taken into account. The most frequent 
methods used for consulting people are attitude surveys, 
neighbourhood meetings, and public hearings 
Informing Informing citizens of their rights, responsibilities, and 
options can be the most important first step toward 
legitimate citizen participation. However, too frequently the 
emphasis is placed on a one-way flow of information - from 
officials to citizens - with no channel provided for feedback 
and no power for negotiation.  
Therapy Under a masquerade of involving citizens in planning, the 
experts subject the citizens to group therapy. Common 
examples may be seen in public housing programmes 
where tenants are brought together to help them adjust 
their values and attitudes to those of the larger society. 
Nonparticipation 
Manipulation In the name of citizen participation, people are placed on 
rubberstamp advisory committees or advisory boards for 
the express purpose of ‘educating’ them or engineering 
their support. Instead of genuine citizen participation, this 
signifies the distortion of participation into a public relations 
vehicle by powerholders. 
 
Source: adapted from Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation (Arnstein, 1969) 
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Whereas O’Riordan et al (2006) and Milligan et al (2009) explore 
participatory approaches to decision making in this context, Fletcher (2007) looks 
at coastal partnerships which employ a different approach. Whilst such 
arrangements have the potential for local people to participate, the orthodoxy 
instead appears to be one whereby communities find voice on decision-making 
bodies via local elected representatives.15 This study, which explores 
relationships between the various stakeholder representatives in the relevant 
polities and their constituencies and the making of decisions/setting of policies 
through partnerships, points to various issues with the ways in which the 
interests of coastal communities are understood, the motivations of those who 
represent them, and how power imbalances come to influence the making of 
decisions and policies.  
Many stakeholders in Fletcher’s (2007) study report limited enthusiasm 
for their role and its value (it is unclear whether this includes those representing 
the public interest), with very few operating within a formal system to identify any 
misrepresentation. Interestingly, Fletcher reports that those participants 
representing the public interest have no direct method of seeking the views of 
the public except for informal ad hoc routes.16  This, it might be assumed, is likely 
to raise the costs for at least some local interests seeking to exert influence in 
such fora.  
  Doubts are expressed concerning the robustness of decision-making 
processes, with opportunities to influence agendas considered poor and concern 
expressed over how contributions were received from the wider community of 
stakeholders. In each of the partnerships studied, a degree of inequality of 
influence over decision-making is perceived by respondents, with funding, 
 
15
 Held proposes that political representation involves the delegation of government to ‘a small 
number of citizens elected by the rest’ (1987: 64).  
16
 Concerns that such a model of stakeholder representation may not guarantee that local people 
are properly represented are echoed by Milligan et al (2009: 206). 
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chairing and hosting of partnerships all seen as important in this regard.  Here 
we might observe that local interests sit very much outside the polity, with those 
charged with representing the public interest themselves experiencing issues 
with aspects of opportunity.  
 
Further enquiry 
 
What does this research tell us in terms of the amelioration or otherwise of social 
inequalities, and where do they lead us to in terms of further enquiry?  
There are clear issues that arise from the literature on coastal change 
regarding the ability of local people to influence state-led efforts to make related 
policy – whether that should be as a consequence of a reluctance on the part of 
authority to submit their interests to negotiated outcomes, the effectiveness of 
elected representatives, the power that various actors are able to bring to bear 
on making decisions and setting policy, or irreconcilable expectations of local 
influence on decisions.17 Tellingly, given government’s confidence in 
participatory decision making, those researchers with a particular interest in that 
mode of engagement are lukewarm in their final assessments, with O’Riordan et 
al (2006) observing that arrangements for coastal policy in terms of funding and 
governance are unstable and inconsistent, with Milligan et al (2009) declaring 
that there is ‘no participatory panacea’ (2009:210). 
Overall, evidence from this body of literature would appear broadly to 
support the work of (Foot, 2009), which explored the experiences and 
perceptions of communities, councillors and public officials involved in a range of 
governance processes.  This suggested conflicting views about how far 
communities and citizens can exercise substantial influence over decisions about 
public services  – whilst community respondents expressed positive feelings 
 
17More fundamentally, a recurring theme in these studies is that managed realignment is seen by    
local people as politically controversial – especially where radical change is proposed. 
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about the potential benefits of engaging (citizens reported a benefit in involving 
communities in governance in that it creates links and networks between 
communities and service providers, and between different communities), there 
was also frustration about the barriers that limited their involvement.   
To conclude, whilst offering some solace to pluralists and their 
confidence that a more competitive democratic landscape will bring more 
satisfactory outcomes, the relevant literature  would appear to support the 
scepticism of the neo-pluralists who, according to Held (1987), are: 
 
…reluctant to assume the existence of fixed unalterable patterns of political 
relations and outcomes, and stress the need to examine the particular interest 
constellations, institutional context, resources and tactics brought to bear on any 
given issue…(1987: 205).  
 
More specifically, Held quotes Bachrach and Baratz (1962) in observing 
that:  
 
…classic pluralists failed to begin to grasp those asymmetries of power – 
between classes, races, men and women, politicians and ordinary citizens – 
which were behind, in large part, the decay of what they called ‘consensus 
politics’ (1987: 200).  
 
 
With an interest in how local populations seek to exert influence on 
government decisions in the context of coastal change, analysis of the relevant 
literature using Tilly’s (1978) action framework prompts both reflection and 
further enquiry – particularly concerning findings under the headings of 
‘Interests’, ‘Mobilization’ and ‘Organization’. We might further interrogate these 
findings via the prism of Bourdieu’s (1983) Theory of Capitals with a view to 
exploring potential ‘asymmetries of power’ as they apply to ways in which 
citizens mobilize and organize around their interests. 
 
 
64 
 
Bourdieu and capitals 
 
 
Bourdieu (1983) identifies a related trio of types of capital – economic, cultural 
and social (between them feeding a fourth, symbolic capital) – the distribution of 
which, he proposes, represents ‘the immanent structure of the social world. This 
turns on his reclamation of a broadly Marxian concept of capital concerned with 
the maximisation of profit and economic self-interest, and which posits non-
mercantile exchange as beyond its boundaries.  This, he maintains, disguises 
the ways in which power reproduces itself.  
By this analysis economic capital is that which is immediately and 
directly convertible into money, whilst cultural capital includes the things we 
know, our dispositions and attitudes, the things we own and guarantees of 
cultural capital in the shape of, for example, educational qualifications.  Social 
capital is the: 
 
…aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession 
of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition – in other words, to members of a group (1983: 
248). 
   
Thus, power becomes manifest, for example, in the things that we know, 
and the people with whom we mix.  Key to Bourdieu’s conceptualisation – and 
important for the purposes of this study – is the observation that capitals are not 
evenly distributed.  For example, an individual’s social capital is dependent on 
the size of his or her networks of connections and the extent of the capital – of all 
types – possessed by those in the network.  This is important, as Bourdieu’s 
conception allows for the conversion between different types of capital.  Both 
cultural and social capital can be converted into economic capital and, in turn, 
are reliant on economic capital in the shape of time and labour in their 
development. Thus, there is potentially a hard economic cost to other capitals, 
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with their efficacy related to the resources individuals and collectives are able to 
muster in its construction, maintenance and reproduction. 
Through considerations of ‘field’ and ‘habitus’, Bourdieu proposes a 
reflexive relationship between social structure and individual agency in any 
analysis of social activity (and the accumulation and exercise of capital) that 
would appear to allow for nuanced examination of the social actions of coastal 
dwellers within their populations and, in turn, the collective actions of such 
populations in deliberation with authority. ‘Field’ refers to territories of social 
practice – each with its own specific logic or principles which structure the 
choices and preferences of individuals in these contexts (Abercrombie et al, 
2000: 31). Related to this, individuals acquire a ‘habitus’ encompassing their 
dispositions with regard to the world – for example, through beliefs and 
preferences.  Ideas of field and habitus sit well with Tilly’s broad conceptual 
framework. For example, findings such as those of O’Riordan et al (2006) and 
Milligan et al (2009) which report improved relationships and greater 
understanding between the various parties involved, might be understood in 
terms of a field that is more navigable for the various parties, possibly, as a 
consequence of modified habitus for all concerned.  In contrast, Milligan et al 
also find that local and official cultures are neither aligned nor likely to be in the 
future follows the same dynamic, although more  pessimistically. 
 
How does interest translate into attitudes and collective 
action? 
 
 
In the literature on coastal change interest is broadly understood via either 
occupation/social class, exposure to physical impacts, or threats to residential or 
other property – or as a combination thereof. However, it is not always clear how 
such interests translate into attitudes and social action.  
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Recent decades have seen revaluation of ‘traditional’ structural 
interpretations of collective action in the context of industrial societies. Della 
Porta and Diani (2006) propose that a decline in industrial work in favour of 
administrative and service occupations and an accompanying new middle class, 
a shift away from stable and protected forms of work, migration to the stronger 
economies and the entry of women into the labour force have all contributed to a 
muddying of the water in terms of class relations and conflicts, with the 
consequence that it has: 
 
 …affected lines of definition and criteria for interest definition within social 
groups, which were previously perceived as homogeneous (2006: 39).  
 
Touraine (1980) goes further in proposing that:  
 
We are living through the transition from industrial society to programmed society 
and hence experiencing the decline of a certain type of class relations and 
conflicts... (1980: 9).  
 
In contrast to industrial society, which he says should be defined in 
terms of production relations, programmed society is characterised by ‘human 
government’ and its propensity to shape social and cultural behaviour. 
So where does this leave the question of ‘common structure and shared 
beliefs’ as the basis of identity in this context? Della Porta and Diani echo Tilly in 
proposing that identity construction remains an essential component of collective 
action, whilst acknowledging that identity feelings are frequently elaborated in 
reference to specific social traits such as class, gender, territory, or ethnicity – 
however, they are unable to identify any new cleavage as a primary basis for 
social conflict.  
Perhaps more useful, given the centrality of state decision-making to 
coastal change is Touraine’s (1980) proposal that the crucial cleavage now is: 
 
67 
 
…between the different kinds of [state] apparatus and user – consumers or more 
simply the public – defined less by their specific attributes than by their 
resistance to domination by the apparatus (1980: 6-7).  
 
Taking up this theme, Taylor-Gooby (1986) describes the development 
of the state and its involvement in people’s lives as a striking feature of the post-
war political economy and describes as important attempts to understand the 
relevance of these developments for political consciousness through the idea of 
‘consumption sectors’: 
 
 …the division between groups in society who share common interests based on 
division in access to the means of consumption (1986: 592).  
 
Saunders (1990) observes that an obvious candidate for such a new 
fault line is housing tenure18, with a decline of class voting appearing to coincide 
with the growth of working-class home ownership – apposite given what is at 
stake for those who stand to ‘lose’ from coastal change.  Kemeny, Ronald (2008) 
tells us, conflates private ownership with the development of a reserve of 
housing wealth that, amongst other things, offsets pension shortfalls in old age; 
whilst between the world wars the expansion of working class ownership was 
considered: 
 
…a potential antidote to both the decline in the private rental sector, on one side, 
and labour-union agitation, social unrest and demands for the expansion of 
citizenship rights on the other (2008: 22).  
 
In post-war Britain, Ronald identifies an assumption that homeownership 
would improve civic responsibility and encourage support for conservative 
political parties. By this analysis, home-ownership has multiple potential effects. 
It appears to offer individuals a means for wealth generation; whilst for the state 
mass home-ownership has been associated with a shift away from state welfare 
 
18
 As of 2009, 37 per cent of households in Great Britain were buying their homes with a mortgage, 
32% of homes were owned outright – a level of home ownership of 69%. (Randall, 2011: 3) 
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provision, and with the fostering of conservative political attitudes militating 
against collective action. Might we expect housing tenure, then – running down 
the fault line of a consumption cleavage – to form a locus of interest around 
Tilly’s common structure and shared beliefs in a more compelling way than 
occupational position?  
Whilst home-ownership is an example of individual consumption 
according to the consumption cleavage thesis, the provision of sea defence – 
which, despite recent reforms, continues to be funded principally by the state – is 
an example of collective consumption19, and one that is politically contentious in 
that its benefits are not to be universally enjoyed. Put crudely, the majority living 
on the coast will have their individual assets (and means of welfare) protected by 
a (largely) collectively-funded and managed ‘good’ for the foreseeable future, 
whilst a minority will not.  Thus, it can be argued that the interests of people in 
coastal communities might be structured by their consumption position – 
although not to the exclusion of consideration of traditional occupational class 
structure. Touraine (1980) argues that industrial class relations do not disappear 
with the emergence of class relations of programmed society, whilst Saunders 
(1990) stresses that class position, consumption sector location and housing 
tenure are all closely interrelated. This surely warns that there may be no straight 
line between a homogenous interest (coinciding with Bourdieu’s concept of 
‘habitus’) for coastal ‘losers’ and collective action, and alerts us to the possibility 
that populations – and even individuals – may be prey to competing urges 
towards conservatism on one hand, and collective action on the other. Further 
enquiry, then, might seek to see how individual interest and habitus impacts on 
mobilization and collective action in distinctive social contexts. 
 
19
 Dunleavy writes that: ‘Collective consumption…is typically concerned with services provided by 
the state apparatus…In exclusively individualized forms for consumption, location continues to be 
determined by household incomes…’. Collective consumption processes, he tells us, ‘create an 
inter-subjective-basis for the development of political action’, in part due to ‘the directly politicized 
context of provision’ (1979: 418-9). 
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Social class and resources for collective action 
 
 
If it is the case that in line with Bourdieu’s (1983) analysis the various capitals 
are unevenly distributed in the contexts under study, we might enquire as to the 
effects of this in terms of mobilization. More specifically, we might ask how (if at 
all) local populations seek resource from outside their boundaries, and with what 
results. 
For Tilly (1978), mobilization is the process by which a group acquires 
collective control over the resources needed for action, and findings from the 
literature on coastal governance would appear broadly to support Bourdieu’s 
thesis that such resources – in the shape of various capitals – are unevenly 
distributed. 
Zsamboky et al’s (2011) finding that disadvantaged coastal communities 
may lack the necessary adaptive capacity to respond to climate change might 
direct us towards a lack of economic capital. Whilst ‘adaptation’ is not here 
associated with any specific activity, and so can not be said to refer to or even 
include collective social action, a broad connection is proposed between a lack 
of economic resource and an inability to respond to the impacts of climate 
change.  On this question, Foot (2009) proposes that when people from deprived 
neighbourhoods get involved in tackling deep-rooted social problems, they need 
to persuade people from the more affluent and socially influential 
neighbourhoods to ally with them – consistent with Clark et al’s (2002) 
conclusion that activism is a middle-class, middle-aged preoccupation.   
This resonates with Myatt et al’s (2003) Freiston Shore study, and the 
researchers’ equation of the largely professional/retired status of respondents 
with widespread club membership and a willingness to take on local issues. Here 
we might pay particular attention to social capital, with individuals’ membership 
of clubs and networks both drawing upon and feeding the various capitals that 
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comprise them by Bourdieu’s (1978) analysis. This sits in some contrast to 
findings from the same researchers’ Orplands study (2003b), where a different 
economic/occupational profile saw a lack of leisure time due to work and family 
commitments and less emphasis on social activity. Besides relationships 
between occupational/economic status, free time and the appetite for social 
action, we might also consider populations’ ability to generate the cultural capital 
to mount such action on the back of a familiarity with, for example, relevant 
modes of professional conduct or even specialist knowledge – potentially salient 
given findings that in ‘participatory’ settings local representatives can struggle to 
understand expert/technical perspectives.   
We might also ask how such considerations are affected by the size of 
the populations concerned.  Klandermans (1993) proposes that ‘mobilization 
potential’ – that is expectations about the number of participants, and about the 
probability of success if many people participate – is an important element in 
each individual’s motivation to participate themselves, which would make the 
extent of the population salient to successful mobilization. Mobilization potential 
determines maximum possible levels of participation in a movement, although 
Klandermans stresses that this may well not be reached as it remains to be 
converted into actual participation, adding that mobilization potential is of little 
use if social movements do not have access to networks through which to reach 
people – placing a premium on the social capital of those involved. The stronger 
and more extended the group’s ‘alliance system’ – that is, those groups that are 
well-disposed towards the movement’s aims - the higher the proportion of the 
mobilization potential that will participate. Reaching potential participants 
requires networks, then, whilst at a wider level participation is reliant in part on 
the strength of the movement’s alliances. By way of illustration, we might again 
observe that respondents in Myatt et al’s Freiston Shore study (2003a) appear 
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better placed in such respects than those in their Orplands study (2003b) in ways 
that Bourdieu’s capitals might usefully explain. 
 
Organization and the capacity to act on interests 
 
 
There is very little to be found in the literature on coastal governance as to how 
local people organise themselves into groups, beyond simple references to 
‘community stakeholders’ (O’Riordan et al, 2006; Milligan et al, 2009) and 
‘representatives of the local community’ (Milligan et al, 2009). Who these people 
are, how they come to represent their ‘communities’, and the nature of 
responsibilities and their relationships with others both within and outside their 
communities, is not explored.  
Given the importance Tilly (1978) ascribes this aspect of collective action 
to the realisation of interests and, perhaps more importantly, the pivotal function 
of contention to influencing government, further insight would be valuable. To 
this end, the wider literature may be instructive. Foot (2009) reports that a 
fundamental question for Maguire and Truscott (2006) lies in establishing 
whether those who take part can legitimately be seen to represent the 
communities they speak for which, in turn, draws attention to factors such as 
how local groups are constituted, the strength of mandate enjoyed by their 
representatives, and the ways in which group decisions are made.  
Looking beyond the literature on coastal governance, factors related to 
social class would appear to determine who gets the opportunity to influence 
decision making in deliberative settings. Those who are already involved in such 
processes tend to get more involved – Skidmore et al (2008) argue that such 
people are often sought out and valued by authority, presumably lowering the 
bar in terms of Tilly’s ‘opportunity costs’.  By contrast, Foot (2009) suggests that 
others exclude themselves or are not invited to join because they find it difficult 
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to deal with bureaucracy, they ‘don’t fit’ or they feel they can have more effect as 
an outsider. Given this finding, it is hard not to wonder at the capitals required of 
those ‘community stakeholders’ and ‘representatives of the local community’ 
mentioned by Milligan et al (2009) and O’Riordan et al (2006), or to consider 
what happens when communities are unable to mobilize such resource in 
seeking to realise their interests and, as in Zsamboky et al’s study (2011), 
authorities lack the adaptive capacity themselves to compensate to some 
degree.  
If on the one hand authorities prefer to deal with people who are ‘one of 
us’ and, on the other, disadvantaged people feel compelled to recruit middle 
class allies, we might ask whether there is a danger that ‘justice’ remains in the 
gift of ‘professional types’, and that representative legitimacy is simply code for 
‘middle class’.  Again, such possibilities might be explored in terms of potential 
dissonance between individual habitus and field, and any play of capitals therein.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Conclusions from this body of literature will be used to both contextualise and 
interrogate empirical evidence arising from this study, with the intention of 
developing clearer understandings of the nature of contention on this issue, and 
the obstacles to effective collective action faced by people operating in distinctive 
social, economic and cultural contexts. This may help to address the research 
gaps identified, shed light on key areas of policy and prescription and, 
importantly, be of use to coastal communities as they seek just responses to the 
effects of climate change and related policy prescriptions. 
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Chapter 4: THE SETTING OF LOCAL COASTAL 
POLICY 
 
 
This chapter has three purposes. First, to offer a narrative description of key 
geographical and socio-economic features of Selsey and Sheppey (see Table 
10).  It describes the success with which the interests of people who might be 
placed at risk as a consequence of coastal planning decisions were incorporated 
by the Pagham to East Head draft coastal defence strategy as it applied to the 
Manhood Peninsula (and primarily Selsey) and by the Isle of Grain to South 
Foreland Shoreline Management Plan (SMP) as it applied to Sheppey.  
Explored, in turn, are the means by which policies were made, practical steps 
taken by the relevant authorities to ensure that people knew about the proposed 
policies and their implications, the nature and extent of people’s responses, and 
how such representations were subsequently accommodated. In so doing, 
accounts are rendered more or less chronologically.  
Second, to employ Tilly’s Polity model (1978) as a means for calibrating 
and comparing data with a view to understanding the efficacy of deliberative 
processes in accommodating the needs and concerns of local people likely to be 
affected by resulting policies. To recap, Tilly’s Polity model sees contenders 
attempt to realise their interests, but varying in the success with which they are 
rewarded with resources. The biggest division, Tilly notes, is between the high-
return members of the polity and the low-return challengers.  
As such, these two purposes might be said to serve the development of 
a macro view of the process and its actors as a whole, with a third purpose to 
reflect upon relevant findings and questions posed by the literature discussed in 
Chapter 3. Finally, the two ‘local’ studies are configured to support, to an extent, 
what Ritchie and Lewis (2003) describe as inferential generalisation (transferring 
findings to other settings and contexts). 
74 
 
Table 10 – Key socio-economic indicators 
 
 Selsey Sheppey 
Population(s) 12,000 approx. 40,000 approx. 
 
 
Commerce 
and industry 
Narrow industrial base – 
reliant on service sector 
Distribution, hotels and 
catering 
Public administration, 
education and health 
(Swale) 
Employment Highly seasonal 
 
Unemployment high relative 
to rest of district 
Professional and 
managerial occupations 
under-represented 
Prisons, tourism  major 
sources of employment on 
Sheppey 
Low demand for skills from 
employers 
Skills and 
education  
Low educational 
achievement 
Low educational 
achievement 
Poor skills profile 
Demographics Relatively elderly population 
Predominantly white 
Age profile broadly 
representative of England 
Predominantly white  
Deprivation Middling position in Indices 
of Deprivation 
Many pockets of severe 
deprivation 
Housing 
tenure 
High levels of housing 
owner occupation 
High levels of both 
registered social landlord 
stock and housing owner 
occupation. 
 
 
 
A coastal typology of settlements, developed by the Marine Management 
Organisation (MMO) [2011] as a set of ‘categories’ to be used by marine 
planners at national level as a starting point to understand the socio-economic 
circumstances, and recent trends, of coastal communities offers useful if 
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necessarily limited guidance on the transferability of findings from these studies. 
The MMO typology identifies 10 categories of coastal settlement based on 
geodemographic analysis, broadly outlined in Table 11 below. 
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Table 11: MMO categories in England by proportion, compared to the 
Chichester and Swale local authority areas. 
 
 
MMO categories 
(with % of 
settlement types 
[England]) 
Characteristics Local authority area 
by % of MMO 
settlement types 
Chichester Swale 
A1 Silver seaside 
7.5% 
Retirement areas – smaller, less developed, older population, part-time 
employment, home working, self-employment, employment in tourism, 
few on benefits, low crime. 
17 
30.4% 
6 
7.3% 
A2 Working countryside 
4.9% 
Rural, sparsely populated or small settlements, lower skill occupations, 
away from key amenities, working from home, second homes, few 
people in flats, below average car ownership, few on benefits. 
6 
10.7% 
6 
7.3% 
A3 Rural chic 
6.0% 
Rural, sparsely populated, well-qualified, away from key amenities, 
bigger houses, jobs growth, self-employed, car owners, low crime, low 
child/pensioner poverty. 
14 
25% 
6 
7.3% 
B1 Structural shifters 
9.4% 
Towns and cities have lost primary markets and struggle to find new 
ones. Above average employment in manufacturing, benefits, long-term 
illness. Below average qualifications, employments, jobs growth and 
flats. 
4 
7.1% 
19 
23.25 
B2 New towns or ports 
12.15 
Poor skills, high unemployment, BUT strong economy and located near 
to areas of economic growth. Above average jobs growth, child and 
pensioner poverty and benefits claimants. Below average qualifications. 
3 
5.4% 
10 
12.2% 
B3 Striving communities 
12.4% 
Deprivation, high rented accommodation, high claimants, high child and 
pensioner poverty, high unpaid care. Work in wholesale, retail, motor 
vehicle repair. Low qualifications, employment, jobs growth.  
0 
0.0% 
6 
7.3% 
C1 Reinventing resorts 
6.2% 
Tourist economies, high deprivation and diversity, attracting high skill 
people. High private rental, claimants, degree level education, 
migration, students, seasonal unemployment, travelling to work, 
household vacancy, flats and crime. Low house occupation, owner 
occupation, employment, part-time work.  
1 
1.8% 
2 
2.4% 
C2 Coast professionals 
10.6% 
City and market town service centres. High qualifications, levels of full 
time students, migration, commuting, private rental, crime and flat 
dwelling. Low levels of pensioners, part time employment, living in 
houses. 
8 
14.3% 
3 
3.7% 
D1 Prosperous suburbia 
14.7% 
Affluent areas on edge of towns. High qualifications, employment, 
owner occupation. Big houses. Low claimants and child and pensioner 
poverty. High vehicle ownership. 
3 
5.4% 
11 
13.4% 
D2 Working hard 
16.1% 
High employment, industrial work, stable population, owner occupation. 
Low degree-level education, migration, claimants, self-employment, 
social rented housing. 
0 
0.0% 
13 
15.9% 
Source: adapted from MMO (2011) 
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The document explores the distribution of these categories in England 
by region, local authority area and major settlement.  
 
Selsey  
 
Social, economic and geographical profile  
 
 
Part of the Chichester district in west Sussex, the town of Selsey is approximately 
14 miles east of the city of Portsmouth, and lies at the southernmost point of the 
Manhood Peninsula (see Figure 3).   
Figure 3: Selsey and the Manhood Peninsula 
 
 
 
Source: Map data © 2014 Google 
 
Selsey has a population of around 12,000 people, and both local 
authority wards within it (Selsey North and Selsey South) are described as Town 
and Fringe – less sparse in terms of Rural and Urban Area Classification (ONS, 
[no date]a). It is described as a relatively isolated community (for the south east 
of England) with a narrow industrial base heavily reliant, in employment terms, 
on the service sector and a number of sectors whose business is highly seasonal 
with an accompanying seasonality of employment opportunities and high level of 
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unemployment relative to the rest of the district (Chichester DC, 2000).  One 
such employer is holiday park owner Bunn Leisure which employs 300 full time 
and part-time staff, whilst retailers such as Budgens, Co-op and Somerfield 
employ around 80 people (Chichester DC, [no date]b).  
Selsey has a relatively old population. 45.5% of the population of Selsey 
North and 47.2% of the population of Selsey South are aged 55 and over, 
compared to just 28.0% for the whole of England (WSRU, 2011). Ethnically, 
Selsey is predominantly white – significantly more so than England as a whole 
(ONS [no date]f, ONS [no date]g).  
A high proportion of the population has no formal qualifications, 
particularly when compared to the rest of the South East. Selsey is under-
represented in terms of higher level qualifications, and those working in both 
higher and lower managerial and professional occupations when compared to 
Chichester, West Sussex and the South East (WSRU, 2011]. Nonetheless, both 
Selsey wards occupy a middling position in terms of Indices of Deprivation (of 
7,332 wards with No. 1 being the most deprived, Selsey North ranks 3,411 and 
Selsey South 4,882) [WSRU, 2011], and both Selsey wards have high levels of 
housing owner occupation in comparison to local, regional and national trends 
(Chichester DC, [no date]a). 
Historically, the Manhood Peninsula as a whole has been vulnerable to 
coastal erosion and flooding.  The 2008 draft Coastal Defence Strategy (CDS) 
confirms that since the 1950s, timber, concrete and shingle defences have given 
protection against the most serious impacts of flooding and erosion, and that 
previously some areas of the peninsula had eroded at a rate of 8 metres per year 
(EA et al, 2008). Sea defence is a key issue for Selsey, then, with a 1998 tourism 
audit identifying 10 holiday parks under threat of incursion by the sea if a 
decision not to maintain the Medmerry shingle bank were taken (Chichester DC, 
2000). The effects of just such a policy recommendation, when combined with 
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the potential impacts in terms of employment, economy and housing, formed the 
basis of a conflict of interests. 
 
The setting of the Pagham to East Head draft Coastal Defence 
Strategy 
 
 
The Pagham to East Head draft CDS sets out how the Environment Agency (EA) 
in partnership with Chichester and Arun District Councils (referred to hitherto for 
this case as the Operating Authority) proposed to manage flood and coastal 
erosion risks to the area from Pagham to East Head on the Manhood Peninsula 
for the subsequent 100 years. In so doing, options were analysed (broadly) in 
terms of: 
• the flood and erosion risk to people and properties;  
• predicted sea level rise and climate change; 
• how much the option will cost and the value of the assets it will protect; 
• effects on the natural environment (EA et al, 2008). 
Whilst for the initial draft strategy the preferred options arrived at for the 
majority of urban frontages was to hold the existing defence line, the picture 
looked rather different at Selsey and Medmerry. For the Selsey Bill frontage, the 
draft strategy appears to indicate that the preferred option was for no active 
intervention, with the expectation that the sea would reach the first houses within 
50 years, and the possibility of 100 houses being lost over 100 years. At 
Medmerry, immediately to the west of Selsey, a shingle bank has provided 
ongoing flood protection to 300 properties and large caravan sites, and to 
essential infrastructure. The bank has been breached regularly, however, and 
requires extensive maintenance, and the strategy identified a preferred option of 
managed realignment. An essential caveat to all preferred options in the strategy 
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was uncertainty with regard to attracting national funding, and the need to 
explore other alternatives with those communities affected.20 
In developing the strategy, the Operating Authority was mindful of a local 
population that was older and unlikely to want to see any changes to the 
coastline, and the likelihood of the strategy eliciting an emotional response. 
Consensus was seen as potentially difficult to both identify and achieve.  
Nonetheless, the Operating Authority made clear that whilst it wanted to inform 
the community of how their initial consultation responses had been considered, it 
was not ‘asking for input’. And whilst it sought to inform key stakeholders such as 
residents groups and encourage their understanding of decisions and co-
ordinate work with local authority work on spatial plans, this did not involve 
collective decision making.21 
Finding a definitive account of how the draft policies were introduced to 
the public and feedback sought, and the supporting rationale, is difficult. EA 
officer B (Selsey) describes two formal consultation periods in which the 
Operating Authority sent letters to everybody on the whole peninsula asking 
them to comment, and directing them to whether or not they might like to see the 
summary documents. He explains that the Operating Authority had to recognise 
that its previous strategy in 2000 had not got anywhere, with his colleague EA 
officer A (Selsey) stressing that: 
 
We had to start by informing people where we were up to, and then coming up 
with some very draft recommendations, allowing people to comment on that and 
influence the outcomes, and then coming back with our recommendations in the 
light of people’s input. 
 
 
20
 Environment Agency in partnership with Chichester and Arun District Councils. 2008. Planning 
for the Future: Pagham to East Head draft coastal defence strategy. Summary Document. 
 
21
 Arun and Chichester District Councils and the Environment Agency. 2007. 
Pagham to East Head draft Coastal Defence strategy stakeholder engagement plan. Version5. 
Arun and Chichester District Councils and the Environment Agency. 
 
81 
 
Whilst EA officer A (Selsey) describes a balance between 
communicating with people and getting their feedback, and not being able to give 
them anything definitive, Local Authority coastal engineer A (Selsey) – closely 
involved with policy development on a day-to-day basis – offers a rather different 
interpretation of the guiding rationale in suggesting that the original proposals 
were designed as an act of ‘devilment' to arouse local public interest, and get 
them involved. As becomes clear, issues around vagueness of proposals 
resonate through both literature review and accounts from respondents in both 
cases, whilst threat appears to have had potency, albeit unpredictable, for 
getting people’s attention.   
Activist A (Selsey), who was heavily instrumental in initiating collective 
local action through two new local interest groups and later to become a local 
councillor, offers yet another distinctive account. He maintains that the 
publication of the draft strategy elicited a weak response, with an initial public 
meeting attracting only about 20 people.  This, he attributed to poor publicity on 
the part of the Operating Authority – despite the plan having what he saw as 
serious local consequences.  He explains:  
 
We were told that a large part of the caravan park, which is our main employer, 
was going to be destroyed by flooding, because they weren’t going to protect it 
any more, and something like 300 homes were probably going to fall into the sea 
over time as well.  
 
By Local Authority coastal engineer A (Selsey)’s analysis this was never 
the plan’s intention, and he laments giving people the erroneous impression that 
the authorities were planning not to defend, with the consequence that the 
Operating Authority was already into an argument before the consultation had 
even started. In step with this account, EA officer B (Selsey) describes a public 
response to the draft CDS that was both numerically substantial and hostile and, 
despite evidence of a subsequent rapprochement, a degree of lingering unease 
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and mistrust emerges from accounts from officials and those who had taken up 
issues with them out the outset. 
In Selsey, defence arose as one of the key geographical issues. EA 
officer A (Selsey) alludes to conflicting interests in recalling that:  
 
One of the things that one of the groups wanted, they wanted us to build a sea 
wall around Selsey, and it was pretty clear from the early economic assessments 
we did that that simply wasn’t going to be an option. By the same token there 
were other groups who were very concerned about making sure that the ecology 
and environmental benefits of the area should not be damaged or lost. 
 
These various interests, he suggests, were pursued by ‘stakeholders’ 
occupying divergent positions in terms of representational accountability and the 
zeal with which their respective agendas were promoted:  
 
There are members of the public, there are councillors, there are people of 
groups which might be publicly-funded. There are other groups – the RSPB for 
example – which are private groups, but have objectives and an agenda which 
they are seeking to move forward.  
 
The ways in which such interests were incorporated by the policy 
process, and with which respective parties pursued their remits, is important. In 
the Sheppey case we will see that a numerical sway was held by an 
environmentally-orientated interest closely aligned to the central government-led 
‘policy owning’ group. In the Selsey case, one grassroots response raised 
concerns about what it considered to be the centrality to the process of 
organisations keen to see land given back to the sea, whilst legitimate 
community voices were marginalised. 
Perhaps more subtly, in the Selsey case observations by relevant 
officers as to what was achievable in terms of continued sea defence [as with EA 
officer A (Selsey)’s judgment that a sea wall at Selsey ‘wasn’t going to be an 
option’] were sometimes made in rather opaque terms that, arguably, concealed 
a dominant interest. For example, Local Authority coastal engineer A (Selsey) 
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speaks of the desirability of ‘sensible dialogue’ with concerned local people, 
whilst EA officer B (Selsey) offers the view that people involved in the Medmerry 
Stakeholders Advisory Group (MStAG) felt that the solution reached had been 
‘pragmatic’. These ideas are worthy of closer scrutiny: ‘sensible’ has various 
meanings according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, with one encompassing: 
‘having or showing good sense, reasonable, judicious, moderate, practical’22.  
Dealing with matters ‘according to their practical significance or immediate 
importance’ is one of various possible definitions of ‘pragmatism’ (as distinct from 
the philosophical school) according to the same dictionary, whilst Merriam 
Webster offers as its key definition:  
 
…dealing with the problems that exist in a specific situation in a reasonable and 
logical way instead of depending on ideas and theories.23 
 
Thus, we might argue that stress is placed by officers on the practical 
and the immediate, with the risk of the marginalisation of more abstract 
considerations – for example, of what is fair or just.24  Interestingly, Local 
Authority coastal engineer A (Selsey) strays into ethical territory at one point, 
observing that:  
 
There is a real danger government will say ‘You pay for your own defences’. 
Whilst in fairly well-off areas that’s an option, we’ve got to be careful that not 
everybody can find additional money just like that.  
 
 
He concludes on this point, in what appears to be a reference to 
government not defending in the future what it had defended in the past:  
 
22
 Oxford. 1982. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English. 7th edition. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
23
 Merriam-Webster. [No date]. Pragmatic. [Online} Available at: http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/pragmatic [Accessed 8 February 2013]. 
 
24
 This evokes Habermas’ concern that science as applied in the ‘political public sphere’, which he 
suggests, occurs when ‘public discussions concern objects connected with the practice of the 
state…’ (1989: 231) has lost focus on what should be done, leaving us with what Sensat describes 
as ‘an exclusively technical perspective’ (1979: 18).  
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Society has provided this wall, and society has said ‘You can build behind it 
guys, that’s alright’ – society has an obligation to maintain that bloody wall as far 
as I’m concerned.  
 
 
This hints at fundamental tension in the work of local authority officials 
(and as we will see in the Sheppey case, elected members also), with Local 
Authority coastal engineer A (Selsey) explaining that his role on the strategy was 
both very closely involved around setting policy and trying to sell that policy to 
other people and, simultaneously to make sure that residents get ‘a fair crack of 
the whip’.25  
Activist A (Selsey) and others opposed to the plan were instrumental in 
setting up the pressure group ‘Save our Selsey’ (SOS)26 – formed to ‘alert and 
inform residents and businesses to the proposals, and to ‘campaign for a fair 
solution to our coast defence, that considers the people who live and work here’.  
SOS sought guarantees for funds to protect the town’s main road and services, 
that existing defences be maintained until the new strategy is agreed, that it be 
involved in realignment planning at Medmerry; support and funding for private 
investment in coast defences; and clarity over how the preferred options would 
be paid for.   
At around the same time The Manhood Peninsula Steering Group 
(MPSG)27 was established, with Activist A (Selsey) and the MP for Chichester as 
 
25
 Here we might observe a tension in balancing a rights-based discourse with an official 
governmental requirement for ‘pragmatic’ and ‘sensible’ outcomes. Accordingly, central 
government FCERM policy must be understood as an interest, although obscured by technocratic 
discourse and unique in it is not being subject to the same disciplinary process of mediation as 
other interests.    
 
26
 Save Our Selsey (SOS). [No date]. Save Our Selsey Campaign for Coastal Defence. [Online] 
Available at: http://www.saveourselsey.org/index.html [Accessed 6/2/13]. 
 
27
 MPSG is a voluntary alliance of residents, businesses and elected representatives that works to 
ensure that coastal areas from Pagham to East Head are protected from coastal erosion and 
flooding where this is in the social and economic interests of the local community; supports 
measures which make the Manhood Peninsula a more attractive place to live, work and visit, 
thereby improving the case for appropriate coastal protection; to work closely with other similarly 
affected coastal areas and statutory agencies, to improve government policy, raise awareness and 
understanding of coastal issues and the importance of supporting coastal communities; to 
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co-chairs. The former explains that whereas SOS was unrestrained in its criticism 
of policy decisions, MPSG was designed to be more cooperative and committed to 
a strategy of attracting funds for regeneration projects that might strengthen the 
local economy and so make a stronger case for sea defence investment in the 
future. Nonetheless, MPSG was highly critical both of certain proposals contained 
within the CDS, and of the ways in which the views and needs of local people had 
been accommodated in their formulation. The formation, mobilization and 
organizational strategies of both groups will be considered in more detail in 
Chapter 5. 
 In a representation to the National Audit Office (NAO), which holds 
government bodies to account for their use of public money (NAO, [no date]), 
MPSG argued that the Stakeholder Engagement Plan for the strategy could not 
deliver the community’s balanced view of the initial proposals to the project team. 
In contrast, it argued that non-community organisations with a nature conservation 
remit (National Trust, Natural England (NE), English Heritage (EH), and Chichester 
Harbour Conservancy) were given a very strong role. These organisations, the 
submission argued, all had a background of advocating managed realignment, 
without bearing any responsibility for its socio-economic consequences. The 
submission went on to complain that: 
 
Where legitimate community stakeholders are included, regardless of size or 
mandate, similar weightings are given to peripheral interests as ‘core’ interests. 
For instance, Selsey Town Council gets the same degree of involvement …as 
the Selsey Dog Park; and only one private landowner is granted involvement28.   
 
Investigating the strategy, the NAO concluded that while the Operating 
Authority had listened to local concerns, it could have sought opinion more 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
encourage the goodwill and involvement of the wider community; and to encourage civic pride and 
foster community spirit. (http://mpsg.org.uk) 
 
28
 Manhood Peninsula Steering Group (MPSG). 2007. Submission of Further Evidence to the 
National Audit Office Regarding the Pagham to East Head Coastal Defence Strategy. 
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effectively. Greater clarity, it concluded, would have helped the general public 
understand the issues better, thus adding fuel to concerns around the policy 
containing somewhat amorphous propositions. More specifically, the NAO 
ascribed a low response rate to a questionnaire issued in part to a proportionally 
large retired population that was unlikely to use the Internet29 – one of many 
observations, to be found in both cases, that link demographics and the 
development and mobilization of interest, and with implications for how 
authorities seek to involve people in the development of policy.  
A redrafted CDS30 stated that the Operating Authority had taken account 
of people’s wishes by joining some of the frontages together, for example, by 
combining the three around Selsey giving them a single management option. 
The revised policy of ‘Hold the Line’ was however tempered by the observation 
that the most important issue for Selsey was its current low priority status for 
national funding, with the clear implication that, despite the change to the plan, 
those in the locality would have to pay for defences in the future.  For Medmerry, 
the strategy recommended that a policy of managed realignment might both 
protect the road and utilities whilst also providing compensatory habitat to 
replace losses resulting from schemes to manage flood and erosion risk at other 
sites in the Solent such as Portsmouth.  It also explained that local caravan site 
owners Bunn Leisure were investigating potential ways to improve coastal 
defences for their sites. 
The MPSG consultation response to the redrafted strategy indicates 
ambivalence with regard to the processes by which decisions were made. On the 
one hand, it acknowledges that consultation had been a great improvement from 
the earlier draft consultation, particularly the efforts made to engage with 
 
29
 Hooper, M (National Audit Office). 2008. Potential Managed Realignment at Medmerry, West 
Sussex [letter, 25/4/2008]. 
 
30
 Environment Agency in partnership with Chichester and Arun District Councils. 2008. Planning 
for the Future: Pagham to East Head draft coastal defence strategy. Summary Document. 
Environment Agency in partnership with Chichester and Arun District Councils. 
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business and community representatives, but on the other stressed that change 
was being forced through. 
Activist A (Selsey) explains that by that stage MPSG had made an 
assessment that it had got as far as it could possibly go with the things that it 
wanted to get done – whilst it had lost the argument over realignment at 
Medmerry, it had made sure that a local farmer would be compensated and that 
nobody would lose their homes. Confirming a change of mobilization strategy for 
MPSG, he adds:  
It looked like we would be able to get much better public access through there 
and it might help improve our economy, so we wanted to open the door to 
influencing positively the managed realignment. 
 
Subsequently, and with specific reference to the managed realignment 
scheme at Medmerry, the EA supported the formation of the Medmerry 
Stakeholder Advisory Group (MStAG)31, comprising a group of ‘key local 
stakeholders’ which, although not a decision-making body, had a remit to ensure 
the community was involved throughout the implementation phase. Members 
were sought from all local councils affected by the proposal to ensure that all 
residents were officially represented, with a balance of different interests 
additionally sought to include businesses, landowners, recreational interests, 
agriculture and horticulture, fishing, and community and environmental groups.  
EA officer A (Selsey) explains that, through MStAG, the EA tried to make it fair 
and balanced, so that nobody felt excluded and allowed participants as much as 
possible to have a share in how the process was taken forward.  Activist A 
(Selsey) agreed that: 
 
 
31
 Environment Agency (EA). 2011b. Draft Terms of Reference for the Medmerry Stakeholder 
Advisory Group: Implementation Phase. [Online] Available at: http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/static/documents/Leisure/Terms_of_Reference_MStAG_Mtg_Feb11_pdf.pdf 
[Accessed 14/2/13]. 
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We had a good opportunity to hammer home the points that we wanted in the 
fine detail, and the EA made quite a lot of effort to try and engage with local 
people.   
 
In terms of the influence over policy that local people were able to bring 
to bear, Town/parish councillor (Selsey) considers the efforts of the groups with 
which he had been involved such as SOS and MPSG, as well as Selsey Town 
Council, to have been successful in terms of changes that people had wanted to 
see made to the strategy. Significant amongst these, he suggests, was turning 
round the idea of managed realignment so that it was acknowledged that the 
primary purpose was coastal defence rather than compensatory habitat, and 
would be maintained as such.  Activist A (Selsey) cites as a ‘key win’ the revision 
to the strategy that saw the Selsey urban sea front reconsidered as a single 
frontage with a policy of ‘Hold the Line’ and the fact that the owner of Bunn 
Leisure had been allowed to build his own defences (albeit at his own cost). 
Whilst he considers dealing with decision makers to have been very difficult and 
continues to have misgivings in this regard, he also points to an improvement in 
terms of the involvement of local people in relevant decisions. He describes 
MStAG as ‘excellent’, although his endorsement comes with the caveat that the 
main battle had already been lost, and that such ‘proper’ engagement was 
essentially over the terms of the defeat.  
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Sheppey  
 
Social, economic and geographical profile 
 
 
Sheppey lies in the borough of Swale on the Thames Estuary in north east Kent. 
Swale comprises three main areas focused on the towns of Sittingbourne, 
Faversham, and Sheerness on Sheppey; and is bounded by Medway district to 
the west, by Canterbury to the east, Ashford to the south and Maidstone to the 
south west (Swale BC, [no date]c: 1).  The population of Swale is 137,700 
according to figures for June 2012 (ONS, [no date]h. This study places a 
particular focus on two areas on Sheppey (population 40,300) [Swale BC, {no 
date}d] – Leysdown and Warden, with a ward population of 3,019 (ONS, [no 
date]d), and Minster Cliffs with 7,513 (ONS, [no date]e). 
Figure 4: The Isle of Sheppey 
 
 
Source: Map data © 2014 Google 
 
Swale is predominantly rural, and there is a close association between 
the nature of the countryside and agriculture (Swale BC, [no date]b: 2), with 
around 80% of land managed through agriculture. (Swale BC, [no date]b: 11) For 
employment, Swale’s main industrial sectors are distribution, hotels and catering 
(24%) and public administration, education and health (22%), with proportions 
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broadly similar to the regional and national averages. The largest private sector 
employers are in the industrial and transportation sectors, whilst another 
important local employer is the cluster of prisons on Sheppey. The tourism sector 
is also a significant provider of local jobs through, for example caravan parks on 
Sheppey and bed and breakfast accommodation (Swale BC, [no date]c: 2).  
The age profile of Swale is broadly in line with those for the South East 
and for England as a whole (ONS, [no date]k), whilst ethnically the borough is 
predominantly white – more so than the South East, and significantly more so 
than England (ONS [no date]j).  
Only 18.6% of working age residents in Swale hold a degree or higher 
qualification, significantly below the regional (30.8%) and national (28.6%) 
averages, whilst the proportion with no qualifications (19.2%) is double the 
regional average (9.6%), and also above the national figure (13.1%) [Swale BC, 
[no date]c: 5]. Though improving, Swale’s poor skills profile is related to an 
employer demand which, historically, has not tended to require the high skill 
levels that are increasingly in demand nationally. In August 2011, 3.8% of 
Swale’s working age population were receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance, similar to 
the national figure although slightly higher than those for Kent and the South 
East (Swale BC, 2011: 8). 
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Table 12: Top 15 most deprived Super Output Areas in Swale according to the 
Index of Deprivation 2007  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Swale BC, [no date]a: Appendix A). 
 
 
Swale is amongst the most deprived boroughs within Kent, and sits 
within the most deprived 35% of local authorities nationally (Swale BC, [no 
date]a: 29). Nine Super Output Areas (ONS, [no date]b) on Sheppey are within 
the 20% most deprived areas nationally (Swale BC, [no date]a: 30), and 
Sheppey is home to 11 of the 15 most deprived SOAs in Swale (see Table 12). 
Two of these are in the ward of Leysdown and Warden (Swale BC, [no date]b: 
Appendix A). Swale has high levels of both registered social landlord stock 
(14%) relative to the South East average (8.7%), and housing owner-occupation 
(77.88%) compared the England average (69%) (Swale BC, [no date]a: 15). 
Rank Ward Rank of 
IMD 
1 Sheerness East 899 
2 Leysdown & Warden 1040 
3 Murston 1451 
4 Sheerness West 1576 
5 Sheerness West 2345 
6 Queenborough & Halfway 2780 
7 Sheppey Central 3162 
8 Sheerness West 3473 
9 Milton Regis 4738 
10 Davington 4814 
11 Leysdown & Warden 5231 
12 Sheppey Central 5416 
13 Sheerness East 5911 
14 Kemsley 6198 
15 Sheerness West 6390 
92 
 
Twenty six per cent (approximately 10,900 ha) of land in the borough is 
designated either for its international or national value for biodiversity (Swale BC, 
[no date]b: 2). Natural processes have a strong influence on the area, with large 
areas of land subject to coastal erosion and tidal flooding (Swale BC, [no date]b: 
18) – most notably in 1953 and 1978 (Swale BC, [no date]b: 20). Sea-level rise is 
expected to lead to increasing ‘coastal squeeze’ (Swale BC, [no date]b: 16).  
 
The Isle of Grain to South Foreland Shoreline Management 
Plan  
 
Formally approved in 201032, the Shoreline Management Plan (SMP) for the Isle 
of Grain to South Foreland is a ‘high level document’ that provides a large-scale 
assessment of the risks associated with coastal processes and presents a long-
term policy framework to reduce these risks to people and the developed, 
historic and natural environment in a sustainable manner (Defra, 2003).  The 
SMP explains that for much of the coastline the recommended plan is to 
maintain existing defences in the long term. On Sheppey, however, the final plan 
identifies losses under preferred policies at Policy Unit 4a04 (Minster Slopes to 
Warden Bay) with the accompanying assessment that one property is at risk in 
the medium term (2025-2055), and 20 in the long term (2055-2105)33, and at 
Policy Unit 4a06 (Leysdown-on-Sea to Shell Ness) where ‘set back’ under a 
preferred policy of managed realignment would involve the loss of houses at 
Shell Ness (Canterbury CC, 2010a: 69). 
Commencing in the Winter of 2005-06, the SMP was developed through 
a Client Steering Group (CSG) made up of local authorities, the EA and other 
key bodies including NE, EH, and representatives from consultants to the 
 
32
 Willison, T (Environment Agency). 2010. Shoreline Management Plan Review (SMP) Isle of 
Grain to South Foreland [letter, 31/8/2010]. 
 
33
 Canterbury City Council (Canterbury CC). 2010a. Isle of Grain to South Foreland Shoreline 
Management Plan Review. Canterbury City Council. 
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project.34 Whilst this group had overall responsibility for the delivery of the SMP, 
a Key Stakeholder Forum (KSF) was intended to act as a focal point for 
discussion and consultation for the project, with members providing 
representation of the primary interests within the study area. To this end, stress 
was placed on the KSF including representatives of those significantly affected 
by the outcomes of the SMP review process including representation of the 
public.35 Members of the KSF included EA staff, local authority members and 
staff, consultants, environmental groups, non-departmental public bodies, 
industrial and commercial interests, and bodies with a specific coastal interest 
(e.g. a coastal architect). 
‘Other stakeholders’, including parish and town councils, coastal 
landowners, and residents associations, were not included in the KSF, although 
it was intended that these should be contacted by the project developers at the 
start of the process, and as consultees on draft decisions.36 Thus, it might be 
observed that those who risked the loss of their homes under any resulting plans 
were significantly reliant on their interests being represented effectively by key 
stakeholders and elected members during policy development, and subsequently 
through public consultation once the draft plan had been finalised.37 However, 
consultation responses made with regard to the resulting proposals questioned 
the effectiveness of the consultation process; and an analysis of relevant policy 
literature and media coverage, and interviews with local politicians, invite further 
 
34
 Canterbury City Council (Canterbury CC). 2010b. Isle of Grain to South Foreland Shoreline 
Management Plan Review. Appendix A: SMP Development. Canterbury City Council. 
  
35
 Canterbury City Council (Canterbury CC). 2010c. Isle of Grain to South Foreland Shoreline 
Management Plan Review. Appendix B: Stakeholder Engagement. Canterbury City Council. 
 
36
 Ibid. 
 
37
 Canterbury City Council (Canterbury CC). 2010c. Isle of Grain to South Foreland Shoreline 
Management Plan Review. Appendix B: Stakeholder Engagement. Canterbury City Council. 
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consideration of how effectively the process as a whole incorporated such 
interests.   
A process of policy development saw regular meetings of the KSF, and 
elected members were informed that at one such meeting representatives of the 
Friends of North Kent Marshes and the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) had 
proposed contacting anyone directly affected by the policy decisions to give them 
the opportunity to be involved, and that it may also be necessary to meet with 
them. However, the chair of the Elected Members Forum – himself a local 
politician – expressed concern regarding personal levels of public consultation 
on the grounds that ‘objections may have a major impact upon the final SMP 
document and policy choices’.38 
Such a response appears to conflate awareness of proposals with 
objection, and objection in turn with threats to a successful policy. It also raises 
questions concerning the orientation of elected members to, respectively, the 
interests of their constituents, and central government policy in this process – 
mirroring, and even amplifying, the dilemma attending Local Authority coastal 
engineer A (Selsey)’s role in the Selsey case.  
We might also usefully pay attention to the constitution, in terms of 
interest, of KSF meetings – arguably the principal vehicle by which particular 
interests might shape the direction of the SMP. The first such meeting was 
devoted in part to attendees considering what was important in the future 
management of the coast, which they did in two groups. The first of these groups 
(comprising representatives from consultants Halcrow, EA, NE, RSPB, Kent 
Wildlife Trust, NFU and Kent Wildfowlers Association) appears to have had a 
significantly pro-environmental conservation flavour. The second group 
comprised a local politician, a representative each from transport infrastructure 
 
38
 Ibid. 
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and utilities companies, and two EA officers.39  From these two groups 
combined, the attendees from central government agencies number five of 
thirteen (nearly 40%), and with the inclusion of a consultant to the project the 
proportion rises to nearly half (46%).  
For the second KSF meeting, 10 of 38 attendees were either from the 
EA or NE, augmented by no fewer than seven consultants. Again, then, nearly 
half of those in attendance (44.7%) were associated with organisations holding 
key project ownership or advisory positions via the CSG. By contrast, only one 
elected member was present – incidentally, the same one who had advised 
against personal consultation with affected parties.  For the third and final KSF 
meeting, of 39 attendees just under a quarter (nine) were from with the EA or 
NE, with a further three consultants. Again, only one elected member was 
present, raising the question as to how effectively any relevant balance of 
interests was brought to bear via such an arrangement. 
Whilst unmediated input from those directly affected was discouraged at 
this point, Local Authority coastal engineer B (Sheppey) recalls there being 
objections to aspects of the draft policy from the farming community, and it is of 
note both that the NFU was a key stakeholder involved in the relevant meetings, 
and that Local Authority councillor A (Sheppey) – closely involved in key 
stakeholder meetings – agrees that perhaps as a farmer he emphasised the 
agricultural with regard to deliberation.  
Local Authority coastal engineer B (Sheppey) explains that where there 
was conflict in the setting of the policy, resolution generally came through 
assessing what the objectives of the SMP were and applying them accordingly 
although, he stresses, not necessarily to the satisfaction of all. Whilst it would 
appear to make sense that disputes should be resolved in this way, we might 
observe first that the polity in this case had acted to limit the likelihood of 
 
39
 Ibid. 
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particular disputes, and second that Local Authority coastal engineer B 
(Sheppey) and others had concerns over the weighting of relevant interests in 
decision-making – reflected, as we have seen, in the numerical composition of 
the main deliberative forum. In a statement echoing those voiced by MPSG in 
the Manhood Peninsula case, albeit in less strident terms, Local Authority 
coastal engineer B (Sheppey) explains:  
 
The environmental side, particularly when frontages are an internationally 
designated area, does seem to score quite highly, and everyone says ‘Oh, well, 
can’t do much about it – European law says we’ve got to protect this, or improve 
it’, and that’s got higher weighting, possibly even, than the community interest. 
 
 
Canterbury City Council’s formal consultation response to the draft 
strategy (whilst having no representative role with regard to Sheppey), makes 
reference to various issues, including that of effects on homeowners it 
associates with: 
 
…the rush to try to set back as much of the coast as possible under the 
environmental lobby.40 
 
 
Completion of the draft plan saw the commencement of public 
consultation.  According to the Operating Authority, this involved press notices 
and briefings, the development of briefing packs and leaflets, posters, letters to 
the extended stakeholder group, copies of SMP documents in both hard and 
digital formats, consultation response forms, and the organisation of public and 
stakeholder meetings. Letter drops by local authorities to properties on parts of 
the coastline, including Sheppey, where properties were considered to be 
directly affected by the proposed policies, were also reported, whilst face-to-face 
 
40
 Canterbury City Council (Canterbury CC). 2007. Isle of Grain to North Foreland SMP Review – 
Consultation Response. Canterbury: Canterbury City Council. Whilst signed by the portfolio holder, 
it may be relevant that the name given for contact for the submission is that of Local Authority 
coastal engineer B (Sheppey) himself. It is not unreasonable to suggest, then, that disputes were 
settled with reference to a set of guidelines, supported by national policies, that were considered 
less than satisfactory by key parties and so of questionable value for providing useful mediation.  
 
97 
 
meetings in such cases were proposed, although only if stakeholder response 
indicated that they were required.41 Local Authority coastal engineer A (Sheppey) 
explains that on Sheppey it was done:  
…by informing as best we could all the residents who were likely to be affected 
and anyone else in the general area, and then having a small public exhibition.   
 
Discussion with officials and written comment were both encouraged. He 
makes the judgement that this approach worked fairly well although, again, the 
response was less than he had hoped for. 
Concerns around compensation and blight for those with property in 
areas likely to be ‘realigned’ and the effectiveness of the consultation process 
were identified by the Operating Authority as key themes to emerge from 
consultation. However, when compared to other areas identified for potential loss 
of homes by the draft plan, public responses from the two Sheppey frontages 
must be considered limited. Minster-on-Sea Parish Council objected to the policy 
at the Minster Slopes to Warden Bay frontage, as did individuals who, in 
observing that they were sure that other residents would agree if they knew of 
the plan, raised the wider question as to how the interests of residents as ‘other 
stakeholders’ had been accommodated in all stages of the planning. There were 
no responses of any kind from the public with regard to the Leysdown-on-Sea to 
Shell Ness frontage.42  
How might this be explained? A reading of case-specific policy literature 
and interviews with local authority councillors concerned about the implications 
of SMPs attest to efforts on the part of the local authority and the EA to inform 
 
41
 Canterbury City Council (Canterbury CC). 2010c. Isle of Grain to South Foreland Shoreline 
Management Plan Review. Appendix B: Stakeholder Engagement. Canterbury City Council. 
 
42
 Canterbury City Council (Canterbury CC). 2010c. Isle of Grain to South Foreland Shoreline 
Management Plan Review. Appendix B: Stakeholder Engagement. Canterbury City Council. 
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local people of the plan and its implications for them and, on the other, a range of 
factors that may have inhibited both awareness and response.  
A number of public meetings devoted to the SMP took place in the 
Swale area, and on Sheppey in particular, and these saw the expression of 
concerns. At a Swale Rural Forum meeting in August 2006 issues were raised 
over how areas of coastline to save might be identified, and the likelihood of 
homes being lost in the future due to coastal erosion.43 More recently, a Swale 
Rural Forum meeting in Eastchurch, Sheppey, in January 2013 featured a 
presentation on the realignment of sea defences from EA staff.44 
Local Authority councillor B (Sheppey) stresses the opportunities 
presented by these and similar public meetings (indeed, he requested the 
relevant agenda item at the most recent).  He explains:  
 
The problem is they don’t get enough people out there to come, and that when 
they do they just don’t bring it up regarding realigning the sea defences.  
 
He goes on to argue that whilst EA presentations on the SMP are ‘fairly 
clear’, they are vague on specifics. He is unsure as to whether there has been 
concern over people losing their homes as nobody had approached him, 
stressing that when people did find out it would be of great concern to them. 
Local Authority councillor A (Sheppey) gives a rather more positive 
account of attendance at public meetings: 
 
43
 Swale Borough Council (Swale BC). 2006. Swale Rural Forum: Minutes of the Meeting held at 
the De Lacey hall, Broadway, Sheerness on Tuesday 1st August 2006 from 7:04pm to 9:05pm. 
[Online} Available at: 
http://www2.swale.gov.uk/dso/download/7442C0F41EC943B381C05E008D51CC32.pdf [Accessed 
20 February 2013]. 
 
44
 Swale Borough Council (Swale BC). 2013. Swale Rural Forum: Minutes of the Meeting helad at 
Eastchurch Village Hall, Warden Road, Eastchurch, Isle of Sheppey on Tuesday 8 January 2013 
from 7:00pm to 9:13pm. [Online] Available at: 
http://www2.swale.gov.uk/dso/viewminutes.asp?uid=1300 {Accessed 22 February 2013]. 
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Some of the meetings we ran it was obvious that a lot of them had very particular 
personal interests. It was the landowners, it was the owners of holiday parks, in 
some case – particularly in the meeting on Sheppey – it was people whose 
houses were likely to disappear into the sea over the course of the next hundred 
years.  
 
However, he counters this by observing that it is very difficult for the 
ordinary man in the street, or even the parish council, to feel that they have a 
genuine influence and, tellingly, from his informed position of polity membership 
in the setting of the SMP, he adds: 
You do sometimes get the impression that the decisions are made and then 
communicated to you. 
 
Despite the presence of the press in the strategy’s communications plan, 
little use appears to have been made of local newspapers for the purpose of 
encouraging awareness of and responses to the implications of the draft SMP. 
Whilst a 2009 article in the Sheerness Times Guardian reported that there were 
around 7,500 residential and industrial properties on Sheppey at risk of flooding, 
and explained that an SMP was being compiled (Grove, 2009), no mention was 
made of any risk that Sheppey residents might lose their homes.45  
It is possible, of course, that people at risk on Sheppey were aware of 
the SMP and had no issue with what was proposed and its implications. Local 
Authority coastal engineer B (Sheppey) explains that a follow-up exhibition, held 
in Eastchurch on Sheppey in May 2013 and devoted to the Minster/Warden Bay 
frontage – most of which, he explained, had never been defended, and where 
erosion was to be allowed to happen – was very well attended. He offers the 
possible explanation for such interest that people realised that the authorities 
 
45
 A field trip to Sheppey included a conversation with the journalist who had written the article in 
question. Research notes record that whilst she stressed that it was a long time ago and that she 
didn’t have a special journalistic interest in the subject, she did tentatively venture the view – 
apparently corroborated by a colleague – that authorities would generally make more noise around 
a major consultation, and that she thought she would have remembered had that happened. 
Though admittedly anecdotal, this account appears broadly to support the argument that the local 
press was not best used for the purposes of raising the awareness and interest of local people. 
 
100 
 
meant what they had been saying, and so were more prone to coming forward 
with their comments. If so, this would seem to support the idea that the 
perception of threat to people’s personal interests – advanced by Local Authority 
coastal engineer A (Selsey), and reinforced by Local Authority councillor A 
(Sheppey) – can be key to people becoming active on the issue. Such a thesis is 
also in step with the suggestion that, arguably, the exhibition made the 
implications of change more explicit than had previously be the case. Difficult to 
calibrate, however, is Local Authority coastal engineer B (Sheppey)’s expression 
of surprise that:  
 
…the vast majority of the comments was: ‘Well, yeah, OK we accept it’s got to 
happen, but there’s things we’d like you to do to help us, including indications of 
time, and in some places some diversion of private roads and these sorts of 
things’. 
 
 
However, a fresh perspective might be usefully sought in considering 
how different responses from local residents have been in the respective cases 
to a similar order of threat. And in terms of the involvement of local people in the 
making of policy, we might wonder at the wisdom of the Operating Authority not 
making early and meaningful contact with those likely to be affected on Sheppey 
with a view to prompting precisely the kind of interest it appears to have been so 
keen to avoid. 
To conclude on the Sheppey case, as with Selsey, there is evidence to 
support the view that social characteristics, combined with a distinctive cultural 
make up, may together inform the pattern of representation – if indeed that is the 
right word to use. Local Authority coastal engineer B (Sheppey) observes that: 
 
It is generally people over 65 who respond. A married couple with a couple of 
young kids it is almost impossible, because they don’t have the time. 
 
 
Such a prescription must be taken in tandem with a judgement by the 
MP for Sittingbourne and Sheppey from 1997-2010 (MP [Sheppey]) who 
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graphically describes a constituency fundamentally lacking what he considered 
to be the skills required for effective representation. Tellingly, he qualifies this 
already worrying judgement with the observation: 
 
I was shocked at the lack of understanding in Sittingbourne and Sheppey – 
especially on the island. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Selsey and Sheppey offer commonalities and contrasts concerning the nature 
and effectiveness of local efforts to influence policy and their relationship to the 
socio-demographic composition of the locale. Both have relatively narrow 
industrial and commercial bases that appear reliant on the service sector and, 
significantly tourism; they also share poor educational achievement and a 
relatively low employer demand for skills. Both are significantly ethnically 
homogeneous, with high levels of home-ownership relative to national figures.  
At both sites, draft proposals were developed that suggested the loss of 
homes, and then publicised. Consultation literature suggests that in neither case 
was the early and direct involvement of the public encouraged. Rather, draft 
policies were developed ‘behind closed doors’ with public interests pursued 
through elected representatives. In terms of Tilly’s (1978) Polity model, citizen 
groups might best be categorized as ‘low-return’ challengers, albeit with potential 
for influence through their representatives’ polity membership. 
In both cases the limiting of opportunity in this way gave rise to negative 
responses via the respective consultation processes, consistent with Foot’s 
(2009) finding about frustration with the barriers that limit involvement.  It is also 
of note that, consistent with Fletcher’s (2007) findings, one elected 
representative active in the Sheppey case, and with a responsibility for public 
representation, expressed concerns over the robustness of decision-making 
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processes, and specifically inequality of opportunities for local people to 
influence decision-making (2007: 618). 
Following the setting of draft policies, in both cases attempts were made 
to raise public awareness of proposals through consultation exercises and 
feedback sought, although with limits in each case as to the nature and extent of 
possible changes to draft policies. Comparable dissemination methods were 
employed to this end, with public meetings and exhibitions at both sites 
successful to at least some degree in attracting attention from those concerned 
about loss of homes.46  
For all of these commonalities, there was a stark disparity between the 
nature and volume of formal consultation responses from this specific interest 
between the two sites. In the Selsey case, authorities acknowledge a large and 
hostile response to initial draft strategy proposals from locales that considered 
themselves to be at risk – to the extent, arguably, that through concerted 
collective action residents’ interests appear to have grabbed the attention of 
policy makers counter to the prescriptions of the original plan. By way of 
contrast, very little was heard from similar areas in the Sheppey case at a similar 
stage in the process.  
Of potential relevance is that the two locations offer contrasting age 
profiles. In line with findings from Myatt et al (2003, 2003a) a greater response 
from the older Selsey population may be predictable – in line with the working 
assumptions held, albeit with qualifications, by the local authority coastal 
engineers in each case. In addition, the two sites differ in terms of relative 
deprivation; Selsey occupies a middling position in the IMD, whilst Sheppey 
stands out as markedly deprived. To this end, it is perhaps predictable that 
 
46
 We might observe, then, a broad parity in terms of opportunity for local interests to exert 
influence in each case. In terms of calibration using the ‘Conceptualising Citizen Participation 
model adapted from Arnstein (Table 9), both appear to belong in the broad category of 
‘Consultation’, as a variant of ‘Tokenism’. Whilst this can be a step towards genuine citizen 
participation, it is itself no guarantee of influence.  
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Selsey mounted what was widely considered to be effective representation 
through carefully coordinated collective action in that it resulted in changes to the 
draft CDS, whilst the response from Sheppey was muted, where it existed at all. 
This appears to be in step with Zsamboky et al’s (2011) argument that in 
disadvantaged communities low incomes or unemployment are considered more 
pressing than issues of coastal change, and that communities may lack 
necessary adaptive capacity to respond to climate change.  To recast using 
Tilly’s terms, we might ask whether the costs of influence for citizens as 
challengers was simply too high. 
By this reading, such a deficit places an onus on institutional capacity – 
in this context, the ways in which institutions as polity members seek to ensure 
that the relevant people are included in decision-making processes. In addition to 
processes that relied on the proxy representation of interests, and which in the 
Sheppey case discouraged early communication between elected 
representatives and constituents, we might also highlight as an institutional 
failing the fact that policy proposals were considered hard to understand – 
especially so on Sheppey – with evidence in support of Zsamboky et al’s (2011) 
argument that an absence of clarity contributes to apathy. However, in the 
Selsey case, Local Authority coastal engineer A’s account has it that explicit 
threat was employed by authorities as a means of arousing public response, with 
self-interest broadly considered the a ‘trigger’ for attention in both cases  
amongst those officers and elected representatives with responsibilities for 
raising public awareness.47  
Finally, and supporting Milligan et al’s (2009) observation around the 
difficulties in balancing conflicting objectives, a major finding has been the 
 
47
 Here, local elected representatives and officers occupy roles in the setting of policy that appear 
nuanced to the point, at times, of appearing contradictory. On the one hand, they have a 
responsibility to constituents in ensuring their interests are represented and, on the other, to the 
‘safe’ passage of the policy. 
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relative power of interests active within the polity, with concerns expressed that 
powerful environmental interests both proliferated and enjoyed privileged, ‘low-
cost’ positions of influence as key stakeholders.  Perhaps less visibly, there is 
also an argument to be made that operating authorities themselves acted as 
both mediators of process and proxies of a dominant and demonstrably 
controversial central government interest. In both cases operating authorities 
expressed contentment that objections were handled and disputes resolved 
according to the terms of reference for the respective processes, and faith in the 
deliberative method. And in both cases, these same methodologies were 
challenged, as were the central government rationales and policies that 
underpinned them. However, unlike other relevant interests, these were not 
disciplined by any process of mediation as part of the planning process, but 
instead represented non-negotiable parameters to which operating authorities 
made appeal through ideas of what was ‘pragmatic’ or ‘sensible’.  
 
Transferability  
 
Whilst MMO categories are not sufficiently fine-grained to map directly onto the 
settlements under consideration in these case studies (there is no analysis 
against Super Output Area, for example), they are adequate for making cautious 
observations as to the broad applicability of evidence to other parts of the 
country where coastal change with loss of homes is anticipated. For example, 
the Chichester district (of which Selsey is a part) features nearly one third of 
settlements typified by the MMO as ‘Silver Seaside’ (four times the regional 
average) – retirement areas that are, for example, smaller, less developed, 
reliant on tourism and non-standard employment arrangements.  As such, we 
might note the symmetry with Selsey, and also that there may be some read-
across to the south west of England, for which 12.6% of settlements fall into the 
105 
 
same category, and where the EA’s ‘best estimate’ envisions the loss to erosion 
of 136 homes over 20 years and nearly 800 over 100 years (see Table 13). 
Table 13: Erosion property counts for the south west of England – buildings 
affected under SMP preferred policies 
 
Local 
authority 
Region 20 yrs 50 yrs 100 yrs 
  5%ile 50%ile 95%ile 5%ile 50%ile 95%ile 5%ile 50%ile 95%ile 
North Somerset SW 3 3 3 4 3 3 9 8 6 
South 
Gloucestershire 
SW 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Cornwall SW 93 76 44 171 132 86 478 273 160 
Torbay SW 2 0 0 10 7 3 13 12 9 
Isles of Scilly SW 6 1 1 34 24 11 49 41 38 
East Devon SW 0 0 0 5 3 0 73 62 5 
North Devon SW 0 0 0 2 1 1 5 4 2 
South Hams SW 43 38 34 99 89 50 149 121 100 
Teignbridge SW 3 1 1 6 5 4 9 8 5 
Torridge SW 6 5 5 19 13 7 25 22 20 
West Devon SW 7 7 6 9 9 7 10 9 9 
Christchurch SW 0 0 0 11 7 2 11 7 2 
Purbeck SW 1 1 1 7 3 1 86 78 43 
West Dorset SW 11 4 2 53 34 20 169 94 60 
Weymouth and 
Portland 
SW 1 0 0 8 6 3 40 23 8 
Sedgemoor SW 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 15 15 
West Somerset SW 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 1 1 
TOTAL  176 136 97 439 336 198 1150 778 483 
 
Source: Environment Agency48 
 
 
48
 Hardiman, N., nick.hardiman@environment-agency.gov.uk. 2012.  Re: Homes to be lost to the 
sea. [Email] Message to C. Blunkell (chris.blunkell@btinternet.com). Sent Tuesday 6 November 
2012, 17:14. [Accessed 10 December 2013].  Figures extrapolated from data supplied upon 
request by the Environment Agency in 2012. No formal methodology was supplied, although an 
accompanying email explained that the data covered projected loss of homes to coastal erosion in 
England and Wales (and excluding homes loss to managed realignment), and that the 5%ile, 
50%ile and 95%ile figures represented ‘worst case’, ‘best estimate’ and ‘best case’ projections 
respectively (Hardiman, 2012).  
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Similarly, we might note that 23.25% of Swale settlements, more than 
twice the regional average, are adjudged to fall into the ‘Structural Shifters’ 
category - towns and cities that have lost primary markets and are struggling to 
find new ones, characterised by above average employment in manufacturing, 
benefits, and long-term illness; and below average qualifications, employment 
and jobs growth. Again, we might observe symmetry with the Yorkshire and 
Humberside region (MMO, 2011: 27), where the EA’s ‘best estimate’ envisions 
the loss to erosion of 50 homes over 20 years and over 400 over 100 years (see 
Table 14). 
Table 14: Erosion property counts for the south west of England – buildings 
affected under SMP preferred policies 
 
Local 
authority 
Region 20 yrs 50 yrs 100 yrs 
  5%ile 50%ile 95%ile 5%ile 50%ile 95%ile 5%ile 50%ile 95%ile 
East Riding 
of 
Yorkshire 
YH 56 38 27 130 106 79 291 204 134 
Scarborough YH 25 12 3 109 83 50 281 203 124 
TOTAL  81 50 30 239 189 129 572 407 258 
 
Source: Environment Agency49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49
 Ibid. 
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Chapter 5: MOBILIZING INTEREST AT LOCAL  
    LEVEL 
 
This chapter addresses questions concerning whether and how people in 
communities at risk mount collective action in search of influence over coastal 
planning policies. In so doing, it offers a narrative description of such processes. 
Previous chapters confirm significant commonalities between the local cases in 
the approaches to public involvement taken by the respective operating 
authorities (and attendant issues concerning the clarity of propositions). In 
neither was the early involvement of the public in the setting of policy 
encouraged, and issues with regard to the clarity of propositions, and with 
consultation processes, were raised in both.  However, Selsey mounted what 
was widely considered to be effective representation through grassroots 
collective action, arguably resulting in a degree of influence, whereas no such 
action occurred on Sheppey.  Thus, we might observe an expression of interest 
in both cases, but significant divergence in how this translates to organization 
and mobilization.   
Accordingly, the second purpose of this chapter is to explain and 
compare relevant collective action in terms of socio-economic context. In pursuit 
of a ‘meso’ analysis, then, this chapter makes use of two analytical approaches. 
The first, Tilly’s Mobilization model, will be employed in the descriptive study of 
how, in each case, the interests of local people either translated into action, or 
did not. The Mobilization model (see Figure 2) has it that the main determinants 
of a group’s mobilization are: 
 
…its organization, its interests in possible interactions with other contenders, the 
current opportunity/threat of those interactions and the group’s subjection to 
repression (1978: 56).  
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Whereas Tilly’s Polity model was employed in considering the practices 
of government and other key contenders, this chapter is focused more 
specifically on the ways in which people work collectively in pursuit of 
opportunity.   
Second, this chapter will employ Bourdieu’s Theory of Capitals in 
developing a more nuanced explanation of the interaction and economic, social 
and cultural factors that may enable or limit the propensities and capacities of 
people in each case to work together in seeking influence. 
Although concerned primarily with evidence from the Selsey and 
Sheppey case studies, findings from the third National Voice of Coastal 
Communities (NVCC) case study are also used to inform judgments of contrast 
and commonality as appropriate, in support of a broader understanding as to 
how the nature of collective action and any resulting degree of influence might be 
linked.   
 
Coastal change – interest, organization and mobilization 
 
 
Sheppey and Selsey share certain socio-demographic characteristics – not least 
low educational attainment, a reliance on a low-skilled and seasonal work, and a 
relatively high reliance on state support in one form or another.  They also share 
above average levels of owner-occupation. Another similarity concerns their 
relative geographies – a shared urban-rural classification, and a historical 
vulnerability to flooding and coastal erosion. And although Selsey sits on the 
mainland as part of the Manhood Peninsula whilst Sheppey is an island, both 
have been significantly reliant on a single road for their main physical connection 
to the rest of society, and we will see that this theme of outside contact is highly 
salient. In short, we might argue that people in and around Selsey succeeded in 
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mobilizing resource from beyond their geographical boundaries in their efforts to 
exert influence over coastal policy, while Sheppey did not.  
 
Mobilizing interest – Selsey 
 
Town/parish councillor B (Selsey) explains, in the context of negotiation over the 
Medmerry realignment scheme for the provision of an alternative route for 
emergency vehicles, that there is only one road into Selsey. However, we might 
observe that the single road has been well used by activists, metaphorically, for 
the purposes of mobilizing resources – not least in the form of coalitions – from 
beyond Selsey’s geographical borders.  
During the period in which the draft Pagham to East Head Coast 
Defence Strategy (CDS) [EA et al, 2008] was first made public, efforts to 
mobilize support for action in and around Selsey attracted significant support.  A 
group of concerned individuals was able to bring to the attention of local people a 
synopsis of what was proposed, accompanied by a call to action. Save Our 
Selsey (SOS) was formed at this point, and a public meeting was held in the 
Town Hall – courtesy of Selsey Town Council.  Such was the interest, says 
Activist A (Selsey), that the venue could not accommodate all who wanted to 
attend, to the extent that a local radio journalist was obliged to stand outside and 
hold his microphone through an open window. 
This first public meeting and the accompanying efforts at articulating and 
responding to the threat posed by the draft CDS, he says, galvanised people and 
saw the coming together of a group of eight or nine very committed people who 
were prepared to ‘tread the streets’ and write letters, amongst other things, to 
support the cause.  A second public meeting was staged in a venue provided by 
the owner of the Bunn Leisure caravan park, and was attended by 350 people.  
SOS was able to mobilize existing resources in the shape of a community 
magazine for purposes of raising awareness and free use of the Town Hall, and 
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new resource in the shape of funding – amongst other things, the event raised 
£1,000 including a £500 donation from the caravan park owner, which helped to 
pay for printing.  
The subsequent formation of the Manhood Peninsula Steering Group 
(MPSG) cemented working relationships with, and representation on, various 
other bodies.  The election of Activist A (Selsey) as a local councillor on the SOS 
platform offered the promise of an enhanced opportunity for that interest to be 
represented within the District Council and, given that the Council was a partner, 
that influence might also be exerted on the CDS. MPSG was also successful in 
mobilizing the National Audit Office (NAO) in its scrutiny of Environment Agency 
(EA) consultation practices, whilst membership of NVCC brought the promise of 
coalition with other grassroots groups from around England and Wales, and 
access to the corridors of Whitehall and the Palace of Westminster. 
However, the mobilization of resource in the shape of skilled and 
knowledgeable local help was less easy to achieve – as was continued support 
for action.  In Selsey, some older people had offered to help with SOS research. 
However, Activist A (Selsey) observes that many were not Internet-connected 
and so were effectively excluded.  Nor, he explained, did everybody have the 
wherewithal to research and write cogently.  Thus, a lack of Internet capacity 
appears to combine with a similar deficit of policy and analytical skills – perhaps 
consistent with the local demographic profile in terms of employment type and 
educational profile – in making skilled support difficult to mobilize. 
More broadly, Activist A (Selsey) explains that of those happy to become 
involved, most were more prepared to undertake ‘support’ tasks (such as 
delivering leaflets) than they were, for example, to staff a stand at a community 
event and talk to people.  Fewer still were prepared to make presentations, or to 
attend meetings with officials: 
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Some people it’s time, others are embarrassed as I was to start off with doing 
something where you suddenly have to approach people you don’t know and ask 
them for things, and try and persuade them about something. 
  
  One such was Town/parish councillor B (Selsey) who, feeling at that 
time that he lacked relevant skills, offered to deliver leaflets (although upon 
retiring he joined the committee of SOS and became more involved in policy 
issues and meetings). We will see that professional experience meant that the 
wider demands of political activity as outlined here held few terrors for him. In 
contrast, Activist A (Selsey) observes that those from the adjacent but 
considerably more affluent community of West Wittering, through its parish 
council, had been extraordinarily effective in navigating their away around the 
relevant terrain:  
They’re very astute, professional people, probably retired or not quite retired, so 
they’ve got that nous of the way things work…and that confidence that they can 
take on a system and get it work the way they want it to work.  
 
 Not for them, then, anxiety about attending meetings with officials, which 
invites a more subtle understanding of differential socio-demographic effects 
upon collective action.  Nor, as we will see, did they struggle to mobilize 
resources in the shape of a sizeable contribution towards sea defences.  
Looking beyond the mobilization of direct support in the shape of action 
of some kind, there were also issues around mobilizing a broad support for the 
interests themselves. The SOS argument was that, as well as threatening the 
loss of 300 homes to the sea over time, the draft plan had catastrophic 
implications for the town as whole. Activist A (Selsey) explains:  
 
If you speak to any of the shopkeepers here they say the only reason they 
survive is because of March to November when the park is open. If you had all 
that going on – the worst case scenario –you’d be looking at a small coastal town 
where a third of the properties are either slowly falling into the sea or are flooded 
by the sea, and its major employer had been wiped out.  The shops would all 
close and all the rest of it. 
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At this point he describes the nature of the interest as easy to 
understand: a strategy that had to be either changed or stopped, and given the 
extent and hostility of the response it is clear that this rendering of interest had 
resonance. Nonetheless, Activist A (Selsey) considered a figure of 1,500 people 
indicating support for SOS’s objectives through the group’s new website to be 
underwhelming and, correspondingly, he explains the difficulties of eliciting the 
interest of those whose homes did not appear to be directly at risk under 
recommendations as presented in the draft CDS.  
 Changes to the draft in the light of early representations, whilst 
welcomed by MPSG, saw a further dissipation of local interest. Local Authority 
coastal engineer A (Selsey) reports:  
 
Because we very quickly reached the conclusion that a ‘hold the line’ policy was 
viable around the developed area but not for the adjacent stretch, the concern 
level plummeted. 
 
 
  Confirming this judgment, Activist A (Selsey) suggests that although the 
most obviously pressing issue – that of changing the CDS – appeared to have 
been addressed, the resulting thorny issue of how defences would be funded in 
the future appeared unlikely to be resolved in the short term.  Whereas earlier in 
SOS’s history people had volunteered to do things like deliver leaflets, 
increasingly activities were left to the original small group.  Thus, we might 
observe that in the Selsey case, the local mobilization of interest beyond the 
contributions of its originators appeared to coincide with an immediate and 
focussed threat. 
 
Mobilizing interest – Sheppey 
 
The opening of the road bridge from the mainland at Sittingbourne to Sheppey in 
2006 (BBC, 2006), replacing the slow, vertical-lift Kingsferry bridge, itself can be 
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seen as the result of the kind of collective effort – from grassroots to MP – that 
appears largely absent in the context under study. MP (Sheppey)50 represented 
the constituency of Sittingbourne and Sheppey between 1997 and 2010.51  The 
bridge being built, he says, followed him taking groups prior to his election as MP 
to pitch to the Shadow Secretary of Transport. Of these groups he says:   
 
They didn’t know how to pitch, bless them – had no idea. When we went for the 
first time, I said: ‘You know what? None of these people round the table know 
where Sheppey is. This is Whitehall – you’ve got to come in with pictures, roads 
blocked…’. So we did all that, and we got it – got a £100m bridge. 
 
 
 In some ways, the facilitation of improved links with the mainland – the 
result of a coordinated effort to obtain power and resources as illustrated here – 
appears to run counter to an appetite for isolation. Local Authority councillor A 
(Sheppey) describes ‘an island community with an island mentality’, whilst Local 
Authority coastal engineer B (Sheppey) offers the view that islanders tend to live 
a bit ‘in their own world’. What might be the practical implications of such claims? 
MP (Sheppey) stresses the need when lobbying government for informed 
collaboration between people and the various branches of government – from 
town/parish level, including local authorities, right up to MP. He observes that 
government won’t take any such effort seriously unless people ‘are all in it 
together’ in this way, and that a certain set of skills is required.  
However, he also explains of his time in office, with reference to his 
constituency:  
 
There was just no understanding of how politics worked.  It’s embarrassing really 
– we’re an hour from London and 300 years away…Well, they are an island race 
– they’d have UDI if they could. 
 
50
 Research notes accompanying interview, which was conducted at his suggestion in a central 
London wine bar, revealed him to be well-spoken, personable, opinionated, and comfortable with 
displaying his learning and the influential social circles in which he moved. 
 
51
 Wyatt, D. [no date]a. About Derek Wyatt. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.derekwyatt.co.uk/about-derek-wyatt.aspx [Accessed 18 August 2013]. 
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 The remark concerning UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) 
might easily be categorised as entertaining hyperbole, and was initially 
dismissed as such for research purposes. However, the seriousness of the 
observation was underlined during a research study workshop at Queenborough, 
Sheppey, as part of the European Coastal Communities 2150 project 
(CC2150)52. There, during a ‘visioning’ discussion on climate resilience and 
energy security, proposals from local people that in the future Sheppey should 
be independent in terms of its energy provision, and more generally, became 
increasingly strident – to the extent that UDI was proposed by one participant to 
nods of approval, only partially softened by the counter-proposal by a parish 
councillor that contact with the mainland should not be abandoned completely.  If 
MP (Sheppey)’s understanding of meaningful mobilization is to be entertained – 
broadly, that it requires strong coalitions of interest to be formed including formal 
representation at local, regional and national levels – then such sentiments 
surely run counter to it.  
Returning to the SMP, the expression of local interest as it applied to 
Sheppey residents appears to have been significantly contingent on the efforts of 
local councillors themselves.  Whilst there was a small number of written 
responses from people concerned about the implications of the draft SMP, Local 
Authority councillor B (Sheppey) had not been approached on the issue in his 
capacity as a borough and parish councillor, despite the fact that public meetings 
devoted to the SMP had seen the expression of concerns from a range of 
interested parties – including those fearing the loss of their homes.  
The project manager for CC2150 confirms that efforts to obtain feedback 
on climate change effects from people on Sheppey for research purposes, a 
 
52
 Funded by INTERREG 2 Seas Programme and European Development Funds. Partners 
involved Environment Agency, Kent County Council, Alterra (Stichting DLO), Province West-
Vlaaderen and Agency for Maritime and Coastal Services – Coastal Division. (Environment 
Agency, 2013a: 1)  
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subject that might reasonably be expected to cover sea level rise and coastal 
erosion (and the consequent threat to homes), had resulted in 1,000 responses, 
with comments from over 500 people. However, she explains that:   
 
Any comments we received about issues including erosion and defences were 
generic and applied to the whole of our study areas.  In addition, none were 
given by people whose homes were directly affected.53 
 
 
Thus, an effort that might have been expected to pick up any concern 
around loss of homes (despite not being dedicated to that sole issue) saw no 
response at all. Why might this be? 
Although arguably tangential to the subject in hand, two examples of 
recent efforts at collective action on Sheppey are instructive on the question of 
mobilization of interest, and what may either facilitate or hinder it. 
 Activist B (Sheppey)’s interest concerns coastal amenity and, 
specifically, the viability of recreational sailing clubs in the light of coastal policy. 
In the absence of any evidence of directly relevant collective action on Sheppey, 
his effort to mobilize influence with regard to loss of amenity to beach erosion at 
Sheerness becomes salient. By way of context, he says of the building of the sea 
wall at Sheerness in the late 1970s that those likely to be affected were not 
consulted, and that the local sailing club suffered badly because of the design, 
losing all of its sea view.  More recently, he explains, an EA strategy to remedy 
beach erosion by placing rocks in front of the sea wall following loss of shingle 
effectively forced the nearby catamaran yacht club to close as members could no 
longer land catamarans on the beach in front of the clubhouse. 
Activist B (Sheppey) wrote and submitted reports on the problem to the 
EA, liaised with local authority coastal engineers, lobbied his MP and made use 
 
53
 Wissink, C., christine.wissink@kent.gov.uk, 2013. Re: CC2150 Sheppey. [Email] Message to C. 
Blunkell (chris.blunkell@btinternet.com). Sent Wednesday 6 November 2013: 16:14. [Accessed 1 
December 2013]. 
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of the local press. Town/parish councillor A (Sheppey) had been a supporter, 
however with reference to his efforts at obtaining support from people in 
Sheerness he explains: 
 
They don’t probably appreciate the problems because it’s a gradual process.  
They agree with me that something should be done, but they’re not interested 
really in giving too much support.  It’s like a lot of things – you need to speak to 
other people in similar situations to get support, I think. Unless it affects them 
directly, I think most people are not bothered too much. 
  
Such a failure to convert interest to action he ascribes in part to a lack of 
both affluence and education in the town, and we might note that speaking to 
other people in similar situations, as undertaken by activists in Selsey and 
advocated here, is an activity that may sit uncomfortably with any disposition 
towards insularity. 
The second example concerns lobbying for sea defences at Warden Bay 
– a community that MP (Sheppey) describes as isolated, run down and difficult. 
Of a campaign that in 2007 resulted in sea defence works to protect a section of 
cliffs at Warden Bay, he explains that the local parish council ‘banged on’ about 
the issue, so bringing it to his attention. Following the clearance of woodland, the 
top of the cliff had begun to erode badly, and people there, he says could see:  
 
…that their investment for their children, grandchildren, was going to go down 
the Swanee. So they were continually at my back, saying ‘Help, help, help! 
  
MP (Sheppey) succeeded in attracting the interest of a succession of 
DEFRA Ministers, resulting in central government funding for protection of the 
foot of the cliffs.  In terms of mobilization in this context, he describes a very 
active parish council and, in particular, a woman who then became a borough 
councillor ‘out of just being fed up’. He explains:  
 
We had public meetings – we got everybody: local councillor, county councillor – 
everybody together. I said: ‘Look, you need to bid – I don’t do the bidding! Here’s 
the money – go get it!’ 
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  Beside the involvement of the various levels of government, MP 
(Sheppey) stresses the legitimacy brought to the bid by the involvement of the 
parish council, and we will see that considerations of organizational constitution 
and collaboration (notably with formal democratic institutions) can be key to the 
pursuit of greater opportunity on the part of interest groups. The evidence 
suggests that this is not necessarily a straightforward proposition, however. 
Organizational configuration – grassroots and government   
 
In the Selsey case, interests identified and developed at grassroots level are 
mobilized, at least in part, by efforts to have them taken up by local democratic 
institutions.  In England and Wales, district, borough and city councils (in the 
absence of unitary authorities) are usually responsible for services including 
housing and planning applications. Parish, community and town councils operate 
at a level below these, are elected, and have jurisdiction over local issues such 
as the provision of community centres, grants to help local organisations and 
consultation on neighbourhood planning.54  
Inspired by what they saw as a lack of interest in the issue by incumbent 
councillors at the time the draft plan was first announced, such efforts saw 
Activist A (Selsey) and a colleague from SOS (from a total of five who stood) 
elected to Chichester District Council in 2007 as Independent councillors for the 
Selsey South ward. Given the ‘partner’ role of the Council in the CDS, combined 
with the fact that local authorities alone were able to bid for funding provided, for 
example, through the 2009 Coastal Change Pathfinders programme (DEFRA, 
2009e), this development in mobilization strategy appears to have offered 
greater opportunity for influence through an extension of organizational reach.  
 
54
 www.gov.uk/understand-how-your-council-works/types-of -council 
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However, Activist A’s account suggests that the interest he was elected 
to represent was effectively marginalised through an inability to form coalitions in 
the local authority context – at least during the early stages of his tenure. First, 
he ascribes being ignored as being down to party political enmity as a 
consequence of having displaced a Conservative councillor in a Conservative-
dominated council55. He explains:  
 
It’s always been Tory here forever and a day, so I wasn’t very popular as a 
councillor when I got in because I’d overturned two of their fellows. That meant 
that anything we said directly that we wanted they wouldn’t want to give us, even 
if it was a reasonable idea.  
 
 
  Second, Activist A (Selsey) attributes difficulties with obtaining political 
traction, within the Council and by extension with the setting of the CDS, to 
concerns that he and his colleagues were ‘single issue’ politicians. EA officer A 
(Selsey) explains that the fact that the final strategy had to be approved by both 
of the partner local authorities was potentially complicated by that fact that there 
were councillors: 
…elected not solely, but partly on campaigning for a particular outcome, which 
wasn’t the outcome the Strategy was going to recommend. Clearly that’s a 
difficult debate to have – not just for us, but particularly for the council officers, 
because of course they are directly subject to the will of the councillors, and if 
they are supporting a strategy, and the council body as a whole don’t support 
that strategy, then basically that’s a difficult situation. 
 
Implicit in this observation appears to be the idea that what may be 
considered ‘single issue’ perspectives, despite having democratic authority, are a 
threat to the outcomes preferred by the Operating Authority. In the event, Activist 
A (Selsey) explains that his treatment as a Councillor subsequently improved – 
partly, he says, because others had come to see that he and his Independent 
 
55
 However, despite initial suspicions, he describes his Conservative MP, who approached SOS 
and who was instrumental in setting up MPSG, as: “very reasonable”. 
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colleague had involved themselves in more than the single issue, but also as a 
consequence of changes to the leading group of the Council. 
Nonetheless, when he sought re-election in 2011 he did so as a 
Conservative.  Importantly, this was accompanied by a growing, if sometimes 
uncomfortable, acceptance that the interests he was originally elected to 
represent would inevitably be disciplined through competition with others. He 
explains:  
 
If I can carry my Tory colleagues with me, I know that I can get something 
through for Selsey. If I aggravate them all, then I won’t get the thing through, so 
I’ve got to try and balance – are there times when I should just stop at a certain 
point and think ‘I’m not going to get this through anyway, I’m better building up 
the political capital I need to achieve another thing that I want’? There’ll be some 
things that might have to drop off the ‘to do list’ because they’re not going to 
work, and then at least I can get other stuff done. 
 
  Efforts to redirect mobilization efforts by attempting to propel an interest 
formally onto the agenda of the local authority in this way direct attention to 
considerations of organization: as discussed, the local authority has formal and 
meaningful influence over policies such as the CDS that is beyond grassroots 
groups. However, the demands of entry to the polity in question appear, in this 
case, to have required interest being subjected not only to competition in the 
shape of other interests, but an entirely different (and arguably dominant) 
constellation of interests in the shape of party political considerations. Thus, we 
might argue that any alleviation of concerns about ‘single issue’ politics occurred 
at the expense of the reinforcement of another. Of this Activist A (Selsey) 
observes:  
Once you go to District-level and above people are in different camps, so they 
are going to have fight each other at election times. So they’re not just there for 
their community, they are there for their party and their community, so there’s 
going to be some sort of ambiguity there on what’s good for your party and its 
interests and what’s good for your community. 
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 Revision of the CDS policy for Selsey, and subsequent recalibration of 
interest and mobilization strategies, saw Activist A (Selsey) and others, 
consistent with orientation of MPSG,  embrace economic regeneration as a 
paradigm through which to attract government funding for the area.  
Perhaps the most tangible example of this was an effort to attract central 
government Coastal Pathfinder funding, led by the local authority, for the 
Manhood Peninsula. The resulting bid was successful in attracting funding of 
£450,000 for ‘community engagement’, ‘adaptation planning’ and the ‘delivery of 
adaptive solutions’, and involved organisations of various complexions including 
central government Executive Agencies, local authorities, grassroots 
organisations such as SOS and MPSG, Selsey Town Council and local 
partnership fora (DEFRA, 2010c).   
 As a councillor, he was able to make the necessary approach and 
outline the potential merits of a bid that he had helped to prepare. As such, it 
would appear that his membership of the local authority polity had offered 
greater opportunity than might have been available to him otherwise. However, 
he contends that the process was fraught with difficulties, and characterised by 
what he saw as limits placed on his opportunity to influence the final proposal 
and its interpretation in practice.  He contends that the authority then ‘pulled the 
proposal apart’ with a view to pursuing the aspects that best fitted the Council’s 
own agenda, to the detriment of the original focus. The upshot, he explains, was 
that he came to question whether he could trust the authority to keep its word on 
what it said it would deliver through the grant.  
We will see that the apparently torturous negotiation of this process was 
to have adverse health consequences for Activist A (Selsey). Less dramatic 
perhaps but still relevant, however, is the observation that, from this account at 
least, any temptation to conclude that being elected to representative office 
necessarily results in increased opportunity must be tempered.  Instead, his 
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account, overall, suggests that such dealings can also be attended with the low 
levels of trust characteristic of his dealings with the EA – at least in their early 
stages – in his grassroots capacity with SOS and MPSG. Thus, his guiding 
rationale for the shift in mobilization strategy, that being on the ‘inside’ would 
help to achieve more than might otherwise be possible, appeared to deliver 
mixed results at best.  
With regard to the Sheppey case, there is scant evidence either of 
collective grassroots action in the immediate context under study, or – despite 
the efforts of the latter – little evidence of local people approaching elected 
representatives with their concerns.  Accordingly, any account of interest, 
mobilization and organization in this context must focus on the absence of 
relevant activity. 
To this end, evidence of acrimony between the Conservative-controlled 
local authority and the Labour MP becomes potentially salient, with MP 
(Sheppey) regularly at odds with the council over the apportion of kudos and 
blame respectively for what looked to be a bumpy ride over sea defence 
investment for northern Sheppey – as already discussed. MP (Sheppey) 
observes of his relationship with the local authority:  
 
Up until about 2001, it was a Liberal Democrat-led coalition, and they were 
brilliant. I used to have a monthly or quarterly meeting with the three local 
leaders – Tories, Labour, Liberal Democrats, with the Chief Exec of Swale BC. 
We would go through ‘How’s the bridge doing?’, ‘What about the dock?’, ‘What 
are we going to do about the steel mill?’, ‘How about the by-pass?’ – all of these 
things, and I would give them an update with all the correspondence, all of the 
emails, and would say ‘what are you doing?’ 
 
However, of the 2007 project to protect the section of cliffs at Warden 
Bay, following a change in political control at the Council, MP (Sheppey) 
expresses disappointment that the Council decided not to bid for Government 
funding, explaining that:  
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This scheme simply wouldn’t have happened without my lobbying given the 
incompetence of the Tory executive at Swale Borough Council.56 
 
Further evidence of such bad blood can be found in MP (Sheppey)’s 
request that a Conservative borough and parish councillor retract her published 
claim that he had had nothing to do with the award of a regeneration grant to 
neighbouring Leysdown under the Sea Change scheme.57  Without making any 
kind of judgement as to the rights and wrongs of any such claim, there can be 
little doubt as to the acrimonious nature of inter-party politics at this level, and at 
this time.  Aside from the question of such effects on the appetites of politicians 
to participate in coalitions and any related effects on collective lobbying efforts, 
we might also ask at the requirement placed upon activists to understand the 
political terrain and the associated imperatives. 
Town and parish councils 
 
 
The Selsey case suggests that parish councils offer a mode of local 
representation that can side-step some of the difficulties associated with party 
political interests at local authority and national level. Activist A (Selsey) 
confirms:  
The fantastic thing about the Town Council is it’s not political – there are no party 
politics in the elections, in fact I don’t think any of the councillors were elected 
because not enough people stood, so they were co-opted. 
 
Parish councils are the smallest type of administrative area in England, 
with ‘communities’ their differently-constituted equivalent in Wales. Councils 
represent electorates ranging from small communities to major cities; however, 
not all parishes have a council (for example, where a parish has fewer than 200 
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 Wyatt, D. 2007. MP lobbying on Warden Bay scheme pays off. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.derekwyattexmp.co.uk/news_item.aspx?i_PageID=125897 [Accessed 18 August 2013]. 
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 Wyatt, D. 2008. Good turn out at Leysdown to discuss cultural and heritage bid. [Online] 
Available at: http://www.derekwyattexmp.co.uk/news_item.aspx?i_PageID=126173 [Accessed 19 
August 2013]. 
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parishioners, or if the parishioners do not want one). In such cases, decisions 
can be taken instead at parish meetings, or small parishes can come together to 
elect a joint council (ONS, [no date]c). There are around 8,500 town and parish 
councils in England, with powers to raise their own funds through precept. Over 
15 million people live in communities served by parish and town councils 
nationally – about 35% of the population (NALC, [no date]).  
Offered here as an example for comparison, near to Selsey on the 
Manhood Peninsula, the village of West Wittering demonstrated the capacity to 
raise significant amounts of money very quickly to contribute to the cost of sea 
defences.58  Local Authority coastal engineer A (Selsey) explained of the 
situation that, whilst there was no implication for homes, significantly prolonged 
wave action could bring the risk of flooding of a low-lying area leading into the 
village. By way of response the EA proposed a £1.6m flood risk management 
scheme, commencing in 2012, to which the community was asked to contribute 
£650k.59 Local Authority coastal engineer A (Selsey) explains:  
 
They have the benefit of group called the Woodger Trust. Mr Woodger left his 
estate to be spent for the benefit of the residents of West Wittering. The Trust 
said: ‘We’ll come up with half of that’.  
 
The rest was raised through contributions from the parish council, local 
residents and landowner the West Wittering Estate60. 
Whilst people in other local settlements may have lacked the 
wherewithal to raise resource in this way, town and parish councils appear, as in 
this case, to have some potential for helping to mitigate any such deficit. In 
 
58
 In the latest Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) this area was ranked 25,690 out of 32,482 in 
England, where 1 was the most deprived and 32,482 the least (UK Local Area, [no date]).  
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 Environment Agency (EA). 2013b. West Wittering tidal flood defences. [Online] (Updated 28 
August 2013) Available at: http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/homeandleisure/floods/130590.aspx. [Accessed 10 November 2013]. 
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Selsey, Town/parish councillor B (Selsey) explains that the levying of local taxes 
meant that the Town Council had been able to set aside funding for sea 
defences which, although not sufficient to pay for other than minor repairs, 
allowed it to attract funding commitments from other bodies.   
With regard to more general activities, Activist A (Selsey) observes of 
Selsey Town Council that: 
It has £250,000 a year in precept coming in, for which there’s a full-time clerk, 
another full-time office administrator and a couple of guys who do general works 
around the place, to which they are now going to add this Town Administrator –
so there’s a body of staff there. 
 
At neighbouring Pagham, the parish council was involved in innovating 
to find solutions to the physical problems they face as a consequence of a 
rapidly eroding beach – not least with regard to the protection of homes on the 
seafront.61 Whilst defence works in 2012 saw the construction of a rock 
revetment in front of sea-facing homes62 as part of a CDS preferred policy of 
‘adaptive management’, explained by an EA spokesman as an approach that 
would see a response to ‘each possible outcome’, requests from local residents 
and the Parish Council for a longer-term solution were dismissed on grounds of 
cost (The Argus, 2014).  
Against this backdrop the parish council was active in trying to raise 
funds through the provisions of the Localism Act63, and also in trying to develop a 
commercial product for application not only at Pagham Beach, but that might be 
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 Save Pagham Beach. [No date]. No title. [Online] Available at: http://savepaghambeach.com/ 
[Accessed on 11 October 2013]. 
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 Arun District Council (Arun DC). 2013. Pagham Coastal Protection. [Online] (Updates 21 
February 2013) Available at: http://www.arun.gov.uk/main.cfm?type=PAGHAMCOASTALPROTE 
[Accessed 16 November 2013]. 
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 Under the Localism Act: Local authorities are allowed to require developers to pay a levy when 
they build new houses, businesses and shops. The money raised must go to support new 
infrastructure – such as roads and schools…the Community Infrastructure Levy…gives the 
Government the power to require that some of the money raised from the levy go directly to the 
neighbourhoods where development takes place (DCLG, 2011:13). 
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marketed in other locations facing similar problems.  To this end, Town/parish 
councillor C (Selsey/Pagham) explains that the Parish Council had successfully 
made investment in sea defences a condition of the granting of permissions to 
developers: 
 
The support we’ve had in writing from DCLG has been quite good – that CIL 
(Community Infrastructure Levy) monies coming out of housing can be used for 
flood defence, even with a pre-existing situation. 
 
  On the subject of the potential of innovative sea defence measures as 
they applied in the Pagham context, he adds: 
There are problems with siting groynes on the beach: the regulatory authorities 
objected on the grounds of the coast being dynamic and the danger of them 
being incorrectly sited. So we want to try building tetrapods64 – you pile them up 
on the beach, the shingle washes in and fills the voids, and you’ve got protection. 
It cuts the argument that you can’t have groynes, because you can move them. 
 
  Again drawing attention to the additional potential of the mobilization of 
parish councils, and again citing the potential of the Localism Act, he adds:  
There is an element of self-help, community endeavour, which does seem to get 
the support of DCLG. 
 
Such a product might generate funding sufficient to exert influence on 
defence decisions, but requires ‘know how’ in its development. Town/parish 
councillor C (Selsey/Pagham) confirmed that Pagham Parish Council boasted 
specialist engineering expertise), and financial backing in the shorter term. 
Accordingly, the project enjoyed the backing of a local trust, with trustees, 
described by Town/parish councillor C (Selsey/Pagham) as ‘switched on’.  
Thus we might argue that some influence can be exerted by parish 
councils in these ways on decisions concerning sea defence. However, these 
appear to be significantly contingent on the size of the achievable levy, and the 
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 Multi-legged and interlocking concrete structures used to prevent coastal erosion (Bright Hub 
Engineering, 2009).   
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availability of the various resources – both human and economic – associated 
with maximising the potential of the system and exploiting commercial 
opportunities. 
  More generally, Town/parish councillor C (Selsey/Pagham) describes a 
prevailing lack of interest in this issue on the part of those not directly affected by 
it, explaining:  
You think you’ve got a united community, but you don’t really. 
 However, consultation on the Neighbourhood Plan65 prompted the view 
that the community was perhaps more united and concerned than he had 
thought. Just over a third of those canvassed responded to a survey, and of 
those, he explains, 92% wanted action on sea defences and 94% on inland 
flooding – a mandate for the council’s raising and use of funds, in his view. 
Thus, consultation in this case appears to have had potential in terms of 
galvanising rather than simply recording interest. This being the case, we might 
observe that the creation and subsequent mobilization of such interest (in terms 
of a local mandate for change) is significantly contingent in this case on the 
existence not only of a parish council, but an effective one at that.  
This appears to be a particularly important consideration in the case of 
Sheppey, with LA councillor A (Sheppey) pointing out disparities in the quality of 
some parish councils and the ephemeral nature of their personnel, arguably 
supported by Town/parish council official (Sheppey)’s testimony as to the lack of 
enthusiasm of other parishes for taking up Minster Parish Council’s offer of help 
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 Neighbourhood Planning, a power granted to town and parish councils under the Localism Act, 
allows ‘communities, both residents, employees and business, to come together through a local 
parish council or neighbourhood forum and say where they think new houses, businesses and 
shops should go – and what they should look like…If the plan is approved by a majority of those 
who vote, then the local authority will bring it into force.’ (DCLG, 2011; p.12) 
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with developing local Emergency Planning strategies66 – a process it had itself 
recently undertaken. At the two CC2150 meetings it was observed that the local 
parish council had no representative present.  
 Of potential relevance in this regard was the testimony of a borough 
councillor, participating in the CC2150 visioning workshop, who expressed his 
frustration at a lack of public response to a recent local authority consultation on 
setting up a town council for Sheerness67. If Local Authority officer A (Sheppey)’s 
analysis of the response – that of a reluctance of less affluent residents to pay a 
precept  to a town council and to turn their attention away from ‘hand-to-mouth’ 
concerns – is correct, this suggests a very real relationship between socio-
demographic circumstance and the development of the wherewithal to mobilize, 
consistent with Zsamboky et al’s (2011) findings concerning adaptation to 
climate change effects and the priorities of disadvantaged communities.  
By way of redress, in the context of Selsey, Activist A (Selsey) stresses 
the value of fora such as the Medmerry Stakeholders Advisory Group  and 
MPSG as vehicles which had helped to mitigate resource imbalances and 
enhance opportunities for parish councils (amongst others) to exert influence and 
develop capacity. He explains:  
A recent example is the Marine Conservation Zone consultation68 – the parish 
councils there had virtually no influence until they acted like lobby groups, and 
acting with lobby groups like MPSG and others. 
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 Kent Resilience Forum. [No date]. Community Emergency Planning. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.kentprepared.org.uk/preparing-yourself/community-emergency-planning/ (Accessed 16 
December 2013). 
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town councils for Sheerness and Halfway.  Minutes of a Swale Borough Council Local 
Engagement Forum held on Sheppey in September 2013 suggested that response had been “quite 
small” – 104 in total, with the majority coming from Halfway (Swale BC, [no date]e). 
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 https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/marine-conservation-zones-consultation-on-
proposals-for-designation-in-2013 
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This statement appears to encourage the democratically rather counter-
intuitive conclusion that in certain circumstances some formal representative 
bodies can be reliant on the support of informal interest groups in obtaining 
leverage, and indeed may even be required to act similarly if they are to be 
heard. Of particular note in this regard is Activist A (Selsey)’s judgment that 
parish councils relying on district councils to push interests further up the political 
‘food chain’, at least in the Selsey context, does not work.    
Indeed, the Selsey case points to the development of a strong coalition 
formed around the shared interests of Selsey Town Council and grassroots 
groups such as SOS, with Town/parish councillor B (Selsey) offering the view 
that the two organisations were politically complementary. Whilst the former had 
developed the capacity to take the weight from the shoulders of the latter in 
terms of undertaking some key functions, SOS had retained a licence to be 
politically ‘more boisterous’, he suggested. For example, there is evidence of 
grassroots groups being created strategically, and coordinated, in an effort to 
counter an environmental conservation lobby that was seen as numerically 
dominant and, by MPSG’s reading, enjoyed privileged access to decision-
makers as part of the CDS process. Town/parish councillor B (Selsey) explains: 
 
Somebody asked me ‘Would it not have been better getting together and just 
having one organisation?’ My answer was no – we made a conscious decision 
that all of these groups had slightly different emphases, but with an overriding 
preoccupation with the coastal defence of Selsey. So you’d go to meetings with 
each of these groups represented: all of a sudden four people around the table 
who knew the issue – a strategic way to redress the balance. 
 
Discussion 
 
The Selsey case identifies a group of activists prepared to mobilize wider 
collective action. Aside from attracting local grassroots support mobilizing around 
an identifiable and pressing threat to interest, they also succeeded in reaching 
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beyond the geographical borders in encouraging coalition with other, similarly-
concerned local groups. The election of activists to the local council brought the 
promise of greater influence, and a subsequent approach from the local MP saw 
the formation of MPSG and a coalition of interests involving activists, businesses 
and parish councils amongst others. This, in turn, saw the mobilization of central 
government scrutiny of the deliberative process in the shape of the NAO, as well 
as lobbying representation at national level via NVCC. Thus, we might observe a 
stark difference to the response from Sheppey where, despite the efforts of local 
politicians, there was no such mobilization – despite evidence of concern around 
the relevant interest. 
In terms of effective mobilization, MP (Sheppey) stresses the importance 
of working ‘together’, not least because local action validates the intervention of 
those higher up the political ladder.  This, he argues, must be instigated locally, 
and he identifies one ‘fed up woman’ and an active parish council as being 
pivotal to one related and successful mobilization effort on Sheppey. If effective 
mobilization requires the development of coalition beyond geographical borders 
(to include, for example, a local authority and MP located on the mainland and, 
further afield still, Whitehall and Parliament) then an identifiable instinct for 
isolation on Sheppey surely militates against it. 
Whilst activists in Selsey were comparatively successful in mobilizing 
around the original concern, its evolution as a consequence of change of policy 
saw a dissipation of both broad and ‘hands-on’ support. Furthermore, practical 
support in Selsey had been limited in many cases to relatively undemanding 
tasks, thus inviting the analysis that a relatively low local skills base and 
particular demographic had limited the resource available to be mobilized from 
the outset. Perhaps more subtly, reluctance beyond a small core group of 
activists to meet officials and others is ascribed to ‘embarrassment’, with Sayer 
(2005) echoing Bourdieu in interpreting this as an emotional response to class in 
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social situations where people may be anxious about their position. In 
Bourdieusian terms, we might describe this as a problem relating to navigating 
‘social space’ in mobilizing extraneous capital. 
Such an interpretation is arguably strengthened, in the Sheppey case, by 
the testimony of the participant in the CC2150 workshop (and a proponent of UDI 
for the island) who, in the context of an informal discussion about education, 
ventured that he felt he was intelligent, but that he lacked confidence.  Such 
remarks, invite us to consider how socio-demographic realities quietly inform the 
choices people make, and the resulting effects.  The question ‘Do I seek the help 
of my MP, or not?’ may hold no terrors for the resident of affluent West Wittering, 
but may be a different prospect for the resident of Warden Bay, or Selsey, with 
potentially negative effects in terms of ability to form coalitions, and exert 
influence. Whilst such considerations may help us to explain a lack of action on 
Sheppey and a wider reluctance in Selsey it does not, however, help us to 
understand why it should be that certain individuals who, by their own admission, 
have suffered such anxiety, should choose to act anyway.  
  Turning to questions of organizational configuration, local authorities 
can be essential coalition partners and vehicles through which influence might be 
pursued. Looking beyond the two case studies that provide the principal focus for 
this chapter, Activist C (Happisburgh) describes a very constructive working 
relationship with his local authority, whilst Activist D (Jury’s Gap), speaking of the 
work of DOC at Jury’s Gap observes:  
I don’t think we’d have got anywhere if we wouldn’t have had the backing of the 
District Councils.  
 
However, Activist A (Selsey)’s experience suggests that such positive 
experiences are by no means guaranteed. Rather, he found himself easily 
marginalised on party political grounds, and treated with suspicion as serving a 
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single issue. Supporting Tilly’s observation with regard to the dynamism inherent 
in his concept of mobilization (in its wider sense), marginalisation, in turn, 
prompted an evolving strategy characterised in part by the subjection of his 
interest to wider Conservative party preoccupations. To again use Tilly’s 
concepts, this required him to moderate his mobilization of some interests as the 
cost of opportunity, with party politics representing a different and arguably more 
powerful order of interests in this regard. By way of illustration on this point, in 
Happisburgh, Activist C (Happisburgh) describes a dramatic change in the local 
political landscape with regard to coalition:  
We’ve now got a Tory administration which is not prepared to listen to anybody, 
so I think the good relations we’ve had for a decade with our local authority are 
looking shaky at the moment. 
 
  More subtly, perhaps, he observes that MPs’ interest in the issue is at 
least partly shaped by the balance of power in Parliament:  
Most politicians in this country are party motivated.  And to give you some idea, 
an adjoining constituency that suffers major problems coastal-wise, for the bulk 
of the time I’ve been doing this they had a Labour MP who was good, but there 
was a point beyond which he would not go because there was a Labour 
government, and he wouldn’t embarrass his government for fear of endangering 
his career. 
 
Town and parish councils appear to offer respite from the entanglements 
that can accompany party politics, and potentially have the wherewithal to 
provide valuable practical resource; galvanise, validate and mobilize interest; 
lead innovation and even raise funds towards sea defences. Caveats, however, 
are that the existence of parish councils is patchy, their effectiveness is uneven, 
their formal power in the setting of coastal policy is very limited, their ability to 
raise funds is significantly dependent on their size, and the expertise at their 
disposal is related to local socio-demographic composition. As such, they appear 
able to both reproduce as well as mitigate resource inequalities, and should not 
be regarded as a ready solution to concerns around weak local representation. 
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However, evidence suggests that such institutions can help to mitigate any 
inequalities in learning from each other and, perhaps paradoxically, from 
grassroots organisations, with MPSG as a case in point. 
This leads us to the fulcrum of the conclusion for this chapter – that in 
some contexts motivated grassroots action necessarily underpins much that can 
be considered to be effective collective action. Whilst it is a simplification to 
suggest that at West Wittering problems attending sea defence and coastal 
planning were solved to a large extent with the writing of a cheque supported by 
a residual political effectiveness, there does appear to be some contrast between 
locales in terms of the necessity to locate fresh resource and the difficulty with 
which policy and political terrain are navigated in its pursuit. 
In the Selsey case, the bulk of grassroots action was undertaken by a 
small group of people; in the Sheppey case, MP (Sheppey) cites the importance 
to the campaign to defend homes of the ‘fed up woman’. We will see that, in this 
context, grassroots action is contingent on the work of the few, in some cases 
requiring them to recalibrate their understandings of what they are both able to 
do and are comfortable doing, and undertaken at a cost to themselves and those 
around them that is unsustainable.  
This raises a dilemma. Threats to the interests of individuals are seen by 
local authority coastal engineers in both cases, and an elected representative in 
the Sheppey case, as the key to public attention on the issue. However, in the 
Selsey case there is also evidence of a particular concern with regard to ‘interest’ 
groups. Thus, it appears incumbent upon interests to seek alternative 
organizational configurations and modes of representation in search of 
opportunity, each of which bring fresh costs and, as we have seen, brings no 
guarantee of influence. In the Selsey case, subjection of the interest at hand to 
the democratic discipline implicit in local authority reputation was not sufficient to 
allay concerns that ‘single issue’ politics might threaten the preferred outcome. 
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  Any assumption that a threat to local interests will provoke a response 
requires reappraisal. In the Sheppey case the Operating Authority orthodoxy was 
to seek direct engagement with those at risk only where response deemed it 
necessary to do so.  However, silence does not necessarily indicate 
acquiescence or lack of interest; instead, it may mean more pressing priorities, 
weak local democratic institutions, or a collective habitus unsuited to the kind of 
coalition-building both advocated by MP (Sheppey) and others, and conducted to 
some effect in the Selsey case. Whilst it appears incumbent on the most 
deprived to mobilize resource from beyond social and geographical borders, the 
affluent appear to be the more adept in this regard.  
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Chapter 6: MOBILIZATION AT NATIONAL LEVEL  
 
 
This chapter is concerned primarily with the National Voice of Coastal 
Communities (NVCC), and its interactions with government, through formal and 
structured engagement, from its inception in 2009 until 2011. Extant, although 
largely inactive at the time of writing, NVCC came into being during 2008 as a 
website for community action groups and individuals campaigning against 
government policies on shoreline management, and as a focus of national 
campaigning.69 Then, in July 2009 it was reconfigured as a membership 
organisation with a formal constitution, supported by funding from government to 
cover the expenses associated with NVCC acting as a conduit between relevant 
coastal communities and central government at a time when the latter was 
developing new coastal policy for England and Wales. 
The NVCC case is distinctive in that, unlike the Selsey and Sheppey 
case studies, it is concerned with interaction between grassroots and official 
interests at the national level. However, analysis of evidence arising from this 
case also has potential to extend understanding of mobilization efforts at local 
level: as already discussed, briefly, Save Our Selsey (SOS) and the Manhood 
Peninsula Steering Group (MPSG) sought coalition with groups from other 
locations through NVCC, whilst there was no such representation from Sheppey.  
Besides describing and contextualising the work of NVCC, this chapter 
seeks to test a government assumption that community interests are singular in 
each case, to assess whether the formation of NVCC had potential in 
ameliorating resource inequalities and capacities as they apply to coastal groups 
in deliberative settings, and to question whether government’s direct 
engagement with NVCC addressed problems associated with citizens’ reliance 
 
69
 National Voice of Coastal Communities (NVCC). [No date]. About this site. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.nvcc.org.uk/about/ (Accessed 19 April 2013]. 
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on proxy representation. In so doing, it looks to both Tilly’s Polity and 
Mobilization models in seeking understandings of how NVCC fared in its efforts 
to influence central government policy; and how interest, mobilization and 
organization were calibrated in pursuit of such influence through what appeared 
to be privileged opportunity. As such, it facilitates analysis at both ‘macro’ and 
‘meso’ levels. 
 
NVCC – origins 
 
 
According to its founding chair Activist C (Happisburgh)70, the idea for NVCC 
emerged from a recognition borne of his long work with the Coastal Concern 
Action Group (CCAG) [Happisburgh Village Website, {no date}] in Happisburgh, 
north Norfolk (see Figure 1). He concluded that the village’s problems – the 
recent loss of homes to the sea, with the prospect of more to follow – were in fact 
part of a national problem and that:  
There are many Happisburghs around this country that government ignores, and 
simply don’t have the power or the voice to make a difference. I knew from very 
early on that we had to make a national impact, because only by coming 
together around the coast would we get things changed. 
 
CCAG came into being in March 1999, when Activist C (Happisburgh) 
and his wife went to a meeting called by people in Happisburgh at immediate risk 
of losing their properties on an historically defended but now eroding cliff-top.  He 
explains that nothing was being done in response, and that locals were feeling 
very exposed and worried. He recalls the meeting as being very heated and 
disorganised, with everybody blaming the local authority. He was also stuck by 
 
70
 Research notes record Activist C (Happisburgh), in his late 60s, as cheery, generous, irreverent, 
and comfortable in being direct to the point of bluntness when he felt the situation required it. 
During the interview he acted out several exchanges between himself and others in positions of 
authority, gleefully adopting plummy tones for some officials and politicians that sat in stark 
contrast to his brusquely comic self-representations. During the interview, conducted in a static 
caravan in Activist A’s back garden, his wife did some ironing, and joined the discussion forcefully 
at various points. 
136 
 
the degree of interest – that out of a village of 850, 300 people had turned up to 
an unofficial meeting. At one point during the meeting, he recalls, he raised his 
hand and said:  
There’s an enormous amount of energy here – but you’ve got to organise 
yourselves!   
 
Having subsequently accepted the position of ‘Coordinator’ of the 
resulting group, CCAG, Activist C (Happisburgh) called public meetings which he 
says effectively gave it a mandate to pursue the matter in any way it saw fit. 
There was only one objective: renew the defences, or compensate people for the 
loss of their homes. 
Activist C (Happisburgh)’s ‘Coordinator’s Comments’, published on the 
CCAG website  between 2002 and 2011, offer an insight into the nature of the 
work undertaken by CCAG and its interests; the mobilization strategies 
employed in seeking to influence policy; and its reach, support and the extent of 
its influence. It is also evidence of a change over time in the temperature of the 
relationship with central government which, when combined with growing anxiety 
in settlements around the coast nationally, saw the evolution of NVCC as Activist 
C (Happisburgh)’s focus and vehicle. 
 ‘Coordinator’s Comments’ posts place government coastal policy and its 
discharge, as it applies to Happisburgh and beyond, under the microscope. This 
body of work, constituting 59 substantial entries made over a period of 10 years, 
reveals extensive reading, research and writing to various ends – the evidence 
base on the impacts of offshore dredging on coastal erosion, relevant 
government policies, how money allocated to flood and coastal defence had 
been spent, and the Human Rights implications of government policy. Perhaps 
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the most striking example is the development and presentation to policy makers 
and others of his own proposals for coastal governance.71 
He writes of the various public gatherings he both instigates and attends, 
of conferences and fact-finding visits, of trips abroad, of meetings with politicians 
and others within government, and of journeys to meet people in other parts of 
the country facing similar problems.  
He mobilizes others towards political action – urging people to write to 
Members of Parliament (MPs), the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA) and the Deputy Prime Minister; elected members to insist on the 
satisfaction of social justice considerations before signing off SMPs, neighbours 
to attend council-led Shoreline Management Plan (SMP) meetings and to make 
sure that elected members understand their views; and supporters to sign a 
petition on the CCAG website. 
His comments document the amount of interest shown in CCAG and the 
situation in Happisburgh – from within his own community and from others at 
risk, and from all over the country and indeed the world.  
Locally, he alludes to coalition-building in documenting repeatedly his 
gratitude to the officers of North Norfolk District Council and his local MP, whilst 
taking aim at the local parish council; he thanks the media for bringing to light the 
plight of Happisburgh; and he commends the resource mobilization activities of 
local people in raising money to fund campaigning activities.   
Revealing for our purposes is his narrative on national politicians and 
officials, their attitudes and actions, and the resulting policies and decisions. At 
times he is utterly scathing – he berates them for discriminating against 
rural/coastal communities, for being ‘hard of hearing’, for ‘blatant spin’, for being 
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 From Coordinator’s Comments by Activist C (Happisburgh), and published between 2002 and 
2011 on the Coastal Concern Action Group website. Subsequently archived at 
http://www.happisburgh.org.uk/comments. 
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‘divisive and unethical’, and for being incompetent. He describes government’s 
approach to coastal management as ‘blunt and chaotic’, raises the question of 
government suppression of evidence, the impartiality and objectivity of certain 
processes, and asks whether a government Minister has been ‘economical with 
the truth’. He claims that government is in breach of Human Rights legislation, 
and describes as ‘scandalous’ and a ‘whitewash’ what he considers to be official 
indifference in the local SMP response to representations from local people. He 
derides DEFRA consultants as ‘house trained’ and ‘tame’, and the relevant 
academic community of giving government confused messages. Central 
government, Ministers and HM Treasury ‘fiddle while Rome burns’ he writes, and 
he points to a rapid turnover of Ministers who don’t understand the requirement 
of the post and are only too pleased to move on.72 
It is of note, however, that Activist C (Happisburgh)’s tone is not 
uniformly negative – even though comments appreciative of central government 
sometimes carry a sting in the tail. He acknowledges Ministerial sympathy for the 
plight of coastal dwellers (whilst accusing government of intransigence), 
congratulates DEFRA for its Making Space for Water consultation paper, thanks 
the incoming Minister for agreeing to meet with him, and expresses a ‘fervent’ 
hope for:  
…an era of greater understanding on all sides of each others [sic] problems, of 
much closer and more meaningful dialogue and above all an era of ACTION and 
co-operation.73 
 
Thus, we might observe a mobilization strategy characterized by notable 
public hostility towards the polity tempered, tellingly, by occasional comments 
that allude to his enjoying the confidence of at least some central government 
 
72
 Ibid. 
 
73
 Ibid. 
 
139 
 
officials, and which hint at a certain disquiet in some quarters with regard to 
policy direction.74  
Until the closing months of 2008, and especially early 2009, conciliatory 
remarks from Activist C (Happisburgh) with regard to central government were 
relatively few. However, it might be argued that a change of mobilization strategy 
occurs at this point, and that this coincides broadly with the emergence of NVCC 
in its first incarnation as a web resource.  For example, he is gratified that when 
meeting the Environment Agency (EA) chair the latter acknowledged ‘extreme 
problems’ for individuals and communities faced with a change of current coast 
protection policy and its application, with Activist C (Happisburgh) stressing that 
it is good to hear from him that he believes the EA must pursue the matter of 
compensation for those affected.75  Here we might observe that a shift in 
mobilization strategy towards a more conciliatory approach coincides with what 
appears to be evidence, albeit slender, of influence of some kind relating to what 
literature review indicates may be the key point of contention amongst coastal 
groups.76 
Whilst he remains critical of central government, in April 2009 he 
observes a reduction in local frustration as there is evidence that CCAG had 
begun to change government’s attitude and approach to coast management, and 
observes that CCAG had become increasingly proactive in seeking change that 
will benefit all coastal communities, and not just that in Happisburgh. The entry 
concludes:  
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 In the same report Activist C (Happisburgh) writes about a DEFRA workshop on adaptation 
measures that he has attended. Going against his usual forthright style, in this case he mentions 
his purpose in attending and who else was involved – yet with no word as to content or his 
impressions of what took place or the positions of those present. This, he tells us, is one of number 
of such events he had attended, and further evidence of a multifaceted approach to mobilization – 
as well as shifting between being hostile and conciliatory, he also appears to oscillate between 
public and private exchanges with power. A shifting mobilization strategy, it would appear, 
coincides with the extent and nature of opportunity to exert influence. 
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We have been, and remain, committed to fostering a wider understanding by all 
involved of each others [sic] problems and feel very strongly that we must 
continue the effort and build on the achievements of the last 10 years…CCAG is 
committed absolutely to working with everyone irrespective of political party or 
level of authority to achieve a socially just coastal philosophy and policy which 
we can all ‘buy in to’.77 
 
As well as a retrospective look at the achievements of CCAG – and one 
that appears to confirm a belief that the group had achieved influence – this 
reads as a manifesto that formally extends the Group’s interest from the local to 
the national, and confirms a shift in mobilization strategy towards one embracing 
the need to work with central government.  
At this point Activist C (Happisburgh)’s commentary for CCAG begins to 
wind down, although of particular note is mention of government’s award of £3 
million under the DEFRA Coastal Change Pathfinder project to help communities 
and individuals in the North Norfolk District Council area to adapt to climate 
change where defences were no longer to be sustained. Despite misgivings, he 
describes this as a ‘significant step forward’ and: 
 
…a clear indication that the Government ‘machine’ is beginning to understand 
some of the problems coastal communities and individuals face when coastal 
policy is changed.78  
 
Nearly two years later, in what was to be his last ‘Coordinator’s 
Comments’ posting, he is critical (although perhaps only moderately so in 
comparison to some previous entries) in observing that government is looking to 
reduce funding, and that there is no mechanism for adaptation; and observes 
that people are concerned that consultation is simply a box-ticking exercise. 
Tellingly, given the low frequency of his posts by this point, he also explains that 
he has refrained from comment as there has been ‘considerable activity behind 
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 From Coordinator’s Comments by Activist C (Happisburgh), and published between 2002 and 
2011 on the Coastal Concern Action Group website. Subsequently archived at 
http://www.happisburgh.org.uk/comments. 
 
78
 Ibid. 
 
141 
 
the scenes’ and that he was conscious that any comment could have affected 
some of the negotiations and events which were taking place.79 Thus is 
confirmed a mobilization strategy characterised by private exchanges with power 
for reasons that are not articulated, and only restrained criticism on points of 
fundamental importance to the CCAG cause. 
This change in rhetorical gear coincides with NVCC becoming properly 
active, and with accompanying attempts to influence policy through a distinctive 
organizational configuration accompanied by a significantly enhanced 
opportunity for coastal groups to speak directly to policy makers.     
 
A body that government can do business with 
 
NVCC came into being as a membership organisation on 6 July 2009, at a 
meeting  for representatives of coastal communities held immediately after a 
half-day conference – ‘Coastal Communities at Risk’, organised and managed by 
non-governmental organization (NGO) CoastNet on behalf of CCAG and the All 
Party Parliamentary Group Coastal and Marine (APPG).80  The event was 
devoted to consideration of the extent to which ‘community and individual needs 
are accommodated in adaptation policy’ and ‘the social justice argument from the 
receiving end’.81  
In a proposal to Activist C (Happisburgh), CoastNet’s Strategic Director 
(National NGO official) had earlier explained a motivation to use the meeting to 
bring together the likes of CCAG from around the country to tell their stories, and 
the creation of a new national group as an umbrella body – with a focus on both 
coastal erosion and coastal flooding. With a role of developing and maintaining a 
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 CoastNet. 2009b. A Coastal and Marine All Party Parliamentary Group and Coastal Concern 
Action Group conference: Conference Report, 6th July 2009. CoastNet. 
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common position statement, lobbying government and others and providing a 
self-support network for affected parties, National NGO official suggested that 
the group should be a ‘reasonable voice for affected parties’, and a body the 
government can ‘do business with’82. He went on to make a case for government 
funding for the group which, he suggested, might enable an annual conference, 
organisation of meetings, and maintenance of contact details; advocacy; 
networking resources; and technical advice.83 
The conference was attended by around 70 delegates including MPs, 
policy makers from central government and its Executive Agencies, local 
government members and officers, and representatives from coastal groups. The 
agenda included an address from the Minister responsible for flood and coastal 
erosion management; presentations from representatives of coastal groups; and 
the voicing of themes and concerns that both reflect Activist C (Happisburgh)’s 
preoccupations with regard to CCAG, and are useful in considering the 
formation, development and influence of NVCC. 
In her presentation, Activist D (Jury’s Gap) of the Defend Our Coast 
group, Romney Marsh, echoed consultation responses from Selsey and 
Sheppey in describing how stakeholders were isolated by the SMP deliberative 
process, adding that her group felt ill-equipped to participate in a very technical 
debate against people with specialist training and organisations with budgets to 
pay for research and staff travel expenses.84  The first of these concerns was 
acknowledged in subsequent discussion, although there is evidence of some 
ambiguity in how interactions between community groups and government were 
understood by those present. A comment from one delegate that ‘community 
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engagement is a must’, was broadly supportive of the Minister’s position that 
‘government is genuinely willing to engage’ and that he ‘encouraged people to 
take part in consultations, telling the community representatives present: ‘It’s up 
to you!’.85  However, contributions from others at the conference hint at how such 
an idea might be problematic. The APPG vice-chair, spoke candidly of a ’huge 
disconnect’ between those in power and communities who feel they have very 
little power’, whilst a senior Natural England (NE) official acknowledged ‘a lack of 
suitable tools to arrive at achievable solutions’ and the need for ‘constructive 
dialogue’. Whilst this latter compound of managerial buzzwords reveals little 
about what was considered wrong and what might be required for that to change, 
both of these remarks at least invite a problematised understanding of 
encounters between government and communities.  
The inaugural NVCC meeting that followed the conference was 
facilitated by CoastNet and attended by representatives from 13 coastal groups, 
and saw discussion of the problems that people were experiencing in their 
respective localities, set objectives for and decided upon leadership of NVCC, 
and agreed first actions. Reflecting concerns expressed in the preceding 
conference, objectives covered the sharing of information, with NVCC providing 
a common point for this purpose; the critiquing of government and other 
documents and the provision of related technical support; support for members 
in responding to consultations; and maintaining a common lobbying position on 
points of common interest upon which there is a consensus. Activist C 
(Happisburgh) was elected unanimously as NVCC chair, with first actions 
including a request to the Minister (and others) for funding and the development 
of a response to the DEFRA Coastal Change Policy consultation.86   
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In February 2010 it was announced that £8,700 was to be awarded from 
the DEFRA Customer Project Fund to assist NVCC/CoastNet to ‘act as a conduit 
between coastal communities at risk from flooding and coastal erosion, and 
central government’; and to develop capacity to help communities to ‘understand 
the challenges we face’ in ‘managing risks’ associated with flooding and coastal 
erosion, and to ‘influence the shaping of policy and strategy’.87 More specifically, 
the funding was to cover ‘proactive outreach to different coastal groups’, 
‘attendance at relevant national meetings’, ‘development of a statement on 
common issues amongst NVCC members’, and development of ‘basic principles 
on engagement between NVCC, central government and its agencies’; in return, 
DEFRA would require reports to be submitted giving updates on progress 
against ‘delivering’ these outcomes88. Noteworthy, here, is the use of the term 
‘delivery’ in this context, hinting at an expectation of a client-supplier relationship.  
Between November 2009 and October 2012, with CoastNet now formally 
appointed as its secretariat, NVCC attended various meetings with NE, the EA 
and DEFRA. These fulfilled two main functions – explaining respective positions, 
identifying issues, and discussing the basis of a working relationship89; and 
presentations on government policy, strategy and achievements90.  
The minute of a meeting between NVCC and the EA in May 2010 – the 
second such since NVCC’s institution as a membership organisation – records 
robust commentary from NVCC members on a range of subjects broadly 
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consistent with the more general policy points raised by Activist C (Happisburgh) 
in his CCAG ‘Coordinator’s Comments’ – poor government communication and 
community engagement practices, lack of compensation for homes lost and 
funding for coastal sea defences, confusing government structures, concerns 
around government’s use of evidence,  and a lack of public understanding of the 
subject. However, Activist C (Happisburgh) also reports that there is some sign 
that government departments are ‘catching up with each other’, and the minute 
ends with an unnamed EA official reported as saying that they need to start a 
‘deep dialogue’. Thus, a tone is set of frank criticism expressed through private 
communications, at least partially relieved by a willingness by NVCC to 
recognise positive change on the part of government, all underpinned by an 
acknowledgement on the part of government that a serious commitment to 
continued exchange is necessary.   
A subsequent EA event in January 2011 was designed to explain new 
government Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management (FCERM) funding 
proposals in advance of consultation and to give DEFRA officials the opportunity 
to understand the concerns of coastal groups. 91 Themes covered in this latter 
regard included government overheads and consultancy costs in the provision of 
sea defences; the lack of time allowed for consultation given the complexity of 
the subject; concerns that some communities would struggle to raise the 
necessary financial contributions under the proposed new funding arrangements; 
that the new proposals made no reference to funding for adaptation; that the 
interests of coastal communities would not be reflected adequately in proposed 
new governance structures; and what were seen as the effects of environmental 
regulation. Commitments to various actions were made by government in 
response, whilst the EA’s minute recorded that ‘community groups felt they had a 
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key role to play in encouraging community involvement and delivering bottom-up 
solutions’.   
It was noted that this was the first time that DEFRA had held a workshop 
of this type with community groups, and thanks were both extended to, and 
reciprocated by, NVCC attendees. Collaborative as this may sound, the use in 
the minute of the phrase ‘delivering bottom-up solutions’ in the context of the 
(unpaid) activities of a civil society group again surely invites attention to the 
potentially rather ambiguous nature of the relationship between NVCC and 
government. This language is the managerial shorthand of the public service 
delivery orthodoxy, and arguably reflects the expectations and relationships that 
attend it – which remained a source of concern for some members. 
Reinventing NVCC 
 
By the late Spring and early Summer of 2011, alongside evidence of an 
improving relationship with Executive Agencies, the thoughts of Activist C 
(Happisburgh) and others had turned to the challenges presented, variously, by 
the former’s announcement of his wish to step aside as chair, the expiry of 
government funding and, related to these developments, efforts at reconstitution. 
The recruitment of new members had proven difficult, and the retention of the 
attention and involvement of existing members was also becoming a cause for 
concern.  
During this period, Activist A (Selsey) and a colleague, on behalf of 
MPSG developed for discussion by the NVCC ‘hard core’ – a reference to 
Activist C (Happisburgh), Activist D (Jury’s Gap) and Activist E (Faversham 
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Road) – a marketing plan for a ‘new-style NVCC’ with the intention of making a 
bid for funding direct from NVCC to DEFRA.92 The document proposed that: 
 
NVCC has an opportunity to provide…Government with direct and unmoderated 
access to the grassroots of society affected by national policy on coast 
protection…NVCC would actually provide the likes of Defra etc. with an open 
window on their consultations, how they are delivered and received locally, and 
how communities genuinely feel about the plans and policies destined for them. 
It would be an immensely valuable engagement mechanism for Defra, EA, 
etc…NVCC can not only provide members with a tremendous amount of help, 
guidance, information experience and support but in doing so can also give the 
policy makers the vision and learning opportunities they need to shape future 
policy.  
 
Whilst identifying a funding requirement at that point of around £90,000, 
part of which would pay the salary of a part-time chair or officer, the proposal 
sought:  
 
…to build a model for a national organisation which can become self-sustaining 
and which may ultimately fund itself through its membership and other sources93. 
 
 
This prompted discussion as to priorities. In June 2011, Activist E 
(Faversham Road) wrote that: 
I have thought for some time…that we have been off the pace in terms of 
capturing the commonality in members’ concerns and configuring NVCC, its 
priorities and its activities around this…If we were to try to articulate the major 
points(s) on which we campaign, I suspect we might currently struggle…I am 
concerned that unless we grasp this nettle, then we risk a dwindling membership 
– irrespective of funding arrangements.94 
 
In response, Activist A (Selsey) observed that if the things current 
members want NVCC to do will not attract funding, then the group would ‘reach a 
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dead end fast’. By reaching out to new members for whom the issue is fresh and 
who need the sorts of things that government says it wants to deliver, he 
suggests, then NVCC will have a ‘product’ that government may want to buy 
into.95 
In July 2011 CoastNet circulated the copy of its final DEFRA Customer 
Insight report. In reporting to government on the various activities against which 
funding had been allocated, it confirmed that Activist C (Happisburgh) had 
responded to requests for advice from community groups in Essex, Norfolk, 
Cumbria and Devon, but observed that it took time to turn local groups around to 
a different approach, and that one place may have a number of different groups 
that have different perspectives. 96 Tellingly, National NGO official advances the 
theory that:  
 
…there were others out there but they didn’t want to put their head above the 
parapet because of issues within their own community about the impact on 
property values or starting to talk about these issues in a very open way. 
 
Such potential conflicts of interest were also to be found in his 
commentary on efforts to develop the common statement of member issues, with 
the report explaining that whilst debating and agreeing common issues had 
helped members to understand each other’s situations and perspectives, each 
local group had different experiences, and expertise and more time was needed 
to allow the group to develop more unified views. A difference of understanding 
with regard to the ‘rules of engagement’ was also hinted at, with the report 
explaining that the group was behind the ‘constructive engagement’ approach, 
but that views still differ within the group regarding how to approach engagement 
with DEFRA, EA and NE. 
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A significant portion of an NVCC meeting held in July 2011 was devoted 
to issues pertaining to the chairmanship of the organization; aims and objectives; 
resource options and NVCC’s future relationship with CoastNet.97 At this 
meeting, attended as Activist A (Selsey) was later to observe ominously by just 
‘the 5 of us’98, Activist C (Happisburgh) reiterated at some length what he saw as 
the benefits and achievements of NVCC – not least changes for the better in 
relationships with NE and the EA. However, he also acknowledged that the work 
of NVCC had reached a hiatus, and that it was necessary to discuss the future. 
He formally announced that he was to take a sabbatical as chair, and a proposal 
was made that Activist A (Selsey) should step in as acting chair subject to 
consultation of the wider membership. Funding was identified as a major issue, 
with a tension between views that NVCC should seek additional government 
funding and those proposing that it should seek funding independent of 
government. With the period of funding from government soon to expire, it was 
also decided that NVCC would not retain CoastNet as a secretariat.  
Subsequent to the meeting, Activist C (Happisburgh) advised against 
seeking direct funding from government, on the grounds that it would be 
unacceptable to DEFRA and also leave NVCC open to accusations of being ‘in 
government’s pocket’, although he qualified this with the observation that it was 
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perfectly legitimate to request expenses to be covered because there was an 
‘equality of arms’ case to be made.99  Activist A (Selsey) replied:  
If the consensus is that there shouldn’t be a paid officer/chair, and Defra won’t 
pay up, so be it – but it would mean someone else would have to volunteer as 
chair, rather than me. I simply can’t afford to take any more unpaid time off 
work.100 
 
At a meeting of NVCC in September 2011 Activist C (Happisburgh) 
proposed that it was very much time to reflect, regroup and restructure for the 
future. Findings of a survey of members, undertaken in July and August of the 
same year and eliciting responses from ‘a significant proportion of the 
membership’, were then presented. The survey had been designed to inform a 
conversation reflecting on what the group had done together thus far and might 
do together in the future against the backdrop of Activist C (Happisburgh)’s 
departure and the end of DEFRA funding. Results confirmed various aims for 
local groups, and raised the question of potential conflicts between, for example, 
protecting the environment and protecting communities, and local and national 
concerns; and the possibility and desirability of finding a coherent NVCC position 
from such diverse preferences.101 The survey found NVCC to have been ‘helpful 
to local groups’ and that members valued the access that NVCC membership 
has provided to senior officials. However, it was also noted that this raised 
questions as to the ends of such opportunities, and asked how NVCC might 
balance a desire to be constructive with the urge to challenge and protest. 
Tellingly, Activist C (Happisburgh)’s report of the meeting to the wider 
membership lamented time wasted on ‘the minutiae of local detail which pretty 
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much forestalled the possibility of achieving any constructive work 
on…reorganising the group’ and emphasised that NVCC was not open to 
individuals who may wish to use it as ‘a route to push their own, personal, 
grievances with Government’s coastal policy and approach’.  
At the most recent formal meeting of NVCC on 17 October 2011 it was 
broadly agreed by those present that NVCC must have a national focus, and it 
was accepted that a challenge lay in seeing how local grievances might relate to 
necessarily broad principles.102 Such concern it was felt, might be covered by the 
wish to: ‘put people back into coastal policy’, with its implicit suggestion that local 
coastal people are increasingly marginalised in policy decision making, contrary 
to government rhetoric. Discussion of involvement in a bid for project funding 
made by CoastNet saw cautious agreement to proceed.  In terms of 
organizational configuration, merit was also found in Activist C (Happisburgh)’s 
proposal that NVCC consider forming an executive group, arguably reflecting a 
growing awareness that the business of the group had fallen to a minority of 
active members.  
Then, in January 2012, National NGO official reported that CoastNet’s 
bid for EU funding for NVCC had been unsuccessful, but drew attention to the 
Big Lottery Communities Living Sustainably Fund. To paraphrase, he proposed a 
recommendation of interest on the basis of NVCC liaising with both national and 
local government and other bodies, to raise awareness of climate change 
adaptation and mitigation, to assess community vulnerability and capacity.103 
Response from NVCC members to this late proposal was lukewarm. 
Activist D (Jury’s Gap) expressed disappointment about the unsuccessful bid for 
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funding, as she considered it instrumental to NVCC’s future. Perhaps echoing 
the mood, she continued:  
 
Despite…endless passion and enthusiasm…most NVCC members are not in a 
position to fund themselves nor have they the luxury of committing endless and 
unpaid hours of their limited time to the cause.104. 
 
Activist E (Faversham Road) explained that he had become tired and 
demotivated, and considered undesirable the prospect of ‘the unhappy few 
shouldering the burden indefinitely’.105  Mindful of what she described as an 
apparent lack of enthusiasm displayed by some of its members, Activist D (Jury’s 
Gap) suggested putting NVCC into what she described as ’suspended 
animation’.106     
Nine quiet months later in October 2012, at the behest of the EA, Activist 
C (Happisburgh) and Activist D (Jury’s Gap) travelled to London to discuss 
proposed consultations on the Flood Incident Management Plan and Flood Risk 
Management Plans. However, in inviting concerns or comments from the NVCC 
membership in advance of the meeting, Activist C (Happisburgh) explained that:  
 
…it has been extremely quiet with Government (DEFRA/EA) taking a seemingly 
intransigent response and until now…unwilling to discuss the revised Coastal 
policy introduced last year…it is just as we told them in December 2010 – the 
policy may well be deemed to work by Government because it reduces 
dramatically funding for the coast but it certainly does not work for the people.107 
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Following the meeting, Activist C (Happisburgh) explained in an email to 
NVCC members that:  
…as the general consensus amongst us ‘Stakeholders’ is that consultations are 
pretty much a box ticking exercise…we concluded we would have a much 
greater effect if we officially declined to take part on the grounds that history 
shows that any such responses appear to be ignored…We very strongly put 
forward our position that, if we took part in said consultations, we felt we would 
be legitimising an overall policy for coast management which is unfair, divisive 
and blatantly inadequate…I am convinced that our actions will have a far greater 
effect on the machinery of government than just responding to consultations…If 
and when we manage to elicit a response from them I shall copy you in.108 
 
There is no record of any such response, and a subsequent invitation to 
attend a stakeholder event on the Triennial review of the EA and Natural 
England was not taken up by any representatives from NVCC.109   Hostilities, it 
appears, had been resumed. 
Discussion  
 
In settings where local interests are represented by proxy in the context of the 
setting of coastal policies, Fletcher (2007) notes that the channel of 
communication between representatives and citizens is weak, where it exists at 
all.  Cast in Tilly’s terms, we might ask simply whether ‘low-cost’ opportunity in 
this instance – predicated on unmediated interaction between government and 
coastal interests – was converted into influence over policy or, alternatively, 
whether the findings of O’Riordan et al (2009) are borne out: namely, that 
despite reported benefits to more participatory approaches to decision making 
(such as greater awareness of issues and improved understanding of other 
actors), ultimately ‘community’ actors feel they have wasted their time and effort.   
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We might also note that the creation and constitution of NVCC appears 
to have had potential in addressing issues around resources and capacities of 
various kinds as they apply to coastal groups and the question of adapting to 
change. Zsamboky et al (2011) observe that disadvantaged groups can lack 
capacity, with Foot stressing the need for people from deprived neighbourhoods 
to make alliance with those more affluent and socially influential. Again, the 
constitution of NVCC indicates potential for redress in the shape of support for 
member groups in responding to consultations and the provision of technical 
assistance. More specifically, a gap in the literature concerns the resource 
burdens for those from communities active in participatory deliberative 
processes, and NVCC’s engagement with government offers an opportunity to 
explore this in greater depth. 
Activist C (Happisburgh)’s belief that only by locales under threat coming 
together might things be changed assumes a commonality of interest amongst 
coastal groups that might be mobilized through NVCC. However, NVCC 
struggled to both recruit new groups, and to maintain the active involvement of 
some member organisations over time – broadly mirroring the trajectory of 
grassroots collective action in Selsey in terms both of eliciting broad and ‘hands 
on’ contributions.  
The testimony of National NGO official is instructive to this end, 
indicating both conflicts of interest within coastal locales as an explanatory factor 
for non-recruitment, and that the mobilization of interests had been inhibited by 
concerns over any potentially negative effects of action on local house prices.  
Within NVCC, identification of a consensus on member interests also 
proved difficult, with a tension emerging between the pursuit of local concerns 
and the imperative to develop a common position amongst members on which to 
engage government. Thus, NVCC might be said to have failed to some extent in 
this regard – both under its own terms, and those attending its ‘contract’ with 
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government.  Such evidence of disparity of interests appears to undermine 
government’s confidence in the idea of a single community perspective, on the 
one hand, yet may help to explain officials’ wariness of interest groups as they 
seek to balance the conflicting objectives of diverse stakeholders as identified by 
Milligan et al (2009) on the other. It also supports a concern that interest per se 
may not translate easily to mobilization, as assumed by government and central 
to the consultation orthodoxy employed in the Sheppey case.  
Turning to socio-economic factors as they relate to recruitment 
difficulties and the respective contributions to the NVCC effort of coastal group 
representatives, the Sheppey case raises the possibility of a cultural 
predisposition against coalition beyond geographical borders.  This is compatible 
with Milligan et al’s (2009) observation that some communities are ‘hard to reach’ 
– a finding that poses a particular challenge to Foot’s (2009) prescription 
concerning people from deprived neighbourhoods needing to make alliance with 
those from more socially influential neighbourhoods. To conclude on this point, 
whilst there is evidence that NVCC members found the resulting access to senior 
officials useful, and of peer learning having had value, any broadening of 
opportunity through increased membership did not happen to the extent 
envisaged. 
NVCC’s mobilization strategy as it applies to government pursues a 
distinctive trajectory. Always fluid, it might be said to have emerged from CCAG’s 
initially hostile and very public approach to seeking change, subsequently 
tempered by more conciliatory noises alongside evidence of more private 
engagement.  Then, with the launch of NVCC, came a plea from Activist C 
(Happisburgh) for greater understanding, meaningful dialogue and cooperation 
between actors. Subsequent documentation around encounters between NVCC 
and government records efforts at accommodation in these regards, whilst noting 
NVCC concerns broadly in line with early representations. However, tensions 
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prompted by the expiry of government funding and the need for reorganization, 
surfaced around the trade-offs implicit in adopting an organizational shape, 
purpose and strategy charged with satisfying both an urge to protest and the 
requirements of what might be seen to some extent as a government service 
delivery function. Ultimately, NVCC abandoned this approach for practical 
purposes, effectively declaring that the opportunity it afforded had not translated 
to the desired influence.  
For all that evidence supports to some extent the conclusions of 
O’Riordan et al (2006) and Milligan et al (2009) that involving local people in the 
setting of coastal policy results in improved relationships and greater 
understanding between the various actors, it also supports Foot’s (2009) 
conclusion over conflicting views as to how far communities and citizens can 
exercise substantial influence over decisions about public services and, more 
specific to this context, Milligan et al’s (2009) pronouncement that there is ‘no 
participatory panacea’. Calibration of NVCC’s influence on national policy using 
Arnstein’s Ladder (see Table 9) suggests that it fell short of ‘Citizen Power’ in 
that there is no evidence of the redistribution of power away from government, 
either generally or over a specific programme. Rather, any influence might be 
bracketed under ‘Tokenism’, with the sub-category of ‘consultation’ – 
characterised by authorities both seeking opinion from, and informing citizens. 
Notable, however, is that despite its potential as a step towards full participation, 
there are no guarantees in this regard.110  
Perhaps tellingly, Arnstein sees effective partnership as dependent in 
part on whether the group concerned has the financial resources to pay its 
leaders, and the mobilization of resources for making the case of coastal groups 
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effectively to government was a central preoccupation for NVCC and its 
members. Government funding made possible the retention of a secretariat; 
access to technical expertise; access to other actors through, for example the 
APPG; and the payment of travel expenses.  Thus, its expiry, and NVCC’s 
inability to replace it, must be understood as a major factor, although not the only 
one, in the group going into abeyance. Rather, organizational configuration in the 
shape of a historically significant reliance on the chairmanship of Activist C 
(Happisburgh) caused a related set of problems following his decision to step 
aside – in terms of the interest NVCC should serve, how it should be pursued, 
and the structure of the group and its relationship with government. Central to 
the latter consideration is the extent to which NVCC was reliant on the unpaid 
input of members representing coastal groups, with the sense that personal 
limits had been reached by the summer of 2011 irrespective of the provision of 
government funding, and confirmed emphatically during 2012.  
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Chapter 7: EXPERIENCES OF ACTIVISM  
 
 
There is very little to be found in the literature on coastal governance as to how 
local people organise themselves into groups, beyond simple references to 
‘community stakeholders’ (O’Riordan et al, 2006; Milligan et al, 2009) and 
‘representatives of the local community’ (Milligan et al, 2009). Consideration of 
the mechanisms by which authorities sought to include the interests of people 
potentially at risk in the setting of policy, and the ways in which the latter 
responded, suggests that the business of coastal action groups is undertaken 
typically by very few people.   In this chapter a ‘micro’ view is adopted in 
describing and comparing the reported experiences of action group 
representatives who have been active both within their respective local groups 
and NVCC – as well as those of others who, through working with them, offer 
salient perspectives.  
One purpose of this chapter is to broaden consideration of the 
importance of the work of individuals to organizational configuration and 
mobilization, and the implications of this in terms of how local interests are 
understood by authorities in the context of consultation and community 
engagement, with implications for engagement practices and ascription of 
legitimacy.   
Another key purpose concerns the mobilization of the resources 
necessary for collective action, and the implications for this in socio-economically 
distinctive cases of what appears to be the significant reliance of such efforts on 
individuals. A related question, and one with implications for considerations of 
the legitimacy of local representation, concerns the motivations of activists in 
taking on such responsibilities when others either cannot or will not.  
Analysis draws on Tilly’s Mobilization Model in structuring and comparing the 
accounts of individuals, with nuanced understandings of the individual 
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mobilization of less tangible resources pursued through the application of 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Capitals. 
 
A solitary activity 
 
The bulk of the work associated with activism in this context typically falls to few 
people, and sometimes individuals often working alone. Speaking on his 
involvement as a member of Save Our Selsey (SOS), Town/parish councillor B 
(Selsey) explains that the vast majority of the work was done by just two people 
– a testimony that is notable in being ventured by one not so closely involved in 
the work of the group at that time.  
Although it may not start this way, others having also made 
commitments may drift away – for example, once it is sensed that a crisis has 
passed or the issue become less obviously pressing. Whilst those activists 
remaining find the resulting burden onerous, the alternatives can appear to be 
less appealing still: their working habits, then, can be attributed at least in part to 
their own preferences, and they can be cautious about involving others in certain 
contexts.  
Activist F (Blyth Estuary)111 confirms this pattern in his own case, but 
explains that in his view the relevant effort did not need more than a few people 
– just him to look into the science, and writing to the Environment Agency (EA), 
and phoning and emails.  As we will see, however, this was a significant 
undertaking made at some personal cost, although perhaps one significantly 
buffered by the time granted him by retirement and, at first glance, what appears 
to be some financial comfort. 
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There is also evidence that some have tended to work alone by 
preference, although we must be wary of isolating this as an explanation for such 
eventualities. A journal entry from Activist E (Faversham Road) confirms a 
concern that he tended not to be very inclusive in his work, but also that with 
notable exceptions people had been slow to offer help.   
Activists are alert to the organisational difficulties posed by such working 
arrangements. Another journal entry made by Activist E (Faversham Road) 
concerning his ongoing chairmanship of the local residents association confirms 
that he felt it necessary for the base of the organisation to expand in terms of its 
scope and its involvement of people, in response to a nagging concern that he 
was over-reliant on his own judgment to the possible detriment of the longer-term 
health of the group. Activist C (Happisburgh) neatly outlines the dilemma facing 
activists in this regard, explaining in the context of the Coastal Concern Action 
Group (CCAG) in Happisburgh that:  
 
After the first year or two of the shakedown I went back to the group and said:  
‘Look, things are moving and I’m having to make decisions on the run. I can’t 
keep coming back to you because that automatically puts in a two week delay 
and I need to answer people’. 
 
As a consequence, he explains, he just ‘ploughed on’ in what he was 
convinced was the right direction.  Activist D (Jury’s Gap)112 confirms the view 
that activists relinquishing responsibility for tasks can bring its own problems:  
It’s very difficult to let some things go when you think you need to do them.  
You’ve got to get the right person along to a meeting ’cause otherwise it can do 
more damage than good.  You can’t have somebody go along to drop a spanner 
in the works. 
 
  Thus, it appears that on top of the problems of others not wanting to 
either take on or maintain significant involvement in activism, there is a danger 
 
112
 Interviewed in the garden of her house, which was dwarfed by the adjacent sea wall, Activist D 
(Jury’s Gap) is nearing retirement age, petite, and has a heavy German accent. Research notes 
record her description of herself as ‘private’, which may have made the prospect of interview 
uncomfortable, and a home that had a feeling of happiness about it.  
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that organizational configurations that typically see just a few people, or even 
individuals, shouldering the load can become self-fulfilling. Having invested so 
much in mobilization efforts, it appears that activists may become concerned that 
any gains might be undone without their oversight, or that opportunities are not 
being exploited or developments missed. It seems that the demands presented 
by the need to respond appropriately and in timely fashion to developments can 
preclude activists developing group capacity by ‘taking people with them’. This 
may help to explain the authorities’ apparently cautious attitudes towards 
grassroots groups, as discussed briefly in previous chapters. As we have seen, 
Foot (2009) reports that a fundamental question for Maguire and Truscott (2006) 
lies in establishing the legitimacy of those seen to represent communities which, 
in turn, draws attention to organizational factors such as how local groups are 
constituted, the strength of mandate enjoyed by their representatives, and the 
ways in which group decisions are made.   
  Besides evidence of scepticism on the part of authorities with regard to 
the legitimacy of grassroots representation, there is also evidence of a similar 
lack of faith arising amongst the very people activists seek to represent.  For 
some activists, a crisis can occur when they feel themselves to be squeezed 
between authorities they consider to be less than well disposed towards them, 
and local populations who fail to understand the approaches taken in dealing 
with the former.  
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With reference to the recalibration of his mobilization approach to a more 
consensual politics, Activist A (Selsey)113 explains:  
 
You’re stuck in the middle trying to explain ‘Look, that’s as much as we can get – 
I tried to get more, and I think on balance we should go for it’, and they might see 
it more simplistically because they haven’t been involved in the negotiation, so 
they’re saying ‘No, we want this, this and this.’  So then you feel like you’re in the 
middle between these two sides.  
 
 
  A letter from Activist E (Faversham Road) to the EA at regional level in 
2012 concerning the latter’s decision not to pursue remedial beach defence work 
suggests a similar dilemma, observing that local people there had been, and 
remained, cynical of the value of time spent trying to influence EA policy locally, 
and that he had always tried to persuade those of this disposition to engage 
constructively.  It goes on to articulate a fear that:  
 
…failure to deliver on this proposal, after such firm statements of intent, must 
undermine not only the Agency’s credibility with local people, but mine also.114  
 
 
  For some, then, mobilization strategy either has, or is likely to have, 
ramifications in terms of local support for action. In both of these cases, broadly 
‘constructive’ approaches to political engagement risk alienating other interested 
but less involved parties. 
 For Activist D (Jury’s Gap), however, ‘going it alone’ need not 
marginalise the group; rather, she sees group understanding and support as an 
essential condition for such organizational approaches to activism, not least as a 
guarantee of legitimacy. She explains that support in principle is important, even 
if the bulk of the work is left to the individual or individuals. The east Sussex 
 
113
 Research notes record that Activist A (Selsey) is wiry, grey-haired, in his 50s, and dressed as if 
he has been doing something practical (or is about to). He is twinkly-eyed, keen to talk and quick to 
laugh, but looks tired. His office in the eaves of his house is piled high with box files, and the walls 
dominated by maps. Overlooking his desk is a framed picture of Don Quixote, the symbolism of 
which seems unlikely to be coincidental. 
 
114
 Blunkell, C. 2012b. Faversham Road beach. {Letter] (Personal Communication), 30 May 2012. 
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group Defend Our Coast (DOC), she explains, had regular meetings where 
members would ‘catch up and prioritise’, and that whilst sometimes she had to 
make spot decisions when it was impractical to canvass widely, she is ‘pretty 
confident’ that in this way she was able to operate within her mandate. Activist C 
(Happisburgh) echoes this sentiment, stressing the significance of his being 
trusted to ‘make the right call’.  
Support from those around them, as well as from the groups they 
represent, can be essential for activists. Activist D (Jury’s Gap) explains the 
importance of the contributions of her husband and family to her activism. 
Activist C (Happisburgh) echoes this, gesturing during interview towards his wife 
who was ironing nearby as the only reason he had been able to do what he had 
done; we will see as this chapter proceeds, that the corollary to families providing 
essential support for activists, where that is the case, means that they also get to 
share in any sacrifices that are made along the way. 
 
Education and experience  
 
Review of the relevant literature pertaining to coastal governance suggests merit 
in consideration of populations’ ability to locate what Bourdieu conceptualises as 
‘cultural capital’ – specifically in this context the wherewithal to mount action on 
the back of a familiarity with, for example, relevant modes of professional 
conduct or even specialist knowledge. Given evidence that in ‘participatory’ 
settings local representatives can struggle to understand expert/technical 
perspectives, the education, backgrounds and professional lives of individuals 
bearing the brunt of collective action become particularly salient. 
Testimonies from activists suggest that formal education and 
professional specialisms can inform their work in a very direct way, although in 
this context it appears, for most, to be less relevant than a broad experience 
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which encompasses, for example, dealing with other professionals and speaking 
to large numbers of people and previous experience of contentious action. 
In terms of formal education activists demonstrate significant diversity – 
from Activist C (Happisburgh) who explains that he left school at the age of 14 
and had never taken an examination, to those with academic degrees and 
professional qualifications commensurate with the requirements of involvement 
in engineering (Activist F [Blyth Estuary]) bi-lingual translation (Activist D [Jury’s 
Gap]), secondary school teaching (Town/parish councillor C [Selsey]), surveying 
(Activist A [Selsey]) and corporate communications (Activist E [Faversham 
Road]).  
 There appears to be significant variance in the extent to which such 
educational credentials and associated professional specialisms have helped 
with the tasks associated with activism in this context. Activist D (Jury’s Gap) 
explains that she did not believe that her capacities in these regards had 
qualified her for the requirements of activism. At the time he became involved 
with SOS doing what he described as ‘dogsbody work’, Town/parish councillor 
(Selsey) B too felt he lacked specific skills – for example, in geography. Activist 
C (Happisburgh)’s professional experience is difficult to characterise: he had 
turned his hand to many things including driving buses and lorries, working as a 
parish clerk, and being Customer Services Manager and UK Sales Manager for 
a specialist car maker, none of which would appear to have obvious potential in 
terms of relevant specialist skills. 
By contrast, Activist A (Selsey) believes that his professional specialism, 
enhanced by a qualification in ecological conservation provided him with a 
grounding in finance and environmental issues which helped in discussions with 
officials. Activist F (Blyth Estuary)’s example, arguably, provides an even more 
straightforward relationship between professional competency (and its 
educational underpinnings) and his activism in explaining how he conducted 
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experiments that challenged the scientific evidence upon which policy was being 
made with regard to the Blyth Estuary. He was able to employ his professional 
expertise not only in questioning the judgment of the EA in declaring the walls of 
the Blyth Estuary unsustainable, but also in running his own scientific experiment 
in support of this.115  
Whilst activists bring to bear specialisms and academic backgrounds 
that vary in terms of their direct utility for collective action, the picture looks rather 
different in terms of how that experience furnished activists with contextual 
familiarity, or an understanding of the ‘field’ to use Bourdieu’s language, with 
regard to the political terrain. By way of example, Activist C (Happisburgh) 
mentions having acquired some idea of how local authorities work, as a 
consequence of having had ‘a few run-ins’ with them. Activist E (Faversham 
Road) was able to draw on long experience of working with central government, 
and drew upon this in deciding whether or not he might be effective as an 
activist, and so in deciding whether to take on the role. Whilst not yielding any 
specialism he found to be obviously useful, Town/parish councillor B (Selsey)’s 
work as a teacher and as a manager in a large school proved useful: 
 
Walking into a meeting with 10, 12 people, professionals, was never intimidating. 
Likewise, if you stood up and spoke in front of a couple of hundred people who 
gathered at the meeting having done assemblies in front of 250 kids, a couple of 
hundred adults is no problem! 
 
 
  Again, Activist F (Blyth Estuary) is able to provide a clear example of 
how understanding of the contextual terrain might be directly and usefully applied 
to his dealings with the EA. He explains:  
 
 
115
 Potentially of note is that other interviewees active on coastal issues in their respective 
locations but not involved with NVCC, such as Activist B (Sheerness/Sheppey), Town/parish 
councillor A (Sheppey) and Town/parish councillor C (Selsey/Pagham) cite practical experience in 
building and/or engineering, and their approach is notable for a focus on technical issues and 
practical innovation. We might also note their exasperation at the constraints placed by authorities 
doing what seems to be obvious in terms of defending from the sea. 
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Because I’m an engineer, I’ve always had to have an answer for people who said 
‘Why have you designed it that way? Have you considered this? Have you 
considered that?’ And I had to have an answer for everything – so I started 
phoning up their consultants. 
 
 
  Thus, a willingness to challenge professional specialists on details of 
their judgment appears to present no great challenge – either in terms of 
expertise or understanding of the cultural territory; rather, it is an unremarkable 
part of his day-to-day activity.  
  Whilst activists in this context have typically taken up causes in the past, 
such activity does not appear to stretch to formal, organized activism. Activist D 
(Jury’s Gap) cites previous involvement in local campaigns around free bus 
travel for school children and local school closures, whilst Activist A (Selsey) was 
previously active with his local branch of environmental campaign group Friends 
of the Earth (although this had been neither demanding nor effective in his view). 
He explains: 
I don’t obviously have any axe to grind apart from being an ordinary local person 
and finding that the proposals of the local authority are unacceptable.   
 
  Activist E (Faversham Road) had been involved in supporting the 
miners during the UK government’s programme of pit closures and associated 
industrial action in the 1980s, but had steered clear of the politically energetic 
groups that typified London student life at that time. Activist C (Happisburgh) 
appears to be no lover of organised collective action, although he demonstrates 
a rather individualist predilection for challenging authority. Commonly finding 
himself to be somebody that others will get behind in terms of contentious action, 
it may be of note that this is not necessarily a state of affairs he appreciates. He 
explains he had always had people ‘falling in behind’ him, and had always taken 
on the establishment in whatever shape it had taken, adding that:  
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I don’t like unions, I despise anybody that hasn’t got the bottle to stand up and 
speak for themselves.  
 
 Of course, this assertion sits in interesting juxtaposition with his belief of 
the need for coastal groups to work together, and the importance of giving 
vulnerable people a voice, as covered in previous chapters. More generally, we 
would have to work hard to identify any radical fervour in the testimonies of 
activists in this context; rather, their sentiments might be located broadly in 
mainstream liberal political discourse – a point to which we will return.  
 To conclude on the subject of experience, whilst any obstacles 
encountered, as in the case of Activist C (Happisburgh) in terms of education 
and his own view of his academic facility, or Activist A (Selsey)’s embarrassment 
at the prospect of mobilizing support, may act as disincentives to involvement, 
these are overcome through various means in these cases. Intriguingly, Activist 
C (Happisburgh) offers the judgement as to effectiveness as an activist in 
influencing decision making that you’ve either ‘got it’ or you have not. Perhaps 
tellingly, National NGO official strongly echoes Activist C (Happisburgh) in 
venturing the view that what has made activists effective or otherwise in the 
NVCC context is:  
 
…individual characters really – people’s approaches and past experiences, so 
very interpersonal things. Some people are good at it and some are not. 
 
 
The learning requirement  
 
The policy picture with regard to the coast is complex, and the actors various. 
Locating common ground between actors has been identified as a problem, not 
least as it concerns the limits to what people are able to understand (Milligan et 
al; 2009). Interviews with activists conducted for this study confirm that for some, 
if not all, activism and influencing policy requires significant learning – a 
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challenge clearly differentiated by background and existing levels of education, 
and which can be daunting and require massive effort by way of response. 
Activist D (Jury’s Gap) observes that: reading on the issue at hand represented 
‘a new subject’. Elaborating on this theme, Activist C (Happisburgh) explains:  
 
I had no idea of the extent to which I would have to learn – it was absolutely 
huge. The more I scraped the surface the deeper it became, and there was a 
point early on when I thought: ‘Oh, I can’t do this’.  You ask one question, you 
get an answer that poses three more questions, and you’ve got to go away and 
research and find out. I didn’t want to be bothered – I was totally pissed off with 
that.   
 
 
 This testimony comes from a man who left school at the age of 14 and, 
by his own admission no great reader. We will also see, however, that such an 
obstacle was not sufficient to prevent him from mixing with senior government 
officials, politicians and academics in some rarified settings, or indeed from 
presenting at an international academic conference. LA coastal engineer A 
(Selsey), confirms that Activist A (Selsey) also undertook what he describes as ‘a 
very steep learning curve’, whilst Activist E (Faversham Road)’s journal entry on 
the subject, made shortly after taking charge of the local consultation response 
effort for the local residents association, notes how much he feels he has to learn 
and wonders at the nature of the challenge facing others having to make the 
same rapid journey.  A background including an advanced academic degree and 
long experience of working with central government, clearly, had not removed 
the sting of the learning requirement. 
In contrast, Activist F (Blyth Estuary) gives no hint that the learning 
demands associated with his activism had been unduly challenging intellectually 
(although, as we will see, the time requirements had been significant), and we 
might note in this regard that his grounds for contest, as already discussed, are 
directly related to evidence gathered that draws specifically on his professional 
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competences and understanding of associated orthodoxies concerning scientific 
processes and practices.  
As we have already seen, both policy prescription and the testimony of 
local officials confirm the importance of informing the public in terms of the detail 
and implications of coastal change. We might also note the emphasis placed by 
Local Authority coastal engineer A (Selsey) on the merits of targeting individuals 
who are potentially useful in correcting misconceptions amongst the local 
populace. He explains that at one public meeting:  
 
We targeted a guy who is mouthy and often gets things wrong, but who can also 
be great for correcting others when they get it wrong. We said ‘come and have a 
chat’, and he was very good. 
 
It may appear self-evident that encouraging learning in this way might 
overcome issues attending people being asked to navigate an alien field.  
However, Activist D (Jury’s Gap) explains that she got no help from officials in 
the context of Jury’s Gap, although she also concedes that she didn’t ask:  
 …because I’m pretty stubborn, I sort of end up doing it myself, so I couldn’t say 
that I asked anybody because they had so far until that point they taken a ‘closed 
ranks’ approach that didn’t inspire you to go and ask. 
 
It would not be fair to ascribe indifference to the learning needs of local 
people to authorities on the basis of this evidence, although we might also note 
that in antagonistic situations there is perhaps something counter-intuitive about 
the idea of ‘learning’ from a party with which one has an issue, however 
indirectly.  
To conclude on this point, we might usefully make a distinction between 
the learning required to express a meaningful opinion in response to a 
consultation exercise, and that required to challenge the very basis of the policy 
– and at national level. Such learning, it is reasonable to assume, might 
encompass issues and principles of governance beyond what is considered 
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useful from technocratic perspectives for the purposes of a consultation exercise 
– a point to which we will return.  
 
The costs and returns of activism 
 
Activism in this context, then, tends to be a relatively solitary and highly 
demanding undertaking and, returning to the literature on coastal governance, 
Milligan et al (2006) stress the need for consideration of potential costs to those 
active in participative decision-making.  In representative settings, Fletcher 
(2007) suggests that negativity on the part of stakeholder representatives may 
be unsurprising given the reported significant additional workload implied. 
However, the resource burden for ‘community-side’ participants in decision 
making processes are given scant consideration. 
For those who get heavily involved in activism, there is evidence of 
significant personal costs in terms of time, working lives and earnings, health and 
family relationships. Such effects are differently borne, as with other aspects of 
the experience of activism in this context, and can have clear ramifications in 
terms of the costs to collective action, given the reliance of collective efforts on 
the work and personal investment of the individuals concerned. 
 
Time 
 
The testimonies of activists and officials alike confirm constraints upon time to be 
a key factor in people’s decisions whether or not to participate in collective 
action. Activist D (Jury’s Gap) observes that people having to earn a living are 
wary of committing more time.  Activist A (Selsey) echoes this sentiment, 
observing that:  
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Some people it’s time to try and change anything, and I think in the end even 
once that dawns on some of the people who are more keen, they think ‘Oh 
Christ, I’m whatever age I am, sod it – I’m not going to spend the next five years, 
or ten years, fighting this thing!  So, for various reasons, you end up with just a 
very few people doing it.  
 
 The time spent by activists on their work can be significant to the point of 
being overwhelming. Activist C (Happisburgh) estimates, conservatively, an 
overall time commitment of 13-14,000 hours, whilst Activist F (Blyth Estuary) 
suggests a figure of about 5,000 hours on relevant work between 2005 and 2011 
and about 3,000 hours since on research, reading and related group activities. 
Without putting figures on their involvement in this way, Activist D (Jury’s Gap) 
observes that, in terms of the time required, her activism has ‘taken over’ her life 
and, even the less involved Town/parish councillor B (Selsey) on his early work 
with SOS, that:  
 
There would be meetings, certainly, every two or three weeks.  I’ve spent 
perhaps nine or ten hours delivering leaflets, and we would be organising 
exhibitions, and we were doing other things like manning stalls and talking to 
people. 
 
 He explains that such activities could take up whole days – a point 
notable in drawing attention to the potential for competing demands on the time 
of activists, although being retired for much of his involvement appears to have 
eased this dilemma: likewise Activist C (Happisburgh) and Activist F (Blyth 
Estuary), although arguably to different degrees. Activist C (Happisburgh) 
explains that being retired he could find time; Activist F (Blyth Estuary) echoes 
this calculation, observing that his being retired meant that he was able to give 
‘more than most’, adding that activism conflicted with other commitments ‘only 
occasionally’.116  
 
116
 However, there is little in their respective testimonies to suggest a commonality of experience 
beyond this broad point; whilst the interview with Activist F (Blyth Estuary) took place on his twin-
masted yacht, that with Activist C (Happisburgh) was conducted in a static caravan in his back 
garden.   
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 Working arrangements that facilitate a degree of flexibility are clearly 
considered important by those activists still working for living. Activist D (Jury’s 
Gap) observes that it is hard to see how anybody who is not freelance or retired 
could possibly find the time to do it, an observation given weight by the fact that 
Activist D (Jury’s Gap), Activist A (Selsey) and Activist E (Faversham Road) all 
worked freelance at that time and so were able to juggle commitments to some 
extent. Activist D (Jury’s Gap) explains:  
 
The people I work for, they’ve now got so used to ringing me up and saying: ‘Is it 
alright to send you some work or are you going to a meeting today?’ 
 
  Activist A (Selsey) echoes this sentiment, explaining that as a self-
employed gardener/agricultural labourer, he is generally able to juggle his 
various commitments. However, such flexibility does not ameliorate the demands 
of activism for him. Of his experience as one of two activists elected to 
Chichester District Council as members for the ward of Selsey South on the back 
of the SOS agenda, he explains:   
The problem is, people will say ‘Oh you don’t spend that long doing actual 
council meetings and things’, and no you don’t – but you never know when a 
meeting is going to turn up.  Many of the people that you have to meet will only 
meet you in working hours, so that’s really difficult, and particularly if you’re 
mucky and all the rest of it.  You might be shovelling manure or something – it’s 
not easy suddenly to get changed into a suit and be somewhere for a meeting. 
It’s not as if you can just flit out of your office and in half an hour be sitting in 
another office, you feel ‘actually I need to make an impression on this person, so 
I can’t afford to turn up there sweaty and all the rest of it. And I need my mind to 
be clear and objective, so I actually need to go home, get changed, have a 
shower and then go out’ and that’s probably half a day by the time you’ve done 
that and then gone off somewhere else.  
 
  For all of the apparent promise of freelancing for the purposes of 
activism, then, such experiences are made distinctive by the nature of 
occupation (neither Activist D [Jury’s Gap] or Activist E (Faversham Road] report 
such difficulties with integrating the worlds of activism and paid work), with 
pressures on time exacerbated by social expectations of decorum as well as 
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logistical constraints. Nonetheless, all of those working report major setbacks in 
terms of earnings as a consequence of their activism. Activist A (Selsey) 
calculates that his income had dropped by something between a third and a 
quarter, and that it had not been good in the first place. Activist E (Faversham 
Road)’s journal records that, during a period of particularly intense activity, his 
earnings had ‘plummeted’. Activist D (Jury’s Gap) observes:  
Financially it’s crippling. It’s cost the earth – tens of thousands of pounds. 
Obviously, because I freelance, if I don’t work I don’t get paid. 
 
Health and well-being 
 
There can also be costs to the health and well-being of activists as a 
consequence of their commitment. One of Activist E (Faversham Road)’s journal 
entries reports being denied badly needed rest, and that during a period when he 
was particularly active with efforts to influence coastal policy he took extensive 
time off work – unpaid. Whilst it would be wrong to attribute this solely to the 
demands of activism, it would not have helped. Activist A (Selsey) refers to the 
‘emotional stress’ accompanying his efforts, and recounts a rather dramatic 
consequence:  
 
In the end I, actually blacked out, I had that much stress!  At the end of the week, 
the worst week, I just collapsed. It’s never happened before – I was speaking to 
my wife, and the next thing I know I was on the floor. 
 
  Not all effects on the well-being of activists are so obviously tangible, 
however. There is evidence of feelings of guilt associated with this work – the 
feeling that they are somehow sacrificing their families to this pursuit; through 
their lack of earnings, or attention, or both. Activist D (Jury’s Gap) observes that 
she had been fortunate in that two of her three children had already left home 
and so were not as affected by it as her third daughter before she left for 
university, thus underlining the obstacles to activism faced by those with younger 
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families. Activist A (Selsey) explains with regard to his family’s increased reliance 
on his wife’s earnings:   
It actually feeds into your sort of self-esteem that you’re not doing work, you’re 
not earning money.   
   
  It appears that a sense of self is confounded here, besides arguably more 
prosaic concerns around being unavailable for family purposes during evenings 
and weekends. Perhaps rather grimly, Activist C (Happisburgh) echoes this 
theme:  
It isn’t until you get to the other end of it that you realise what it’s done to you, 
and what it’s done to those around you – and when you kind of look at it like that, 
you do question in your own mind, was the price too high? If I had understood 12 
years ago exactly what that cost would be, and where I would be today both 
emotionally within myself and family etcetera, I would never have done it. 
 
  There are hints that such concerns are justified. Activist D (Jury’s Gap) 
explains her husband’s irritation at the regularity of incoming phone calls whilst, 
perhaps more ominously, Activist C’s wife explains:  
It has been difficult and there’s time when I’ve not been supportive, because it’s 
too much. 
 
The returns of activism  
 
If there are personal returns to be retrieved against the costs of activism as 
described here, they appear to be contingent on personal situation and are hard 
to quantify. Activist E (Faversham Road) had developed an academic interest in 
the subject predicated on his experience and accompanying knowledge in the 
context, as a consequence of which he had obtained employment and developed 
his research skills. As we have seen, Activist A (Selsey) had, perhaps less 
directly, seen a return on his efforts through the expenses paid him as a local 
authority councillor, although he reports no net financial benefit to this. Of note is 
that at a key point in the history of NVCC Activist A (Selsey) saw his further 
175 
 
involvement as contingent on his being paid; thus, a return might be said to be a 
matter of some importance to him, as it was for Activist E (Faversham Road). 
This is not universally the case, however.  Those retired or approaching 
retirement see the prospect of enhanced employability as an irrelevance.  
Activist D (Jury’s Gap) explains that she has no interest in making connections, 
although she concedes that her experience may help a younger person with their 
career.  To suggestions that he exploit his knowledge and experience 
commercially, Activist C (Happisburgh) replied that at the age of 69 he had no 
wish to be ‘charging all over the country’. His wife, who had been ironing nearby 
and occasionally contributing to the interview observes:  
 
 You know, he could be making a lot of money on it. That isn’t his angle on it, but 
by the same token it does go through your mind sometimes when you see 
people doing what they’re doing and charging a fortune for it – hey, why aren’t 
you doing this? 
 
  However, and changing tack, Activist C (Happisburgh) explains:  
 
I’d feel I was stabbing my community in the back – like I was jumping ship, like I 
was crossing the floor of the house. It wouldn’t sit right with me as a bloke. 
 
  A consideration of the motivations of activists may help to shed light on 
such a position. 
Motivations to activism 
 
Given the burden of responsibilities, stresses and privations associated with 
activism for some in this context, we might ask why some take up the challenge 
when, for the various reasons touched upon, others either do not or fail to 
maintain an involvement. This is a question important both for those seeking to 
make collective representation, and officials in the understanding and 
accommodation of such activity.  
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A key finding is that activists appear to share a sense of overbearing and 
insensitive authority, and of an injustice being perpetrated – of some tacit 
principle being violated. This appears to be more important than any formal 
ideological conviction, or experience of organized activism, as already 
discussed. No less importantly, this research casts some doubt on the broad 
conviction of those in authority that the key to people’s engagement with the 
subject is, to put it bluntly, solely self-interest. 
Activist D (Jury’s Gap), whose home was at risk from plans to abandon 
sea defences, describes herself as a person who will speak up when she thinks 
something is unfair. She explains with reference to Jury’s Gap:  
 
I don’t like old people who have worked all their lives being treated like a piece of 
garbage, and I think on the coast it just happens to be that predominantly there is 
an older generation that occupies coastal dwellings, who have worked all their 
lives to look forward to a nice retirement, to then be told ‘Hard luck, you’re going 
to lose your little bungalow because it doesn’t warrant any more to defend it’, that 
doesn’t make it right, does it? 
 
  If she is self-interested, her concern clearly does not end there. For 
Activist E (Faversham Road), a concern for the security of his family was further 
ignited by the anxiety, anger and feelings of helplessness expressed by his 
neighbours, and a sense of bullying authorities. Echoing such concerns, Activist 
C (Happisburgh) explains of his decision to become involved:  
The massive injustice of the situation – that was a great motivator. Little guys are 
getting walked on day in and day out – they count for nothing. What was 
abundantly clear in this situation that I found myself in ’99 was, here is a 
community – a lovely community – which is just being crapped on from the 
greatest height by authority, and they feel there is nothing they can do about it.  
 
  His own home was not at risk, and nor was that of Activist A (Selsey), 
who explains that he does not like authority telling the small people what to do. 
He adds:  
I was brought up in Selsey. I’ve lived here since I was two, so I’ve been off and 
on here for 48 years. This is the place I grew up in, I love.  This is where my 
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daughter’s growing up – no-one’s going to come down and tell me we’re going to 
lose it!  
 
Locality appears central to Activist A (Selsey)’s own story, and policy 
proposals as threatening to sever a thread that connects generations – a 
sentiment that operates in tandem with his perception of autocratic and powerful 
outsiders: he talks about ‘a bunch of suits’ telling people they were going to lose 
their homes and how this: 
 …gets my back up…So I decided fuck it! Fuck you, you’re not going to get away 
with this!  
As with Activist A (Selsey) and Activist C (Happisburgh), the propect of 
personal financial loss has no place in any explanation of the involvement of 
Activist F (Blyth Estuary). Rather, it might too be understood as a distaste for 
autocratic officialdom, with his anger spurred by EA consultants asking him why 
he was querying their data and, more broadly, a conviction that the government 
planned to abandon the coast of Britain based on flawed science. New evidence, 
commissioned by the EA and confirming his analysis, was ignored, he says, with 
the EA refusing to discuss it further.   
A geographical rendering of interest, as government seems to favour in 
its prescriptions, might favour activism emerging from a long association with the 
area – as with Activist A (Selsey). Interestingly, however, such ‘insider’ 
experiences do not commonly inform activism in this context. Both Activist C 
(Happisburgh) and Activist E (Faversham Road) had only lived in their respective 
localities for a matter of months at the time they became active on these issues, 
whilst Activist F (Blyth Estuary) was a relative newcomer in Walberswick having 
retired there in 1998, just a few years prior to his becoming active. And whilst 
Activist D (Jury’s Gap) was well established, she considered herself an outsider 
as a consequence of her German origin – not least as this had caused her 
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problems, for example with local people suggesting she should ‘go back to 
where she came from’. However, she also speculates that:  
 
Maybe it’s because I’m a foreigner, and maybe I have a different mentality, and I 
just will say something when I think it’s wrong.  
 
Foot’s (2009) observation that when people from deprived 
neighbourhoods get involved in tackling deep-rooted social problems, they need 
to persuade those from more socially influential neighbourhoods to ally with them 
may be instructive on this point, although perhaps not in an entirely literal sense. 
Overall, we might observe a recurring theme in the testimonies of activists which 
invites us to entertain explanations beyond those that seek to root interest in the 
risk of personal loss and geographical notions of ‘community’ and, instead, 
accommodate concern for the well-being of others and the shortcoming of state 
actions. This accords with ideas of ‘active citizenship’, with Crick (2007) offering 
a conceptualisation of citizenship located firmly in liberal society, citing Adam 
Smith’s endorsement of strong cultural restraints on the exercise of economic 
and political power. He goes on to argue that part of New Labour’s citizenship 
drive rested on the conclusion that a general ‘political literacy’ in schools would 
empower pupils: 
 
…to participate in society effectively as active, informed, critical and responsible 
citizens’ with the broader benefit  of an active and politically-literate citizenry 
convinced that they can influence government and community affairs at all 
levels’. (2007: 245).  Crucially, he concludes that it is only when we work 
together to defend the rights of others that we are acting as citizens (2007: 247).   
 
 
Allied to this, we might observe personal codes that, whilst they may not 
explain why people become involved as activists, may help with an 
understanding of why their commitment endures when that of others does not. 
For Activist D (Jury’s Gap), this appears to be tied to notions of citizenship and, 
in particular, the exercise of constraint on political power. Referring to her 
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continuing work as an activist subsequent to a welcome change of policy in her 
locale, she remarks:  
I remember one Shepway District Councillor saying to me years ago: ‘What are 
you still doing? You got what you wanted’. I said: ‘No I haven’t – because it 
doesn’t change the principle!’.  
 
Activist C (Happisburgh)’s continued efforts, in contrast, are predicated 
on the personal mantra that if he says he will do something, then he will do it.  
Activist F (Blyth Estuary) offers a variant of this that hints at a decision in this 
regard that, at least in part, is rational in its calculation of the costs and benefits 
of continued action, whilst still reflecting concerns commensurate with an ‘active 
citizen’ sensibility. He explains:  
A lot of people ask me – ‘Why do you bother?’. All I know is that having put six 
years effort into it, it is too important an effort to stop. 
  
Discussion 
 
The business of coastal action groups is typically undertaken by very few people. 
There can be various reasons for this: because it is understood that no more is 
required; because others are unwilling to commit themselves, or at least beyond 
a certain point; because the realities of activism preclude other approaches; and, 
tellingly, because those who do take up key positions find it easier to work in this 
way and may even prefer working alone and with relative autonomy. Whilst this 
arrangement can allow activists to accomplish things they consider unachievable 
through alternative organizational configurations, it may also present problems: 
in terms of a reliance on the resources of the few in important respects, 
difficulties with developing group understanding and skills, and relationships both 
within groups and between groups and other actors within the relevant polities.  
There can be significant economic and related costs to seeking 
opportunity through collective action in this way – not just for activists 
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themselves, but for those around them – which, if not cushioned by a relative 
financial affluence and the luxury of free (or at least flexible) time, points to a 
socially differentiated experience of activism in this context.  Calculations as to 
hours spent on this work can run into five figures, and mountains to climb are 
reported in terms of necessary learning. Activists speak of incomes slashed, and 
of issues with health and general well-being, and of note is that those who make 
and maintain heavy commitments are not necessarily those, in various senses, 
who can most afford to do so. Whilst there can be a return to the costs incurred 
by individual activists, for example in the shape of marketable knowledge or 
skills, this does not appear to apply to the retired or near retired, and for some 
the idea can offend the very basis of their activism. 
Retired engineer Activist F was able to mobilize a highly compatible form 
of cultural capital in a field with which he was clearly familiar. However, activists 
in less affluent areas typically feel less competent in relevant professional or 
educational specialisms, or may demonstrate no pre-existing familiarity with what 
Bourdieu refers to as the relevant ‘social space’ – the political terrain of coastal 
planning, and the various actors who populate it. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given 
this finding, many activists report a heavy burden in terms of developing the 
cultural capital required, which is only partly leavened by the relevant authorities 
in this regard – despite evidence of the efforts in this direction. In short, people 
who take on the task of activism may do so despite feeling ill-equipped for it and, 
more subtly, can feel a disconnect between the demands of the field and their 
own guiding dispositions. That activists struggle past such calculations invites us 
to look beyond what might be considered residual and static capital assets and, 
accordingly, simple and linear understandings of ‘capacity’ in terms of 
‘communities’ and their ability to involve themselves meaningfully in deliberative 
encounters.  
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Given such privations, the question as to why activists take on such 
responsibilities when others either can not or will not is of particular interest. The 
demands of making a living, concerns over lack of aptitude, or the prospect of 
sacrifices and a long and unrewarding commitment may be sufficient to limit or 
halt the involvement of some (indeed most).  Committed activists, however, 
seem prepared to confound ideas of habitus in pushing beyond what is familiar, 
comfortable, or even rational in terms of the calculation of costs and likely return, 
and to find accommodation with these new demands – however painful that may 
be.  
Officials and local politicians alike consider the protection of people’s 
own financial interests key to obtaining public attention in this context. However, 
this does not appear to be key in the cases of these activists. Rather, some 
ascribe a source of motivation to action as being a personal connection to the 
locale in question although, rather ambiguously, a proportion of activists 
considered themselves to be ‘outsiders’ in their own communities at the time 
their involvement commenced.  
We have seen that self-interest is regarded with scepticism by some 
officials in the Selsey case. Whilst it can be seen as the key to the attention of 
the public, it can also be regarded with some suspicion when it is seen to be the 
basis of representation in deliberative settings.  The organizational shape to 
which local action groups appear to default – that of a small number of very 
active people compelled by circumstance to rely significantly on their own 
judgement – is perhaps unlikely to allay any official concerns around the 
legitimacy of any such representation. Findings from the Selsey case suggest 
that not even the subjection of interests to the discipline of local democratic 
structures and processes may be adequate to alleviate such concerns. Given 
such realities, and alongside evidence of the plurality of local interests within 
locales, it becomes difficult to see how local interests might be acknowledged as 
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legitimate voices in coastal planning exercises. This, in turn, begs the question 
as to precisely how government’s stated aims of shifting decision making away 
from existing centres of power into the hands of communities and individual 
citizens (DCLG, 2008) and, more specifically, encouraging communities to have 
direct involvement in decision-making (DEFRA/EA, 2011) might be realised. 
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Chapter 8: CONCLUSION  
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to a critical understanding of the 
experiences of people living in coastal locations in England and Wales, and at 
risk as a consequence of coastal erosion, in trying to influence sea defence 
policy; and to discussions around government policy and practice. Drawing on 
evidence arising from a literature review and three case studies, it seeks an 
understanding of what Snape and Spencer (2003) consider to be subjectively 
meaningful experiences, and follows the prescription of Patten in venturing 
‘modest speculations’ as to the likely applicability of findings to other situations 
under similar conditions (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003) – for example, the relevant 
Marine Management Organisation (MMO) categories as described in Chapter 4. 
It also makes judgements and recommendations as to the policy and practical 
implications of findings for policy makers, public institutions, and relevant 
practitioners. 
This concluding chapter also considers the utility of the various 
renderings of social class considered for the purposes of this study – ‘traditional’ 
occupational class, Bourdieu’s conception of social class, and the application of 
‘consumption cleavages’ – in seeking to understand and calibrate evidence 
concerning the effects of socio-demographic factors in the planning and 
execution of deliberative exercises. Evidence is analysed to this end through the 
use, respectively, of Tilly’s Framework for Collective Action (1978) and Arnstein’s 
Ladder of Citizen Participation (1969). 
Our focus from the outset was on exploring how larger, well-resourced 
and better-connected communities might be better able to pursue their interests 
as community action groups, form alliances and influence policy decisions; and 
how socio-economic circumstance informs individuals’ willingness and ability to 
contribute to such efforts. This was pursued via three broad research questions: 
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• How successfully do authorities’ community participation practices 
accommodate people’s differing needs and concerns?  
 
• To what extent do social, cultural, and economic factors inform the 
abilities and appetites of people in locations at risk to take action to 
influence decision-making processes? 
 
• How do community action group representatives experience activism in 
this context, and what are the implications of this for their effectiveness? 
 
The relevant literature identifies housing tenure and associated loss as 
key themes around which social action might coalesce on this issue, and 
encourages further consideration of the ways in which social class informs 
individuals’ decisions as to whether and how to participate in collective action, 
the ways in which resource deficits manifest themselves and are addressed, and 
how affected populations organize themselves in defence of their interests and 
the implications of this for their effectiveness.  
 
Deliberative democracy and community participation 
 
“…America…is a world that teaches the primacy of the personal, of oneself, 
which ironically leaves people powerless. This country has always been saved 
by a new minority, who realize they’ve been robbed. In the process of righting 
their private wrongs, they have reanimated our public rights.” 
Nicholas Von Hoffman (Terkel, 1980: 280) 
 
Government policy prescription concerning coastal adaption and, more 
generally, localism, favours a pluralist politics that values the participation 
through deliberation of those affected by the resulting decisions. However, such 
calls for more participation and deliberation must not be assumed to deliver the 
prize of further democratization, and instead invite critical scrutiny.   
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Rootes (1997) identifies a crucial dimension in this regard to be the 
openness or closedness of states to input from non-established actors, which 
directs us towards considerations of deliberative models and their 
accommodation (or otherwise) of interested voices. Dryzek (2000) identifies two 
tendencies in deliberative democratic theory – one that is in step with liberal 
constitutional thinking, and a second, ‘discursive’ democracy, that is critical of it. 
Whilst there are features common to both, there are also important differences: 
at the core of liberal democracy lies the assumption that individuals are 
motivated by self-interest rather than any conception of the common good, and 
that diverse and incorrigible interests can be reconciled under a neutral set of 
rules. Deliberative democrats who traffic in ‘public reason’ want to restrict 
arguments to particular terms – for example, Rawls (1993) argues that citizens 
must conduct discussions based on values that others can reasonably be 
expected to endorse, so ruling out self-interest as a basis for participation. 
Rootes observes that: 
The responses of established political elites to collective action vary according to 
their perception of the legitimacy of the aims and social characteristics of 
collective actors and forms of collective action. (1997: 99) 
 
In contrast, discursive democrats propose that democratic legitimacy 
rests on inclusiveness and unconstrained dialogue, and that individuals should 
accept decisions only if presented to them in convincing terms. Accordingly, 
Dryzek (2000) argues that self-interested and instrumental positions should not 
be omitted, but instead be subjected to a process that allows for the mitigation 
and modification of such positions; reflection sees participants distance 
themselves from such concerns through ‘preference transformation’, thus making 
the process amendable to democratic control. 
Liberal democratic theorists argue that the reconciliation of liberal and 
democratic principles is in step with a culturally plural age, and that the 
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institutions of liberal democracy are the proper home for deliberation. In contrast, 
Smith (2003) looks to environmental politics in identifying contradictory values 
and discourses that are difficult to reconcile, whilst Dryzek (2000) argues that 
only ‘thin’ versions of deliberation can take place under liberal institutional 
arrangements. 
For example, cost benefit analysis is a favoured appraisal technique 
within liberal economic institutions faced with the problem of responding to a 
plurality of values. However, Dryzek argues that such processes fail to recognise 
that interests and values are shaped and constrained by the participants’ 
political, social and economic contexts. By such an analysis, the resources, 
experiences and expectations of participants become salient, as do processes 
themselves.  More generally, he points to the preponderance of technocrats in 
such processes, and directs attention to constraints upon public officials imposed 
by the liberal political economy, making them less inclined to accommodate 
competing discourses. 
Thus, mediators can be understood as playing a fundamental role in 
generating the conditions required for successful dispute resolution. Sunstein 
(Dryzek, 2000) argues that pluralism is undermined by social and economic 
imbalances, with Rootes (1997) confirming that participation in collective action 
is a minority activity. Accordingly, Dryzek argues that mediators must take an 
active stance, and assume a ‘public-creating responsibility’, and ensure that 
affected interests are suitably represented and able to engage with their 
constituencies. In contrast, he argues, a passive form of neutrality ensures the 
perpetuation of the status quo.  
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Deliberative democracy and policy discourse 
 
 
Policy discourse on coastal adaptation, in the wider context of political 
enthusiasm for localism, confirms tensions between competing deliberative 
democratic tendencies as well as omissions. 
For example, in stating that adaptation to coastal change should be ‘part 
of mainstream decision making’ (DEFRA, 2009b), government appears to 
identify the institutional structure of liberal democracy as the proper home for 
deliberation which, according to Dryzek, invites us to be alert to problems implicit 
in such arrangements. However, in the context of localism, government’s stated 
aim of passing more political power to people and away from existing centres of 
power (DCLG, 2008: 2) appears to support a discursive rendering of deliberative 
practice. 
In declaring an intention to support communities in adapting to change 
(DEFRA, 2009b), government discourse appears to be in step with Dryzek’s 
stipulation that authentic deliberation requires the effective participation of 
competent actors, although no explicit link is made between social and economic 
imbalances and the appetite and competence of people to make effective 
contentious representation on this issue. 
Government’s enthusiasm for people taking ‘an active part in what 
happens locally’ (DEFRA, 2009c: 7) appears to suggest direct citizen 
participation, although Dryzek warns that this is where stakeholder models are at 
their weakest. Government policy discourse is not explicit on what legitimate 
representation might look like; however, Community Adaptation Planning and 
Engagement (CAPE) guidance’s conflation of engagement with those most at 
risk appears to legitimise self-interest as grounds for participation, consistent 
with Dryzek’s prescription for discursive democracy but inadmissible under the 
liberal constitutional version as advocated by Rawls. Thus, how concerns around 
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participants’ self-interestedness are dealt with in the cases becomes especially 
salient. 
Interestingly, the trigger for inclusion according to CAPE is the 
propensity for those in locations of coastal change to mount, or threaten, 
contentious action which, in turn, raises questions about whether discourses that 
challenge those of policy owners are accommodated  and so, in turn, the nature 
of mediation. Government’s stated enthusiasm for making use of communities’ 
knowledge in finding ‘new ways of solving complex problems’ suggests an 
alignment with a discursive rendering of deliberative democracy, with the 
associated stress on the requirement for reflection and transformation on the part 
of all participants.  
This is pivotal, given Dryzek’s (2000) reading that authentically 
deliberative processes can be undermined by inappropriate institutional settings, 
expectations and practices. 
 
Community participation practices  
 
 
Academic literature raises issues regarding the ability of local people to influence 
state-led efforts to make coastal policy – whether that should be as a 
consequence of a reluctance on the part of authority to submit its interests to 
negotiated outcomes, the effectiveness of elected representatives, the power 
that various actors are able to bring to bear on making decisions and setting 
policy, or irreconcilable expectations of local influence on decisions. 
Overall, the literature appears to support the work of (Foot, 2009), which 
suggests conflicting views about how far communities and citizens can exercise 
substantial influence over decisions about public services  – whilst community 
respondents expressed positive feelings about the potential benefits of 
engagement, there was also frustration about barriers limiting their involvement.   
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Evidence from case studies supports this broad finding. In the Selsey 
and Sheppey cases the public was made aware of draft proposals threatening 
the loss of homes through comparable consultation exercises – consistent with 
those studied by Fletcher (2007) which saw communities find voice on decision-
making bodies via local elected representatives. Despite a broad parity in terms 
of opportunity for local interests to exert influence, this resulted in a stark 
disparity between the nature and volume of responses between the two sites: 
concerted collective action in Selsey resulting in changes to the draft plan, with 
little heard from those affected in the Sheppey case, and no amendments made 
to the plan.  
There is evidence of operating authority officials, local authority coastal 
engineers and elected representatives being attentive to the concerns of citizens. 
In the Selsey case, and acknowledged to be in part the result of local contentious 
action, the Operating Authority demonstrated the capacity and expertise to make 
decisions on a managed realignment scheme in a way that those involved found 
fair and satisfying. Such participation in structured engagement exercises 
suggests potential for developing trust and understanding between policy makers 
and citizens, supporting findings by O’Riordan (2006) et al and Milligan et al 
(2009). However, it was also observed by a key local activist that such an 
approach was applied only when local decisions had already been made that 
were truly important, over which concerns had been raised concerning decision-
making practices. 
More broadly, case study evidence draws into question a guiding 
assumption of UK governments, and guidance for coastal management 
specifically (EA, 2010) – that concern over interests will find voice through 
contentious action. Whereas such action occurred in Selsey, it did not on 
Sheppey, with the relevant consultation orthodoxy interpreting silence as an 
indication of acquiescence to policy proposals.  
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This is problematic. In the Sheppey case, it is difficult to see how 
Operating Authority advice against local authorities making early contact with 
those who might be adversely affected by decisions during the early stages of 
the process can be justified. Such a course of action surely calls into question 
the seriousness of any intent to ensure that opportunity was fully extended to the 
interests of local people in the making of policy – especially given that the insular 
social nature, relative deprivation and lack of political sophistication of parts of 
the island are widely acknowledged. There is evidence, also, that homeowners 
can be wary of mounting collective action as a consequence of concern over 
threats to the value of their properties, consistent with Zsamboky et al (2011) 
reporting concern over negative effects of coastal change on property prices, 
with Few et al  (2007) identifying homeowners as being in a group most 
vulnerable in this regard. This reflects, and even extends, Fletcher’s (2007) 
evidence that those participants representing the public interest in relevant 
decision-making fora had no direct method of seeking the views of the public 
except for informal ad hoc routes. 
A local authority actor in the Sheppey case expressed concern over the 
opportunities afforded local people and their elected representatives to influence 
decisions, whilst complaints about the deliberative process expressed through 
the formal consultation process appear to have been decided by appeal to the 
very same terms of reference that formed the basis of complaint. This reflects 
Fletcher’s (2007) concerns with regard to the robustness of decision-making 
processes in representative settings, and the lack of any formal system to 
identify misrepresentation.  
Turning to consideration of how local authority actors seek to raise 
awareness of issues of coastal change presented by preferred policies, there 
appears to be a commonly held view that appeals to people’s self-interest – for 
example, through articulation of the threat to homes – can be key to people’s 
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attention. There is merit in this approach, although this judgement comes with 
caveats.  
First, there is evidence that direct representation by local people is 
regarded with some suspicion, which directs attention to the question raised by 
Maguire and Truscott (2006) concerning the legitimacy of those seen to 
represent communities. More specifically, decision-makers can be wary of what 
they see as ‘single issue’ representations that may threaten the achievement of 
preferred outcomes. Importantly, such suspicions can also extend beyond 
grassroots action to formal local authority representation, which does not appear 
necessarily to fully legitimise local interests in the eyes of authority.117 By 
contrast, in the Sheppey case the polity was populated significantly with actors 
likely to be in sympathy with the policies preferred by the project owners, few of 
whom enjoyed a meaningful democratic mandate. Much the same criticism was 
levelled at the deliberative process as it applied to Selsey.  
Second, there is not necessarily any straight line between the 
identification of interest and its mobilization. Any threats to self-interest may be 
superseded by others such as those associated with poverty and unemployment, 
whilst the identification of interest appears significantly dependent on the clarity 
and urgency of the proposition. In both local cases, and reflecting the 
conclusions of Zsamboky et al (2011), a lack of clarity and/or immediacy can be 
linked to a lack of action. 
Local authorities can be valuable coalition partners, but this is by no 
means guaranteed. For all that Selsey activists’ pursuit of influence through 
membership of the local authority polity appeared to offer opportunities for 
‘partnership’ (characterised by Arnstein as involving the sharing of planning and 
decision-making through an organized power base, with financial resources for 
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leaders, in practice activists reported being at the mercy of party political 
concerns, and easily marginalised in efforts to influence local authority priorities 
and actions.  
Ultimately, central government ambitions of working in partnership with 
local people to find imaginative solutions to complex problems appear difficult to 
reconcile with official appeals to what is ‘pragmatic’ and ‘sensible’, as in the 
Selsey case, which appear to describe the limits to influence. 
At national level, initial enthusiasm for engagement with central 
government quickly gave way to scepticism as policies were approved that 
activists felt failed to deal with the problems they had identified, with the 
language in which the relationship was couched hinting at an understanding on 
the part of government that its relationship with the National Voice of Coastal 
Communities (NVCC) was, to some extent, similar to that between client and 
service provider. Evidence from relevant government actors on the rationale and 
experience of engagement with NVCC would doubtlessly have provided useful 
additional insights in this regard. 
Analysis of the various interactions explored for the purposes of this 
study, and calibrated using Arnstein’s typology (see Table 8), suggest that, in 
practice, and despite ambitions that encompass ‘partnership’, operating authority 
and central government deliberative practices on key points of policy might best 
be described as ‘tokenist’ (inviting opinion but with no guarantee that people’s 
opinions will be taken into account, and with information typically flowing from 
officials to citizens and little room for negotiation). 
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Social, cultural, and economic factors: abilities and appetites for 
action to influence decisions 
 
 
Although touching upon attitudes to coastal change, a review of the literature 
reveals little as to how local interests are mobilized, or their organizational 
configurations. There is little analysis to be found on how social class translates 
into action: however, what little there is suggests that this may be salient. Myatt 
et al (2003, 2003a) suggest a link between an occupational rendering of social 
class and awareness of and attitude towards change and its implications, and 
strength of orientation towards social action.  
Levels of collective response to proposed policy varied considerably 
between the two key local sites. In so far as changes were made in the Selsey 
case that were attributed to local representation, with no equivalent in the 
Sheppey case, there is support in the evidence for Foot’s (2009) conclusion that 
the benefits of engagement are distributed unequally: despite broadly similar 
approaches to engagement, responses were very different.  
In stark contrast to Sheppey, where a lack of action coincided with weak 
political skills and an appetite for isolation associated with deprivation, the Selsey 
case identifies a group of activists prepared to mobilize wider collective action. 
Mobilization in Selsey also reached beyond geographical borders in encouraging 
coalition with other, similarly concerned groups, and both central government 
scrutiny of the relevant deliberative process and lobbying representation at 
national level. However, whilst Selsey was comparatively successful in 
mobilizing support for action, this dissipated quickly, and in terms of hands-on 
contributions, was largely characterised by participation in relatively 
undemanding tasks.  
How might such issues around identification and mobilization be 
resolved? At local level, vehicles in the Selsey case such as Medmerry 
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Stakeholder Advisory Group and the Manhood Peninsula Steering Group were 
considered successful to some degree in mitigating such inequalities. At national 
level, NVCC appeared to offer potential in addressing issues around difficulties 
with the mobilization of resources in this context – for example, through support 
for member groups in responding to consultations and the provision of technical 
assistance. However, difficulties experienced by NVCC in recruiting coastal 
groups raises the possibility of cultural predispositions against such coalition in 
some locations, exacerbated by issues around funding, and suggest limits to 
such arrangements in mitigating socio-economic differences.  
Town and parish councils appear to have potential in this regard at local 
level, however. Besides appearing to offer respite from the entanglements that 
can accompany party politics, imaginative and well-resourced town and parish 
councils can galvanise, represent and mobilize resource in support of local 
interests. However, they are clearly no panacea for concerns around weak local 
representation: the case of the failure to constitute a town council for Sheerness 
in the Sheppey case raises concerns that the existence of such institutions is at 
least partly contingent on preferences and resources rooted in the local socio-
economic complexion.  
 
Experiences of activism and the implications for collective action 
 
 
When at the ‘Coastal Communities at Risk’ conference in July 2009 the Minister 
responsible for flood and coastal erosion management explained that 
government was willing to engage with coastal communities, in exhorting those 
community activists present that ‘It’s up to you!’, he was closer to the truth than 
he may have realised. Evidence from case studies suggests that the business of 
coastal action groups is typically undertaken by very few people. There are 
various reasons for this – the reluctance of others, because the day-to-day 
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realities of activism preclude other approaches, or because activists feel more 
comfortable working in this way. To some extent this appears to justify 
suspicions with regards to legitimacy entertained by authorities. However, for 
some communities this may be the difference between interest being identified 
and acted upon or not; that such suspicions can remain even when the same 
interests are picked up by formal democratic bodies suggests that the issue may 
not, at root, be one of democratic mandate. 
Key activists and those around them – for example, their families – can 
shoulder significant costs. These people are not typically cushioned by affluence 
and all that can bring, and evidence of differentiated experience of activism 
suggests that, in this context at least, there is merit in revisiting the conclusion of 
Clarke et al (2002) that activism is a middle class, middle-aged activity. 
Activists in less affluent areas typically feel less competent in relevant 
professional or educational specialisms, or may demonstrate no pre-existing 
familiarity with Bourdieusian ‘social space’. Rather, many report a heavy burden 
in terms of developing the cultural capital required: that they do so encourages 
us to look beyond residual and static capital assets, and linear understandings of 
‘capacity’ in terms of communities and their abilities to involve themselves 
meaningfully in coastal planning. That committed activists push beyond what is 
familiar, comfortable or even rational in terms of likely costs and return – 
however painful that may be – invites consideration of motivation that extend 
beyond personal and immediate concerns, to more abstract notions. 
 
Social class, coastal change and collective action 
 
  
Overall, findings tend to support Della Porta and Diani’s (2006) findings that it is 
difficult to identify any new primary basis for social conflict, and the 
circumspection of Saunders (1990) and Touraine (1981) in stressing the 
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difficulties of unpicking occupational class relations from conflicts pertaining to 
post-industrial societies. 
The literature coincides with the idea held by local authority coastal 
officers and elected representatives, that occupational class is an important 
determining factor in people’s level of engagement with coastal issues as part of 
formal consultation exercises.  Myatt et al (2003a, 2003b) identify retired and 
professional people as being more active on local issues, whilst Zsamboky et al 
(2011) find a link between disadvantage and both a low interest in, and capacity 
for, adaptation to coastal change. To an extent, occupational status is also useful 
to explain people’s involvement in activism in that many people appear to make 
decisions based on competing time commitments and priorities, and the 
occupational skills they might bring to bear. Communities such as West 
Wittering, comprising affluent professionals with free time, appear to have little 
trouble either in mobilizing economic resources to contribute to the outcomes 
they would like to see in comparison to Selsey.  
However, whilst the inability, or reluctance, of people to contribute to 
collective action beyond a certain level can be partly explained by an area’s low 
occupational skills base, an experientially more compelling reading is offered by 
that of an emotional class response (Sayer, 2005) to the challenges presented 
by an unfamiliar political terrain and actors. 
Bourdieu’s rendering of social class extends beyond any notion of static 
and residual resources. Besides relative affluence, occupational skills and the 
free time associated with retirement, the community at West Wittering was seen 
as being highly familiar with the political terrain – a local collective habitus, then, 
that sits in some harmony with the relevant social field. By contrast, at Selsey a 
reading of awareness based on an occupational understanding of social class is 
enhanced by evidence that dissonance between habitus and field – or to use 
more straightforward language, what activism requires of people and what they 
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feel comfortable doing – negatively influenced the extent to which people 
participated in collective action, assuming that they elected to do so at all. In the 
Sheppey case, such a reading may help to explain an instinct for isolation that 
arguably militated against the kind of coalition building seen by Klandermans 
(1993) as essential in effective mobilization, and particularly so for those from 
deprived neighbourhoods (Foot, 2009). This supports the latter’s point that 
people may exclude themselves from engagement with government on the 
grounds that they do not fit – a case of silence indicating not acquiescence to the 
policies proposed, but a class-based unease with the processes and terrain of 
deliberation, and what it appears to require of them.  
However, whilst an analysis can help explain people’s 
interest/involvement in collective action, it doesn’t necessarily explain the 
trajectories of activists themselves, which is crucial given that collective action in 
this context appears typically to be concentrated in the hands of very few people. 
The majority of activists interviewed reported that such activity made significant 
demands on them in terms of the time required and income sacrificed – both of 
which can be tied to an occupational reading of social class. Significant 
obstacles were also reported that extended beyond such a reading, however – 
for example, in reading and learning habits, persuading others of a point of view, 
or making presentations to politicians and academics. Here, a Bourdieusian 
reading assists an understanding of a gap between habitus and field – of 
dissonance between individual disposition and the requirements of field.  It does 
not explain why activists consider what is required of them; understand that it is 
uniquely demanding, unfamiliar and even frightening; and, unlike others, decide 
to proceed anyway. 
Instead, there is evidence of a consumption cleavage as a motivation to 
action in that activists report concern at the risk to homes arising from 
government decisions not to protect them indefinitely (with it being implicit that 
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other areas, and thus other people’s homes, will continue to be protected 
significantly from the public purse and as a consequence of public management 
decisions). Again, however, such a cleavage only explains the involvement of 
key activists up to a point, which is important given the difficulties that activists 
appear to have in persuading decision-makers of their legitimacy. Rather, 
activists are significantly motivated by a powerful shared distaste for what they 
see as an autocratic and external officialdom that, for example, refuses to 
discuss scientific evidence that contradicts the rationale for their judgements. 
Whilst this is not the only motivation of activists, there is a palpable 
sense of activists reacting against what Touraine (1980) identifies as ‘domination 
by the apparatus’, and evidence that they identify with Crick’s (2007) concept of 
a critical ‘active citizenship’ with its emphasis on influence on government and 
community affairs that is, by definition, considerably broader than the self-
interest so warily conflated with collective action by operating authority actors.  
 
Implications for policy and practice 
 
Overall, the setting of coastal policy appears to be significantly at odds with the 
stated aim of 21st century UK governments’ to give power to citizens on issues of 
great importance to them. Rather, responsibility for sea defence has been 
removed from local authorities and given instead to central government. 
Ostensibly, local citizens have a voice on deliberative fora; however, for all of the 
appearances of pluralism, the evidence instead supports the conclusion of 
O’Riordan et al (2009: 2011) that agencies and authorities are not willing to give 
up power to negotiated results – at least when it matters the most. 
Operating authorities have demonstrated a capacity for deliberative 
practices that are considered to be satisfactory and fair, and can help to mitigate 
the effects of resource inequalities. An approach satisfying the tenets of Localism 
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must surely extend such engagement practices to considerations of overall 
strategy and, in so doing, make room for perspectives and ideas extending 
beyond the ‘pragmatic’ and the ‘sensible’, and the ‘usual suspects’ in terms of 
genuinely influential stakeholders. Given government’s stated enthusiasm for 
grassroots democracy, the absence from major coastal planning fora of town and 
parish councils as key stakeholders is curious to say the least. Whilst uneven in 
their constitution and effectiveness, town and parish councils appear to have vital 
potential in raising awareness of issues around coastal change, for sidestepping 
obstructive issues around party politics, and for both identifying and mobilizing 
local interest.  
This might partially alleviate, although not necessarily dispense with, 
concerns over the rigour and legitimacy of local representations. As typically 
configured in this study, community representation can be dependent on the 
work of few activists, with concerns over legitimacy appearing to risk self-
fulfilment: in short, where the relevant resource is in short supply, and formal 
representation weak, it is hard to see what more acceptable representation might 
look like. Alternatively, if the legitimacy of local interests must be subjected to the 
kind of scrutiny observed, and such anxiety exercised over their threat to the 
safe passage of preferred policies, then it is reasonable to suggest that other key 
interests be treated in similar fashion, with particular attention paid to the spread 
and relative weight of interests.  
However, it is unlikely that any incremental reform – up to and including 
the adoption of more participatory deliberative practices – will deal successfully 
with the fundamental issue, that under the prevailing arrangements some people 
stand to lose their homes uncompensated whilst others are protected 
substantially by the public purse. Such concerns, tied to those around the ways 
in which decisions are made, underpin sustained local representation, and only 
the adoption of an adaptation model that sees risk shared is likely to solve the 
200 
 
issue. As Milligan et al (2009) stress, there is no panacea to be found in 
participation alone. 
Overall, it is difficult not to conclude that the hand of the centre is not so 
much hovering over the tiller, as Corry and Stoker would have it (Blaug et al, 
2006), as hanging onto it for dear life – at least on deciding the essential design 
of policy. Operating authorities are both mediators of deliberative process, and 
proxies of a dominant interest minded to seek coastal change. More generally, 
we might observe that local authority actors – both elected representatives and 
officers – appear to have to juggle support for policy making processes with 
support for citizens who may have issues both the with what is being proposed, 
and the processes employed in making such decisions, and with no obvious 
mechanisms for redress. This is clearly unsatisfactory, given that the extreme 
implications of decisions for those involved.  
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APPENDICES 
  
APPENDIX A 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR ELECTED MEMBERS 
Primary questions Follow up questions 
Is sea defence an issue in the Borough/Ward 
and, if so, why? 
Are people at risk of losing their homes under 
preferred policies? 
How would you describe your interest and/or 
role in the setting of coastal policy with regard to 
sea defences – for example, through Shoreline 
Management Plans or Coast Defence Schemes? 
Do you have a formal portfolio responsibility? 
 
 Have you taken part in consultation or made 
other representation to relevant decision 
makers? 
 What has been your experience of trying to 
influence relevant decisions? 
Have you been approached by local people 
concerned about policy with regard to sea 
defence? 
If so, who approached you, how were 
approached and what were the nature of their 
concerns? 
 How did you acted on those concerns? 
 
Have you been approached by/worked with 
other democratic bodies on this issue? 
 
In your view, do people and their elected 
representatives have an adequate say in the 
setting of coastal/sea defence policy? 
If so, what works well? If not, why do you think 
that is, and what might be done about it?  
 
What plans are in place to help people who are 
likely to lose their homes under preferred 
policies? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ACTIVIST INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Question Prompts 
What are the issues re: coastal policy 
where you live? 
 
How have people in your community 
worked together on this issue? 
 
How keen have you found others in your 
community to get involved in this issue? 
 
How have others involved themselves? 
 
What do you think has prevented others 
from involving themselves? 
What has this work required in terms 
of resources? 
Time 
 
Money 
 
Expertise 
 
Have you found what you need within 
your community, or have you had to look 
for help elsewhere? 
How did you come to represent your 
‘community’ on this issue? 
 
What are your personal motivations? 
 
Do you have a background or skills that 
is suited to this work? 
How does this work affect the rest of 
your life? 
 
What are time implications of your 
involvement? 
 
Are there family implications? 
 
Are there any effects on your wellbeing? 
How successful do you think your 
work has been? 
 
By what measure(s)? 
 
Do others in your community think your 
work has been rewarded in meaningful 
ways? 
 
How have you found dealing with 
authority on this issue? 
 
How would you say authorities are 
motivated in their approach to community 
engagement? 
 
How would you describe dealing with 
bureaucracy and the official decision-
making process? 
 
What has been your experience of 
your involvement with NVCC? 
How and why did you get involved? 
 
How useful was your involvement with 
regard to the issues you face in your 
area? 
How successful was NVCC in realising 
its aims? 
 
 
 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR OFFICERS AND POLICY MAKERS 
Primary questions Follow up questions 
How are the interests of people whose homes 
are threatened by coastal erosion, or proposals 
to realign or abandon, accommodated in policy 
decision-making processes (e.g. SMPs or coast 
defence schemes)? 
 
 
 
 
 
Whose responsibility is it to make sure this 
happens? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What practical measures are taken to ensure this 
happens as it should? 
 
 
 
 
 
Media? Letters? Visits? Meetings? 
How well would you say that such people’s views 
were taken into account in the relevant 
SMP/CDS?  
 
 
 
 
 
What challenges does it present? 
What plans are in place to help people who are 
likely to lose their homes under preferred 
policies? 
 
 
 
 
 
Regeneration/adaptation schemes? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX B 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
UK Coastal Policy And Experiences 
Of Community Engagement 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research on Climate Change, UK Coastal Policy 
And Experiences Of Community Engagement. This sheet gives you more information about 
the purpose and conduct of the study. 
 
The interview is part of research that is being conducted by Chris Blunkell as part of his 
doctoral studies with the Working Lives Research Institute at London Metropolitan 
University.  The research aims to explore the experience of UK coastal ‘crunch’ 
communities, and the individuals who represent them, in seeking traction in policy decisions 
concerned with ‘adaptation’ in response to climate change and associated state planning. If 
you would like any further information on the project or you would like to raise any issue, 
please contact Chris at: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The interview will last no more than one hour. It will explore: 
 
• how people in your community have worked together in trying to influence coastal 
policy 
 
• how you came to represent your community 
 
• how you fit your community work into the rest of you life 
 
• the results of your community representation work 
 
• your experiences of dealing with authority. 
 
Attached to this sheet is a form that you will need to sign to give your consent to participating 
in the project. Although you will not be identified by name in any report produced, the 
interview will be recorded and you are asked to give your consent to this. You are also asked 
to consent to any direct quotes being used in the research report, although these will be 
anonymised. With your permission we would like to name your organisation as having 
participated in the research in the final report, although we will not directly attribute 
information in a way that identifies it. Data collected on interviewees will be securely stored, 
in compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and in accordance with European Directive 
95/46/CE. Interview and personal material stored electronically will be anonymised using a 
coding system, and will be accessible only to the researcher. Any data held in paper files will 
also be stored securely, with access limited to the researcher. Once the project has been 
completed the recordings and interview notes will be kept securely by the researcher, but will 
have been anonymised so as to protect identities.   
 
Many thanks for taking time to read this sheet and for agreeing to participate. 
 
 Interviewee Consent Form  
Research Project: 
UK COASTAL POLICY AND EXPERIENCES OF 
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
Name of Interviewer(s): Chris Blunkell 
Contact Details of 
Interviewer(s): 
Tel:
 
  
Name of Interviewee:  
Job Title:  
Organisation:  
Relationship to Project:  
  
Research Objectives 
 To explore the experience of UK coastal ‘crunch’ communities, and the 
individuals who represent them, in seeking traction in policy decisions 
concerned with ‘adaptation’ in response to climate change and 
associated state planning. 
Do you consent to…(Please tick) YES NO 
The recording and transcription of the interview?   
Your organisation being named as participating in the project?   
Direct quotes being attributed to you by the above job title?   
(Other write in)    
Signatures  
Interviewee:  
Interviewer:  
Date of Interview: /               / 
 
 Please complete and Sign TWO copies of this form. One copy to be 
retained by the interviewee and one by the interviewer for future 
reference. 
 
 
 
 
 
